Errant thought: on philosophy and its past by Wetherall, Graham
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications   
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/142712 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Errant Thought:  
On  
Philosophy and its Past 
 
by 
 
Graham Wetherall 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
University of Warwick 
Department of Philosophy 
April 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents 
  
 
 
ii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................. IV 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................... VI 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... VII 
ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................................... VIII 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1 
0.1 Philosophy and its History: Two Recent Orientations .............................................................. 1 
0.2 The Incubation Time of Thought and the Significance of Historical Difference ....................... 5 
0.3 The History of Error ................................................................................................................. 7 
0.4 Overview ............................................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER ONE. DESCARTES: ERRANCY INTER DEUM ET NIHIL ........................................................ 13 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 13 
PART ONE: DESCARTES AND THE TRADITION .............................................................................................. 14 
1.2 Against the Tradition ............................................................................................................. 14 
1.3 The Prejudice Against Prejudice ............................................................................................ 17 
1.4 The Subject as Measure ........................................................................................................ 20 
1.5 Error as the Implicit Ground of Historicity ............................................................................. 21 
PART TWO: ERROR IN THE FOURTH MEDITATION ........................................................................................ 24 
1.6 Error as an Anomaly .............................................................................................................. 24 
1.7 Error and the Faculties: Intellect, Will and Judgement .......................................................... 26 
1.8 Who errs? .............................................................................................................................. 31 
1.9 Inter Deum et Nihil: Descartes’ Theodicy .............................................................................. 34 
1.10 Descartes and the Tradition Revisited ................................................................................. 38 
1.11 Conclusion to Chapter One: Method’s Belated Arrival ........................................................ 40 
CHAPTER TWO: KANT’S LOGIC OF ILLUSION AND THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL METAPHYSICS ............ 43 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 43 
PART ONE: KANT AND THE TRADITION ...................................................................................................... 44 
2.2 The Errors of the Metaphysical Tradition .............................................................................. 44 
2.3 Errancy, Science and Revolution ............................................................................................ 46 
2.4 The Posteriority of Critique .................................................................................................... 48 
PART TWO: KANT, ERROR AND ILLUSION ................................................................................................... 53 
2.5 The Lectures on Logic ............................................................................................................ 53 
2.6 Error as an Anomaly .............................................................................................................. 54 
2.7 Kant’s Critique of Meier: The Positive Ground of Error .......................................................... 56 
2.8 Against Absolute Error .......................................................................................................... 59 
2.9 Illusion as the Ground of Error .............................................................................................. 60 
2.10 Transcendental Illusion in CPR: Is the Dialectic Redundant? ............................................... 64 
2.11 Reason as a Source of Concepts (The Transcendental Ideas) .............................................. 68 
2.12 Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion .................................................................... 72 
2.13 Is Reason a ‘Faculty for Committing Errors?’ ...................................................................... 74 
2.14 Conclusion to Chapter Two: Belatedness, Posteriority and Ultimacy Revisited ................... 76 
2.15 Intermezzo: The Economy of Cognition and the Economy of Truth ..................................... 80 
CHAPTER THREE. HEGEL’S ONTO-LOGICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ............................................. 85 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 85 
PART ONE: HEGEL’S PROJECT OF A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ................................................... 86 
3.2 Prelude: History in the Differenzschrift .................................................................................. 86 
3.3 The Philosophy of the History of Philosophy ......................................................................... 91 
3.4 The Parallel Between History and Logic ................................................................................ 94 
PART TWO: LOGIC AND HISTORY, NEGATION AND TIME ................................................................................ 97 
3.5 The Science of Logic .............................................................................................................. 97 
3.6 Kant and Hegel on Dialectic ................................................................................................ 100 
 
 
iii 
 
 
3.7 ‘The Abstract Opposition between Truth and Error’ ........................................................... 103 
3.8 Refutation and One-Sidedness ............................................................................................ 107 
3.9 The Incubation of the Idea .................................................................................................. 113 
3.10 Negation and Time: Historical Difference and Incubation ................................................ 118 
3.11 Conclusion to Chapter Three: Hegel’s Challenge to Philosophy ......................................... 120 
CHAPTER 4. HEIDEGGER’S ERRANT HISTORY OF BEING ................................................................ 123 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 123 
PART ONE: THE HISTORY OF BEING ........................................................................................................ 124 
4.2 Prelude: Destruction in Being and Time .............................................................................. 124 
4.3 The History of Being ............................................................................................................ 128 
4.4 Ontological Difference and Ontotheology ........................................................................... 132 
4.5 Ontological Difference and Historical Difference ................................................................ 134 
4.6 Beginnings ........................................................................................................................... 138 
4.7 The First Beginning and the Forgottenness of Being ........................................................... 139 
4.8 The First Beginning and the Incubation Time of Being Historical Thinking ......................... 143 
4.9 The Other Beginning ........................................................................................................... 147 
PART TWO. HEIDEGGER AND THE ESSENCE OF (UN)TRUTH ......................................................................... 151 
4.10 The Usual Concept of Untruth ........................................................................................... 151 
4.11 The Open Region ............................................................................................................... 157 
4.12 Untruth as Concealing ....................................................................................................... 163 
4.13 A-letheia and the Clearing for Self-Concealing .................................................................. 167 
4.14 Untruth as Errancy ............................................................................................................ 169 
4.15 Errancy and History ........................................................................................................... 172 
4.16 Conclusion to Chapter Four: The Doubling of Untruth ...................................................... 178 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 181 
5.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 181 
5.2 Heidegger’s Failure I ............................................................................................................ 183 
5.3 Heidegger’s Failure II ........................................................................................................... 189 
5.4 Prospects ............................................................................................................................. 192 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 195 
 
  
 
 
iv 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This thesis was written with the generous support of the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). I 
am grateful to them for giving me the opportunity to pursue this project. 
I would like to express my thanks to all of the teachers who stoked my 
intellectual curiosity over the years and helped shape my approach to philosophy. 
Particular thanks are owed to Professor John Horton for introducing me to 
philosophy and encouraging me to pursue my academic interests further. I am 
especially grateful to my supervisor, Professor Stephen Houlgate, not only for 
introducing me to Hegel and German Idealism, but also for teaching me the supreme 
value of patient engagement with philosophical texts. Without his unwavering 
support and the atmosphere of intellectual rigour and freedom he created both in his 
classes and among his graduate students, this thesis would not have been possible. I 
am also particularly grateful to Professor Anton Friedrich Koch for welcoming me 
among his students in his Oberseminar at Heidelberg University.  
Among my friends and fellow students, special thanks are owed to Benjamin 
Berger, whose friendship and enthusiasm for this project have helped me through 
some difficult times; and to Richard Lambert, whose intellectual companionship and 
friendship have been crucial to me during my time at Warwick and beyond. 
Outside of Warwick, my particular thanks to my close friends, Théophile 
Aries and Christopher Rowley. 
I would also like to thank the following people, all of whom played crucial 
roles during my time as a PhD student, both within academic circles and beyond: 
David Allen, Stephen Barrell, Michela Bordignon, Wesley Chai, Joseph Clarke, 
Alexander Englert, Dino Jakušić, Elisa Magri, Daniel Menchaca, Justin Neville-
Kaushall, Marianne Nossel, Victor Ogilvie, Federico Orsini, Georg Oswald, Bethany 
Parsons, Sue Podmore, Simon Scott, Carmen De Schryver, Alex Tissandier, Nikolas 
Schnellbächer, Roberto Vinco, Barnaby Walker, Han Wang, Clare Watters, and 
Young Woo Kwon.  
Thanks also to my sisters, Alaine and Marie, and to their families: Justin, 
Joshua and Isla Wells, and Tom Watson.  
 
 
v 
 
 
I am eternally grateful to my partner Ana Grujić, whose patience, 
encouragement, and companionship saw me through the final years of this project. 
And finally: I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Rose and John, whose love, 
understanding and support made it possible.  
 
 
vi 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
This thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another 
university 
  
 
 
vii 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis consists of two major strands. The first addresses a series of questions 
concerning philosophy’s relation to its own past, chief among them: Why does 
philosophy have a history? And how can philosophers take account of their past, 
situating themselves as part of an ongoing tradition? The second strand constitutes an 
investigation of the concept of error. What is error? How can we explain its origin, 
and to what extent is it a necessary feature of thought? 
Contrary to initial appearances, I show that these two sets of questions are 
intimately connected. Throughout the modern era, accounts of thought’s historicity 
have frequently hinged on the concept of error. It is by appeal to the concept of 
error—and thereby to the idea that thought sometimes goes astray, falling short of 
truth—that a vast majority of modern philosophers have attempted to explain the 
historicity of thought. To ask after the ground of historicity and the status of 
philosophy’s past thus requires us to pose the question: what is error, and how does it 
arise? An examination of accounts of human errancy thus allow us to better 
understand the nature and scope of thought’s historicity. 
 As such, the thesis constitutes both a history of philosophy’s approaches to its 
own past, and a history of the concept of error. It takes the form of a critical 
reconstruction of this conceptual constellation, with a view to renewing the question 
of the relation of philosophy to its past by way of a reappraisal of the nature of error.  
  The thesis is divided into four chapters, each of which is dedicated to a major 
figure from the Western tradition: Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger. In each 
case, I demonstrate that their respective approaches to the question of philosophy’s 
historicity is reflected in the status of error in their thought.  
 For both Descartes and Kant, the historicity of thought arises from the 
tendency of thought to fall short of truth. It is thus thanks to error, conceived of as a 
kind of epistemological waste product, that philosophy becomes historical. It is the 
task of philosophical method to overcome this shortfall, thus liberating philosophy 
from its historicity. I argue that this attitude prevails in many philosophical quarters 
to this day, making of thought’s historicity at best a secondary matter.  
 By contrast, Hegel and Heidegger both adopt approaches according to which 
historicity is intrinsic to the nature of truth itself. I show how Hegel’s concept of 
negativity on the one hand, and Heidegger’s notion of ontological errancy on the 
other, come to supplant the notion of epistemological failure, treating historicity as a 
fundamental characteristic of being.  
 I argue that this notion of a ‘history of truth’ allows for a new relation 
between philosophy and its history, in which the latter is not merely dismissed as a 
kind of accidental waste-product of thought. At the same time, I show how both 
Hegel and Heidegger’s specific approaches to the history of philosophy are 
characterised by shortcomings which prevent them from adequately responding to 
the questions they raise.  
 In spite of these shortcomings, I argue that philosophy ought not abandon the 
idea of a connection between historicity and error. Instead, it is necessary to raise the 
question of the status of error anew, while at the same time seeking to expand the 
scope of the history of philosophy beyond the confines of the Western tradition.  
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Introduction 
 
 
‘Throughout history, philosophy has never ceased to do 
violence to its history, sometimes joining forces with it, 
sometimes violently divorcing itself from it, modifying 
its historiography and slowly becoming aware of the 
problem created for it by the existence of its history.’ 
Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a 
Philosophical Problem.’1 
 
‘We have no logic of error, no real clarification of its 
essence, because we always take error as negative. This 
is the fundamental error that dominates the entire 
history of the concept of truth.’  
Martin Heidegger, ‘Being and Truth.’2 
 
 
0.1 Philosophy and its History: Two Recent Orientations 
 
With what must philosophy begin? This question—fundamental to philosophers as 
diverse as Descartes, Hegel, and Heidegger—continues to animate the historical 
development of philosophy. In recent years, for example, European philosophers have 
begun to question the emphasis that mid-twentieth century thinkers placed upon 
thinking historically, as if one could not philosophise without perpetually engaging 
with the history of philosophy. Alain Badiou speaks eloquently for this new 
 
1 The Monist, Volume 53, Issue 4, 1 October 1969, pp. 563–587; p. 574. 
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), p. 177. 
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movement3 when he argues that ‘philosophical presentation must initially determine 
itself in the absence of any reference to its history.’ He continues: ‘Philosophy has to 
have the audacity to present its concepts without first arraigning them before the 
tribunal of their historical moment.’4  Thus, playing on Heidegger’s notion of the 
‘forgetting of being,’ Badiou advocates a deliberate ‘forgetting’ of philosophy’s past:  
 
For my part, I shall propose a violent forgetting of the history of philosophy, thus a 
violent forgetting of every historical assemblage of the forgetting of being. A ‘forget 
the forgetting of the forgetting.’ This imperative to forget is a matter of philosophical 
method, and of course not at all of ignorance of this history. Forget history: this means, 
above all, making decisions of thought without turning back towards a presupposed 
historical meaning that has been set for these decisions. It is a matter of breaking with 
historicism so that we may endeavour, like a Descartes or a Spinoza, to produce an 
autonomous legitimation of discourse. Philosophy ought to decide its axioms of 
thought and draw the consequences. Only after so doing, and on the basis of its 
immanent determination, should philosophy summon its history.5 
 
Badiou’s point is clearly not that we should simply ignore the history of philosophy. 
Far from it—his texts attest to his own ongoing engagement with the history of 
philosophy.6 Rather, he advocates the insulation of ‘first philosophy’ from this history. 
For Badiou and those sympathetic to his perspective, the ‘decisions of thought’ must 
be carried out in a kind of historical vacuum, according to a measure which is 
thoroughly ahistorical. Only retrospectively can we then turn to examine their relation 
 
3 Badiou is merely one example of a contemporary continental philosopher whose project either 
explicitly advocates or else implicitly entails a strict separation between philosophy and its history. 
Similarly, Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude, with its attempt to move beyond the ‘correlationist’ 
paradigm, essentially implies that the problems of hermeneutics and deconstruction belong to 
correlationism. His attempt to ‘break the correlationist circle’ in the direction of the ‘great Outside’ 
thus implies a similar break with historicity. See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the 
Necessity of Contingency (London: Continuum, 2010). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Alain Badiou, Conditions (London: Continuum, 2008) p. 5. 
6 One need only consider what Badiou calls the ‘textual meditations,’ the engagements with figures 
from the history of philosophy, in Being and Event to see this confirmed, while equally confirming the 
limits of this engagement. Badiou stages readings of a range of figures from within the Western 
tradition; and yet he insists that they are strictly insulated from the ‘conceptual meditations’ and the 
‘meta-ontological meditations’ which make up the remainder of the work. All three strands of the 
work can be read in abstraction from one another; crucially, for Badiou, there is no strict relation of 
dependence between the historical and ahistorical components. See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, 
(London: Continuum, 2005) p. 18 ff. 
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to the history of thought. This history must never itself be allowed to serve as a kind 
of measure for philosophy; nor is philosophy obliged to account for this history at an 
immanent level.   
 From a certain perspective, this orientation toward the history of philosophy 
can be seen as following in the footsteps of Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation, 
On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. There, Nietzsche poses the 
question of the philosopher’s relationship to history in ethical terms, with an 
orientation toward the conditions under which human life and culture can flourish, and 
above all with an orientation toward the future. He writes: 
 
knowledge of the past has at all times been desired only in the service of the future 
and the present and not for the weakening of the present or for depriving a vigorous 
future of its roots.7  
 
Contemporary philosophers who seek to return to a Cartesian or Spinozist 
‘beginning’—those who wish to ‘cut ties’ with the past in order to bring about a new 
way of thinking—exhibit an ethical orientation toward history, i.e. an orientation that 
concerns itself with the future and looks to the future precisely by turning away from 
the past. 8  Much like Nietzsche, Badiou suggests that a focus on the past risks 
‘weakening’ present philosophy, and uprooting its future.  
 This thesis is motivated by a concern with what might be lost by pursuing such 
an ethical orientation toward history. For the Nietzschean who seeks to put the past ‘to 
use’ in service of the future fails to ask the question regarding what the past is. ‘What 
is the past?’ This ontological question differs from Nietzsche’s ethical question, which 
treats the past solely in terms of its utility, without asking after its essence.  
 I am by no means suggesting that it is here, in this thesis, that the question of 
the being of the past is first raised. On the contrary, it is my view that the recent, 
Nietzschean turn in European philosophy can be understood as a reaction against the 
 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 77. 
8  Nietzsche’s point certainly cannot be dismissed lightly. Periodically, philosophy has undergone 
renewals precisely by casting off its past in the name of a new beginning. This freedom from the past 
sometimes seems to be a condition of doing philosophy, as Badiou asserts. Nietzsche’s question remains 
vital: how much of a memory can we endure, before it becomes injurious to life? In terms of philosophy, 
this can be restated: how much can philosophy focus on its own past, without thereby being rendered 
impotent, as Badiou suggests? Yet behind the ethical question lurks an ontological one. Even if we are 
to look away from this past, what is this past from which we look away? 
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major current of twentieth-century European thought in which engagements with past 
texts came to form a necessary component of philosophical practice, in some cases 
even coming to supplant the traditional tasks of first philosophy. In the hermeneutic 
and deconstructive traditions, it is precisely through an engagement with past texts that 
philosophical questions are first raised. To ask after a specific concept or problematic 
always involves turning to an examination of its historical articulations. In a remark 
which could be applied to a far broader range of thinkers from the twentieth-century 
European tradition, Jean-Luc Nancy notes that ‘in the final analysis (and although 
neither Heidegger nor Derrida ever explicitly say so), perhaps deconstruction means 
this: from now on, philosophy cannot be absolved from the question of its own 
historicity.’9 It is precisely this deconstructive orientation toward history which Badiou 
has in mind when he states that ‘philosophy today is paralysed by its relation to its 
own history.’10 That is, philosophy cannot make its way to any new sort of future. 
 Those sympathetic to Heidegger, Derrida, Nancy and the general 
deconstructive orientation toward history might respond that the only possible relation 
to the future as future will necessarily involve the kind of profound attention to the 
past displayed in deconstructive thought. Although this thesis is largely motivated by 
the deconstructive tradition, it does not take the approach of arguing that the past must 
be understood for the sake of the future. On the contrary, it seeks to simply understand 
what it means to question the nature of the past and thereby to suggest an alternative 
orientation toward past history that is ontological rather than ethical. To be sure, 
Heidegger ultimately subordinates the question of the past to the question of the future 
through his emphasis on the possibility of the ‘other beginning;’ and the same might 
be said of Derrida’s reflections upon that which is always ‘to come.’ In both cases, 
there is thus a clear echo of Nietzsche’s ethical orientation which sits uneasily with 
other aspects of their thought.11 Indeed, it seems that the ontological question of the 
 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Philosophy Without Conditions,’ in Peter Hallward (ed.), Think Again: Alain 
Badiou and the Future of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 44. 
10   Alain Badiou, Conditions (London: Continuum, 2008),  p. 4 
11 Indeed, in spite of its close attention to past history, much continental philosophy in the 20th century 
was predominantly concerned with the possibility of holding open the possibility of a history yet to 
come, and was thus explicitly oriented towards the future. This concern with the future dominates 
Heidegger’s thought, and has also become a major motif in recent Hegel scholarship. See in particular 
Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic (London: Routledge, 
2005).  
 
 
5 
 
 
past has only rarely been posed in its own right, without reference to this ethical 
problematic. 
Thus, one of the fundamental aims in this thesis is to take a first step towards redressing 
a relative neglect of the question concerning the ontological status of the past. I take it 
that neither Badiou on the one hand, nor the deconstructive tradition on the other, 
possess the conceptual resources to raise this question adequately. Instead, I claim that 
the terms in which this question must be raised can be found in a series of key figures 
in Western philosophy, whose thought decisively shaped the terrain on which 
contemporary continental philosophy unfolds.  I thus turn to a specific historical 
development—from Descartes through Kant and Hegel to Heidegger—in which the 
history of philosophy is thematised and gradually comes to take centre stage in the 
practice of philosophy itself. Thus, throughout this thesis, we will be concerned with 
the relation of philosophy to its own history—or more specifically, to its past.  
 
0.2 The Incubation Time of Thought and the Significance of Historical 
Difference 
 
One of the perplexing questions that confronts us as soon as we turn our attention to 
philosophy’s past is why thought should take time. Following Heidegger, we will refer 
to this as the question of incubation. In his lecture course The Principle of Reason, 
Heidegger raises the question of the ‘incubation period’ of this most fundamental of 
principles. He asks why it should have taken so long—more than two thousand years—
for such a simple principle to come to expression. He writes:  
 
This formulation of the principle of reason was first mentioned and specifically 
discussed in the course of those meditations Leibniz carried out in the seventeenth 
century. In the West, however, philosophy has been reigning and transforming itself 
ever since the sixth century BC. Hence it took two thousand three hundred years until 
Western European thinking actually discovered and formulated the simple principle of 
reason. How odd that such an obvious principle, which always directs all human 
cognition and conduct without being stated, needed so many centuries to be expressly 
stated as a principle in the formulation cited above. But it is even odder that we never 
wonder about the slowness with which the principle of reason came to light. One 
would like to call the long time it needed for this its "incubation period": two thousand 
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three hundred years for the positing of this simple principle. Where and how did the 
principle of reason sleep for so long and presciently dream what is unthought in it?12 
 
Here, Heidegger poses the question of the strange paradox of apparently atemporal, 
eternally valid laws of thought that nonetheless emerge at a specific point in history. 
How is it that a principle as fundamental as the principle of reason should have 
remained undiscovered by thought for so long?   
Heidegger thus points to the inherent strangeness of the discovery of a 
fundamental, timeless law of thought at a certain point in time—in this case, Leibniz’s 
discover of the principle of sufficient reason. In this thesis, we generalise Heidegger’s 
concern regarding the ‘incubation time’ of thought. When philosophers claim a certain 
privilege for their own philosophical projects, how do they explain the delay in the 
arrival of those projects? If each philosopher claims to establish a previously 
unattained understanding of what is true, how can they explain their place in an 
ongoing tradition? 
The question of the incubation period of thought is further complicated by the 
fact that the history of philosophy is not characterised by a linear, cumulative 
development, but is constituted by a series of often conflicting and mutually exclusive 
positions. In other words, the history of thought is fundamentally differentiated. 
Throughout this thesis, we refer to this form of difference as ‘historical difference,’ 
and we suggest all philosophers must address it in one way or another. Indeed, whether 
a philosopher appeals to some timeless truth or emphasises the irreducible historicity 
of truth itself, the question remains: how can we take into account the radical 
differences between past systems of thought? Are such differences simply contingent, 
such that philosophy’s past can be brushed aside as a series of mistakes which need 
never have taken place? Or is there something about this historical difference that is 
itself necessary? 
In what follows, we will put all of these questions to four thinkers: Descartes, 
Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger.13 We will thus ask, on the one hand, how each of these 
 
12 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason (Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 4. 
13 This selection is by no means random. As we will see, Descartes typifies the ‘ahistorical’ view of 
philosophy, advocating an absolute breach with the past. It is significant that Badiou should invoke 
Descartes as an ally on this score. In the following, I will suggest that through Kant, Hegel and 
Heidegger, the question of the past comes to greater prominence; and it is only through an engagement 
with this philosophical heritage that the question of the past can be adequately posed. 
 
 
7 
 
 
philosophers accounts for the ‘incubation time’ of their own thought; and, on the other 
hand, we will be concerned with how they account for the existence of a tradition 
characterised by multiple, mutually exclusive philosophical positions. Such questions 
may seem obscure. Yet this makes it all the more remarkable that all of the thinkers 
examined in this thesis offer up significant answers to them. Moreover, as will become 
clear, in all four cases, the incubation period of thought and historical difference are 
bound up with the status of error in their thought. 
 
0.3 The History of Error 
 
Martial Gueroult argues that the concept of error first came to be explicitly 
associated with the historicity of philosophy in the wake of Christianity’s growing 
cultural and intellectual dominance in Europe. He notes that the advent of 
Christianity was decisive in bringing philosophy to explicitly reflect on its own 
historicity, since it introduced the idea of a rupture in time, dividing the tradition into 
a ‘before’ and ‘after’: 
 
For the first time, philosophical consciousness, drawing together its past in a solid 
block as profane or pagan philosophy, projected it into times past and judged it as 
historical, in short, gave it the coloration of history and of temporality that ancient 
historiography, which was nothing but nontemporal erudition, let go unnoticed. For 
the first time, and above all, the problem of the value of philosophy's past was 
brought before the philosophical consciousness.14 
 
Gueroult divides Christian philosophy’s response to this issue into two major forms: 
historia stultitiae and historia sapientiae. Historia stultitiae ‘makes a nullifying 
value judgment on tradition, but it thereby keeps it as the history of the aberrations of 
the human mind, in order to show the weakness of that mind when left solely to the 
light of its own reason.’15 In other words, historia stultitiae treats the history of 
philosophy as a product of a human tendency toward error. Even as it engages with 
this history, it does so purely as a warning, a kind of precautionary tale intended to 
 
14 Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem,’ in The Monist, Volume 
53, Issue 4, 1 October 1969, p. 575. 
15 Ibid., p. 576. 
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delimit mankind’s pretentions to knowledge. The past is preserved as a series of 
errors that must be remembered insofar as they constitute a warning; one learns from 
this past in the name of a better present and better future. He contrasts this with 
historia sapientiae, which treats the history of philosophy as an expression of man’s 
eternal wisdom, in spite of its imperfections. 
 The idea that the history of philosophy is a product of error provides an 
intuitive explanation of both historical difference and the incubation period of 
thought. If truth is taken to be univocal, while the history of philosophy consists of a 
series of conflicting and contradictory positions, the most obvious explanation is that 
many of these positions are false, the product of thought straying from the path to 
truth.  The ‘time taken’ by thought is simply the time it takes for thought to overcome 
its tendency to err—to eliminate distortions to thought, whether they are contingent 
or in some sense made unavoidable by the nature of human thought.  
This approach to history is present, implicitly or explicitly, throughout much 
of the modern era, and indeed in much contemporary philosophy.16 In his 1964-65 
seminar, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, Derrida sums up its basic 
logic: ‘[o]nly knowledge, and not truth, would be historical, and it would be so only 
to the extent of its distance from truth, that is in its error.’17 In other words, the 
historicity of philosophy is understood as a product of thought’s falling short of truth. 
The concept of error, then, is essential in explaining why there is a history of thought 
and why this history is (in some sense) incompatible with knowledge of what is true.  
The word ‘error’ is closely related to the term ‘errancy.’18 The latter can mean 
wandering or roaming in a neutral sense, but also going astray in the sense of making 
a mistake. Conceived as a history of error, the history of philosophy is thus 
frequently described in terms of thought’s straying from the true path. We will 
encounter this metaphor of errancy at various junctures throughout this thesis. Kant, 
for example, understands his critical project in terms of putting metaphysics on the 
‘royal road’ after centuries of errancy. And even before Kant, Descartes understands 
 
16 We will see in chapter three below that Hegel exposes the prevalence of this idea, subjecting its 
logic to a critique in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and elsewhere.  
17 Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), p. 2. 
18 Significantly for our purposes, the English terms error and errancy have direct cognates in, 
respectively, the German Irrtum and Irre, as well as the French erreur and errance. They have their 
common root in the Latin errrare, meaning both ‘to wander’ and ‘to go astray.’  
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‘method’ itself as a matter of putting thought back on the right path. Prior to the 
arrival of the one genuine philosophy (be it Cartesian or Kantian), thought has erred; 
and the purpose of their respective philosophical methods is to restore thought to its 
rightful path. Indeed, the Greek root of the term method—meta hodos—points to this 
idea of a path that might finally liberate philosophy from its aimless wandering.19  
By contrast, we will see that Hegel attempts to reinterpret the history of 
philosophy not as a series of ‘errant’ wanderings or wrong turns, but rather as a single, 
logically necessary path along which philosophy had to move before it could reach its 
culmination. In this way, Hegel constitutes an exception among the thinkers considered 
in this thesis, as he rejects the connection between history and error, instead endorsing 
a version of historia sapientiae. Nonetheless, we will see that Hegel’s concept of 
negation is informed by Kant’s theory of error. Indeed, the concept of error is 
conspicuous by its absence in Hegel’s thought—not just in his account of the history 
of philosophy, but throughout his system. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Hegel goes to great lengths to show why the ‘negative’ path of thought’s history is apt 
to be misinterpreted in terms of error, and to explain why it can only retrospectively 
be understood as the negativity immanent to truth itself. As such, Hegel’s critique of 
the understanding of history in terms of error goes hand in hand with a rejection of the 
modern concept of error and its central place in philosophical thought. 
 Like Hegel, in several of his works, Heidegger reflects explicitly on the 
traditional connection between historicity and error. Yet unlike Hegel, Heidegger does 
not reject this connection, instead reconceiving it in ontological terms: ‘Errancy’ is no 
longer conceived as a shortfall of thought from being, but rather a kind of untruth or 
self-concealing immanent to being itself. Heidegger’s notion of a history of being thus 
goes hand in hand with his development of an ontological concept of error.20  
Various thinkers writing in the wake of Hegel and Heidegger take their 
respective turns to history seriously, perhaps more seriously than they themselves took 
 
19 On the etymology of the term ‘method’ and the significance of the metaphor of the path, see 
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Weg und Methode, Zur hermeneutischen Phänomenologie des 
seinsgeschichtlichen Denkens, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990). The image of the 
path clearly echoes Parmenides’ poem, which draws a distinction between the path of truth and the 
path of doxa.  
20 In deploying the term ‘ontological’ in relation to the later Heidegger’s thought, I am aware that he 
himself rejected this term on the basis of its metaphysical connotations. In the following, I nonetheless 
retain the term to denote the idea that for Heidegger, historicity is made necessary not by an 
epistemological shortfall, but rather by the very nature of being.  
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them. What is lacking after Heidegger, however, is a corresponding theory of error. 
The turn to history that followed in Heidegger’s wake—embodied in figures such as 
Derrida and Nancy on one hand, and Gadamer and Ricoeur on the other—constitutes 
an impressive attempt to take history more seriously than Hegel or Heidegger had done. 
At the same time, however, reflections on the concept of error—essential to the 
trajectory from Descartes to Heidegger—seem to vanish in the post-Heideggerian 
period. It is my ambition to reawaken this enquiry into the role of error in thinking 
about the nature of the past. 
 Before providing an overview of the thesis as a whole, one final remark is in 
order. The thinkers discussed in this thesis are all ‘Eurocentric’ thinkers; indeed, even 
Hegel, who demonstrates a greater interest in non-Western traditions than the others, 
places the history of European thought at the centre of historical-philosophical analysis. 
In Heidegger’s case in particular, the ‘history of philosophy’ is largely restricted to a 
Greek-German philosophical history, everything outside of which is at best ignored, 
and at worst violently rejected. On my view, this is not in itself a reason to simply set 
aside the conceptions of history and error that are to be found in Descartes, Kant, Hegel, 
and Heidegger. On the contrary, we ought to examine these concepts in order to 
discover how we might pose the question of historicity otherwise, to raise the questions 
of history and error once more. We return to this issue in the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
 0.4 Overview 
 
In chapter one, we investigate Descartes’ understanding of his own place within the 
broader philosophical tradition. We argue that his method of radical doubt implies a 
break with the past. Through a reading of the fourth Meditation, we show how his 
conception of philosophy’s historicity is reflected in his concept of error. We show 
that implicitly, historicity is a product of this error and of man’s fallenness. We argue 
that Descartes’ thought can be understood as the archetype for an approach to history 
which remains prevalent to this day.  
In chapter two, we show how Kant understands his project of critique as an 
intervention in the errant history of thought, which will finally put metaphysics on 
the right path. Yet unlike Descartes, Kant argues that this errant path was in some 
sense a necessary precursor of his own project. It was only after passing through the 
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various errors of metaphysics that the critical philosophy could finally arise. Through 
a reading of his Lectures on Logic and the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
we will see that this change in attitude towards philosophy’s past is reflected in 
Kant’s theory of error—specifically, in his notion of illusion [Schein] as the ground 
of error. His notion of transcendental illusion developed in the CPR allows him to 
take account of the incubation time of his own thought, and the contradictions 
inherent in the metaphysical tradition—albeit within certain strict limits. 
Descartes and Kant both treat historical difference in terms of an 
epistemological shortfall. In a brief ‘intermezzo’ at the conclusion of chapter two, we 
consider the implications of this approach to historical difference, while also looking 
forward towards Hegel and Heidegger as two thinkers who understand historical 
difference in ontological terms.   
In chapter three, we turn to the place of the history of philosophy in Hegel’s 
system, examining his much maligned and frequently neglected claim that the history 
of philosophy develops in parallel with his own system, and particularly his Science 
of Logic. We argue that Hegel has essential reasons for advancing this claim, 
examining the relation between his history of philosophy and his ontology. We argue 
that, in spite of the limitations of Hegel’s project, his approach to the history of 
philosophy constitutes the most extensive attempt in Western thought to take account 
of its own past, confronting philosophy with a challenge to which it has rarely risen.  
Finally, in chapter four, we turn to Heidegger’s notion of the history of being, 
arguing that it goes hand in hand with an ontological concept of errancy. We will see 
that the notion of a history of being is crucial to Heidegger’s apparently paradoxical 
claim that ‘the essence of truth is untruth,’ showing that this claim can be interpreted 
to mean ‘historicity belongs essentially to the economy of truth.’ Heidegger attempts 
to understand historicity as a necessary dimension of truth. We argue that his notion of 
an errant history of being blurs the line separating philosophy from the history of 
philosophy, pointing the way towards a mode of thought which takes the past seriously 
in its autonomy.  
Nonetheless, in the conclusion to this thesis, we argue that such a project was 
ultimately undermined by Heidegger’s Nietzschean ethical orientation towards the 
‘other beginning,’ understood as the specific destiny of the German people. We show 
how through an arbitrary gesture, he excludes all moments which do not belong to 
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his privileged Greek-German account of history, ultimately rendering his history of 
philosophy violent and reductive. We then consider prospects for a renewal of the 
question of the relation between error and philosophy’s past beyond the confines of 
Heidegger’s violent gesture of exclusion.   
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Chapter One. Descartes: Errancy Inter Deum et Nihil 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Martial Gueroult takes Descartes’ thought to be exemplary of philosophy’s 
indifference to the question of its own historicity, arguing that Cartesian thought can 
be considered paradigmatic of the modern attitude toward the history of philosophy 
still dominant in many quarters today. Gueroult claims that according to this 
paradigm, ‘philosophy does not have to concern itself with history, it has only, as 
requested by Descartes, to dismiss its history for good.'21 
 Despite this, Descartes demonstrates a keen awareness of the historical 
situatedness of his own philosophical project. Indeed, alongside the more prominent 
motivation of his awareness of the falsity of many of his own opinions, it is partly in 
response to the perceived failures of the history of philosophy that he develops his 
new method. In this chapter, we examine how Descartes understands the relation of 
his own thought to this broader tradition. While he does not explicitly pose the 
question concerning thought’s historicity, we nonetheless suggest that his texts 
contain an implicit account of how his own project relates to the tradition from which 
it emerges. As such, even as his task consists in making a clean break with the 
philosophies of the past, the question remains: what is the principle of the initial 
dispersal of these philosophies in a history characterised by difference and 
contradiction? In other words: what is the nature of historical difference? We suggest 
that, for Descartes, a history characterised by irreducible differences can only have 
emerged through a misuse of the faculties, resulting in error. The contradictory 
claims of the tradition are in this way contrasted with the absolute singularity of 
truth. By means of the adequate regulation of the faculties, philosophy can hope to 
transcend its errant historicity and establish a new, ahistorical foundation. 
 This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, we examine Descartes’ 
attitude toward the philosophical tradition. We show that his method begins by 
 
21 Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem,’ in The Monist (2014) 53 
(4): 563-587, p. 567. 
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explicitly excluding the tradition from consideration, seeking instead to build on the 
secure foundation of the self-certainty of the ego cogito. In this way, his thought 
exemplifies the enlightenment ‘prejudice against prejudice’ diagnosed by Hans-
Georg Gadamer.22 We will see that Descartes’ emphasis on the certainty of the 
individual subject as the locus of truth is bound up with the idea that the economy of 
truth is entirely withdrawn from history.   
 In the second part of the chapter, we turn to an analysis of Descartes’ account 
of error in the fourth meditation. We show that he considers error to be a product of 
our misuse of our faculties. Insofar as our capacity for thought proceeds from God, it 
can never fall into error. And yet error persists. In order to account for this, Descartes 
appeals to an argument borrowed from theodicy. Specifically, he locates human 
thought between being and the nothing. We indicate that Descartes’ invocation of the 
nothing at this juncture anticipates the Hegelian concept of negativity, as well as 
aspects of Heidegger’s notion of errancy. Our account of Descartes thus provides us 
with the conceptual framework which underlies the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Part One: Descartes and the Tradition 
 
1.2 Against the Tradition 
 
Nowhere in his corpus does Descartes reflect extensively on the issue of 
philosophy’s historicity—the question as to why philosophy should have a history. 
Nonetheless, his works attest to an acute awareness on his part that his own thought 
is situated within a broader tradition. In those passages in which this history is 
addressed, it is characterised in purely negative terms, invoked as evidence of 
philosophy’s lack of an adequate foundation. Thus, we read the following in the first 
part of the Discourse on Method: 
 
I shall not say anything about philosophy except that, when I realized that it had 
been cultivated by the best minds for many centuries, and that nevertheless there is 
nothing in it that is not disputed and consequently is not subject to doubt, I was not 
so presumptuous as to hope to succeed better than others; and that seeing how 
 
22 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2004) p. 273 ff. 
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different learned men may defend different opinions on the same subject, without 
there ever being more than one which is true, I deemed anything that was no more 
than plausible to be tantamount to false.23 
 
Descartes’ sentiment here is familiar from many works of the modern era. Indeed, 
the prefaces and introductions of many modern works are characterised by the 
consciousness of belonging to an ‘errant’ tradition which, over the course of many 
centuries, has made little or no progress. Furthermore, the tradition is depicted as a 
series of conflicting opinions, the plurality of which contradicts the necessary 
singularity of truth.  Like many such thinkers, Descartes understands his own 
philosophical undertaking as a calculated intervention in this history of failure. We 
find similar ideas in the works of Descartes’ near-contemporary Francis Bacon, 
whose project of a great ‘instauration’ amounts to an explicit break with the 
tradition.24   
 Descartes invokes the failings of the tradition as grounds for a clean 
methodological break with his predecessors. As he declares in the Discourse: ‘as 
soon as I reached an age that allowed me to escape from the control of my teachers, I 
abandoned altogether the study of letters.’25  If philosophy is to be established on a 
secure foundation, this requires a total suspension of all appeals to the tradition. 
Gueroult adds that for Descartes, it would even be preferable to have never known 
the doctrines of the tradition26—to which we might add that the next best thing 
would surely be to forget them as soon as possible. 
 According to Descartes’ method, the claims of the tradition are to be granted 
no special authority, but instead must be subjected to the same trial by doubt as his 
own uncertain beliefs. Moreover, we must actively seek to overcome the influence 
they exercise over our thought. In refusing dogmatic assent to the tradition, Descartes 
is following the first (and arguably most significant)27 of the four rules which he 
elaborates in the second part of the discourse, namely 
 
23 DM, p.10. 
24 As we shall see in chapter two below, we also find similar ideas at work in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
25 DM, p. 10. 
26 Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem,’ in The Monist (2014) 53 
(4): pp. 563-587. pp. 569-70. 
27 See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) p. 19. 
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[the resolve] never to accept anything as true that I did not incontrovertibly know to 
be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid both prejudice and premature conclusions; 
and to include nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself to my 
mind so clearly and distinctly, that I would have no occasion to doubt it.28 
 
The rule is developed above all in the light of Descartes’ awareness that many of the 
opinions he had long held were in fact false; yet the philosophical tradition ultimately 
is submitted to the same trial by doubt. 
 The radicality of Descartes’ gesture here can be brought into relief by way of 
a contrast with Aristotle’s endoxic method. Aristotle opens many of his works, 
including the Physics and Metaphysics, with a consideration of the ‘credible 
opinions’ [endoxai] of his predecessors.29 He begins by reviewing the limitations of 
these opinions and the conflicts between them before proceeding with his own 
analysis. At the end of these texts, Aristotle generally reaffirms the (at least partial) 
truth of the opinions from which he set out.30 Endoxai thus constitute a legitimate 
resource for his philosophical project to which he makes apparently unproblematic 
appeal, even as he is prepared to call such opinions into question where they give rise 
to problems which cannot be resolved. 
 By contrast, Descartes’ philosophy begins by suspending all such appeal to 
one’s predecessors and to the tradition as a whole, beginning again with the 
certainties that can be established by the isolated ego cogito—a program which he 
realised most radically with his method of doubt in the Meditations. 
 
 
28 DM, p. 17. 
29 On endoxic method, see Christopher Shields, Aristotle (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p. 25 ff. Cf. 
Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem,’ in The Monist (2014) 53 
(4): 563-587, p. 574; Gueroult suggests that in the light of his endoxic method, Aristotle may be 
considered the ‘true founder’ of the philosophy of the history of philosophy. A more comprehensive 
account of Aristotle’s method is beyond the scope of this thesis; nonetheless, it is worth noting that, 
even as he engages in a dialogue with his predecessors, his approach does not attempt to take account 
of their historical status; instead, he engages them as if they were his contemporaries. 
30 See Dominic Scott, Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 187ff. 
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1.3 The Prejudice Against Prejudice 
 
Seen in a certain light, Descartes’ resolve vis-à-vis the tradition seems entirely 
unobjectionable. It may seem self-evident that it should not be enough that a Plato or 
an Aristotle should have made a particular claim that we should assent to the truth of 
this claim. If philosophy is to lay claim to the status of a critical discipline, it seems 
that we need some criterion distinct from the mere authority of the great names of the 
past—an authority which, in the Scholastic milieu in which Descartes was educated, 
was very real indeed. 
 Nonetheless, Descartes’ statement of the problem presents us with a 
dichotomy which Gueroult describes as the ‘radical antinomy, “either philosophy or 
tradition.”’31  We are confronted with a choice between either dogmatic assent to the 
tradition, or a critical philosophical undertaking which precludes the possibility of an 
engagement with its history. We shall consider alternatives to this dichotomy in the 
chapters to follow. For now, we need to ask: how does Descartes come to find 
himself faced with this dichotomy? 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer understands Descartes’ method to be exemplary of 
what he calls the enlightenment ‘prejudice against prejudice itself.’32 The term 
prejudice (and its German equivalent Vorurteil) originally simply meant a 
preliminary judgement, ‘rendered before all the elements that determine a situation 
have been finally examined.’33 During the enlightenment, however, the term 
increasingly came to mean an unfounded judgement, a negative meaning it retains in 
its present day usage.   
 Recall once more the example of Aristotle. If Aristotle drew on the endoxai 
of his predecessors as a useful resource (albeit one which was not simply 
dogmatically deferred to), Descartes suspends all such appeals under the banner of 
prejudice. Even as Descartes refers to the thinkers of the tradition as the ‘best minds,’ 
he recognises no obligation to engage with their claims. Instead, they must be 
 
31  Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem,’ in The Monist (2014) 53 
(4): 563-587. p. 579. 
32 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (London: Continuum, 2004) p. 273; cf. p. 279. 
33 Ibid., p. 273. 
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suspended until such time as they can be confirmed or disconfirmed by means of his 
own method. Until then, they can only be considered prejudices —judgements 
reached not by the light of reason, but through dogmatic assent to the authority of the 
tradition. 
 In Truth and Method, Gadamer argues for the need to rehabilitate the concept 
of prejudice.34 Prejudices are not simply faulty judgements which arise through 
overhastiness or dogmatic assent to received doctrines. Instead, they constitute a 
necessary component of our understanding. It is in terms of our prejudices in this 
broader sense that we first approach a problem. Drawing on a series of examples, 
including our understanding of works of art and of texts from the tradition, as well as 
ethical questions, Gadamer attempts to show that prejudices constitute the positive 
condition of our very capacity to approach such matters.35 
 Gadamer asks: ‘[d]oes being situated within traditions really mean being 
subject to prejudices and limited in one’s freedom? Is not, rather, all human 
existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If this is true, the 
idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity.’36 For 
Gadamer, to reject our prejudices outright is thus to renounce our most fundamental 
orientation in the world in the name of an impossible standard, thereby 
impoverishing our self-understanding as finite, historical beings. 
 Gadamer’s notion of the necessity of prejudice has not infrequently been 
received as a call for an uncritical acceptance of past doctrines, a form of purely 
dogmatic assent.37 Yet as Donald Ipperciel notes, Gadamer’s restoration of prejudice 
is founded on a broader critique of the Cartesian conception of the nature of thought 
and subjectivity.38 Specifically, Descartes envisages a mode of philosophical enquiry 
premised entirely on an idea of truth which can be established without any appeal to 
the history of thought. By contrast, Gadamer claims that thought is always embedded 
 
34 Ibid., p. 278 ff. 
35 Elsewhere, he argues for the necessity of prejudice in all spheres of knowledge, including the 
natural sciences. See ‘The Universality of the Problem’ in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics (Oakland: University of California Press, 1974), p. 3 ff. 
36 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (London: Continuum, 2004) p. 277. 
37 Perhaps most prominently, this was the core issue at stake in Gadamer’s debate with Habermas. See 
Demetrius Teigos, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding: A Study of the Habermas-Gadamer 
Debate. (London: Bucknell University Press, 1995). 
38 See Donald Ipperciel, ‘Descartes and Gadamer on Prejudice,’ in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical 
Review, vol. 41, no. 4, 2002, p. 635-652. 
 
 
19 
 
 
in a broader history which it cannot simply transcend by means of method. To deny 
this is to lose sight of thought’s true nature.  
 Gadamer’s point is a broader one than concerns us here. What is significant 
for our purposes is that the prejudice against prejudice exemplified by Descartes 
implies an intrinsically ahistorical conception of truth. By denying the necessity of 
an engagement with the tradition, Descartes simultaneously denies the relevance to 
philosophy of the historical boundedness of our relation to truth. Even as Descartes is 
acutely aware that his own thought is located in the context of an ongoing history, he 
nonetheless operates under the assumption that the fact that ‘truth’ is something 
which seems to have first become manifest over the course of a history is irrelevant 
when considering the ultimate nature of truth. Indeed, for Descartes, the very 
criterion of truth is that it should admit of a completely ahistorical grounding in the 
certitude of the ego cogito in its absolute self-presence. Truth is entirely insulated 
from the historical mode of its presentation; and first philosophy thus has nothing to 
say about this historicity. 
 It is important to emphasise that Descartes never simply denies that the 
individual thinking subject is always caught up in a broader history. As stated at the 
outset, Descartes is all too aware that philosophy has a long and complicated history, 
characterised by detours, difference and contradiction. Yet for Descartes, the 
thinking subject first attains to truth by withdrawing from this historical dimension. 
The implication of this gesture is that the economy of truth itself is withdrawn from 
this history. The history of thought is precisely what is left behind by his method; the 
end goal is the simple presence of truth to the individual thinking subject. 
 Gadamer’s critique of the prejudice against prejudice owes a clear debt to the 
thought of his teacher, Martin Heidegger. In Being and Time, Heidegger insists that, 
in order to properly pose the question concerning being, it is first necessary to carry 
out an analysis of that being which poses the question concerning being, i.e. of 
Dasein. His analysis shows that Dasein is always thrown—that is, bound up in a 
particular world-historical context.39 Again, Descartes does not deny this as such; 
and yet he considers it to be irrelevant in defining the thinking subject as the one who 
asks about truth. For Descartes, to ask after truth is precisely to transcend one’s 
 
39 See BT, p. 219 ff & p. 424 ff. 
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historical setting. In BT, by contrast, Heidegger insists that this historical situatedness 
of the one who asks the question concerning being is not a mere accidental feature 
from which we can simply abstract. Descartes’ pure subject which transcends its 
historical bounds is thus rejected in favour of a questioner who is intrinsically bound 
up in a concrete world with concrete historical conditions. 
 As we shall see in chapter four, Heidegger’s difference from Descartes on this 
score grows more radical in the 1930s. His shift away from the analysis of Dasein in 
the writings which follow BT toward a concern for truth as such constitutes a shift 
away from an account of the historical conditions of Dasein’s access to truth, 
towards a historical conception of truth itself.  It is no longer a question of the 
historical nature of our relation to the economy of truth, but rather, the historicity of 
the economy of truth itself—what Heidegger will call the history of being. 
 As such, Heidegger’s history of being is doubly removed from the Cartesian 
method. The prejudice against prejudice, typified by Descartes’ thought, brings with 
it an intrinsically ahistorical conception of thought and its relation to truth. On the 
one hand, it asserts the possibility of a mode of thought withdrawn from historicity, 
seeking to establish an ahistorical foundation for philosophy. On the other, it 
precludes the possibility that the fact that truth becomes manifest over the course of a 
history might be an irreducible feature not merely of the one who asks after truth, but 
rather of truth itself. 
 
1.4 The Subject as Measure 
 
Descartes’ suspicion vis à vis the tradition can be understood in terms of the question 
of his entitlement to draw on it. A.W. Moore notes that Descartes’ method 
incorporates 
 
a preparedness to reflect critically on his heritage and to ask, using no other 
resources than are available from that position of critical reflection, what entitles him 
to draw on his heritage in the ways in which he does; a preparedness to question all 
authority except for that of his own reason, his own faculty for ‘clear and evident 
intuition’ and the ‘certain deduction’ of its consequences.40 
 
40 A.W. Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press) p. 27. 
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Moore’s formulation is apt: Descartes begins by suspending all authority except for 
that of his own reason. Indeed, Descartes makes the certainty of the thinking subject 
the sine qua non of truth. According to his method, only what the individual subject 
can establish beyond all doubt is to be admitted at the level of philosophical 
discourse.41 
 Heidegger makes a point closely related to this about the entitlement of 
reason. According to Heidegger, Descartes establishes the certainty of the thinking 
subject as the measure of truth.42 That which the thinking subject can establish as 
certain by means of its own reason alone is considered true; everything else remains 
subject to doubt, and is consequently suspended. By making the certainty of the 
subject the ultimate measure of truth, Descartes necessarily excludes the possibility 
that the history of philosophy should come into view for philosophy as a history. 
Instead, it is reduced to a sequence of more or less plausible claims, each of them 
subject to the scrutiny of individual reason. The fact that these claims should stand in 
a temporal relation to one another simply does not register at the level of first 
philosophy, since it takes as its measure the absolute self-presence of the thinking 
subject.43 
 
1.5 Error as the Implicit Ground of Historicity 
 
In the introduction, we cited Derrida’s description of the metaphysical concept of 
refutation: ‘[o]nly knowledge, and not truth, would on this view be historical, and it 
would be so only to the extent of its distance from truth, that is in its error.’44 We 
claimed that this notion of history as a product of error is definitive of modern 
 
41 This should not be taken to imply that Descartes’ conception of truth is in some way solipsistic. The 
subjective reason which acts as the criterion of truth is accessible to us all, and can thus form the basis 
of a shared, intersubjective discourse on truth. Yet it begins precisely by abstracting from all 
differences between subjects—including those associated with our ‘thrownness.’ 
42 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche IV, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), p. 108. 
43 It is worth noting at this juncture that, by subjecting all claims of the tradition to the scrutiny of 
reason, Descartes tars memory with the brush of (illegitimate) prejudice. The collective memory 
which binds us to the tradition is submitted to the authority of the intellect, such that philosophy takes 
account of its past only in the mode of suspicion. This precludes the possibility of conceiving memory 
as a source of knowledge in its own right. 
44 Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), p. 2. 
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approaches to the question of philosophy’s history, and that this approach is typified 
by Descartes.   
 It is not immediately obvious, however, that Descartes considers historicity in 
terms of error. Indeed, it is important to note that his critical attitude by no means 
implies the falsity of any particular claims or philosophical positions within the 
tradition. Instead, his method simply involves the suspension of assent on the basis of 
authority alone. Past systems of thought are treated as dubious or as ‘tantamount to 
false’ until they have been subjected to the scrutiny of the understanding, a position 
which clearly differs from simply denouncing the entire tradition as false. 
 Nonetheless, the ultimate aim of Descartes’ method of doubt is to exclude 
error by suspending all uncertain claims. As he states at the opening of the first 
meditation, it is his awareness of the large number of ‘falsehoods’ which he had 
accepted as true in his youth which first motivated his project of radical doubt.45 He 
resolves to suspend all of his opinions which are uncertain, in order to thereby 
guarantee that all errors are excluded. 
 The implication is that both our own opinions, as well as the received wisdom 
of the tradition, constitute a set of uncertain claims, some of which may be true, but 
others of which are certainly errors. Indeed, the method is only necessary insofar as 
our opinions and the tradition contain errors, which it is the task of method to 
exclude. 
 Furthermore, in the passage from the Discourse cited at the outset,46 
Descartes characterises the philosophical tradition in terms of a series of ongoing 
conflicts. He writes: ‘seeing how different learned men may defend different 
opinions on the same subject, without there ever being more than one which is true, I 
deemed anything that was no more than plausible to be tantamount to false.’47 
 On Descartes’ account, it seems that the only way of accounting for these 
differing opinions, and thus for historical difference, is by appeal to the concept of 
error. As we shall see in chapter three, Hegel will develop a different approach to the 
contradictory opinions of the history of philosophy, allowing him to integrate 
seemingly opposed doctrines into a broader economy of truth. For Descartes, 
 
45 MFP, p. 12. 
46 See section 1.2 above. 
47 DM, p. 10. 
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however, where the tradition is equivocal, truth itself is necessarily univocal. The 
history of philosophy is constituted by a series of conflicting opinions on the self-
same matter, of which no more than one can be true. By treating all as ‘tantamount 
to false,’ Descartes seeks to avoid assent to the errors within the tradition, retaining 
only those which stand up to the scrutiny of his own method. 
 If the history of philosophy deviates from the economy of truth, then it does 
so in terms of error. We can only explain its conflicts and irreducible differences by 
assuming that at least some of its claims are false. This is confirmed by another 
crucial passage from the Discourse, in which Descartes notes the tendency of even 
the ‘greatest minds’ to stray from the path: 
 
It is not enough to possess a good mind; the most important thing is to apply it 
correctly. The greatest minds are capable of the greatest vices as well as the greatest 
virtues; those who go forward but very slowly can get further, if they always follow 
the right road, than those who are in too much of a hurry and stray off it.48 
 
In the introduction, we discussed the figure of errancy.49 Errant conceptions of 
historicity begin with the notion of a ‘path’ to truth, from which human reason in its 
finitude strays, giving rise to a series of conflicting opinions which lie beyond truth. 
For Descartes, the history of philosophy is populated by just such ‘great minds’ who 
have strayed from the ‘right road.’ 
 Thus, the need of method arises precisely because of our tendency to err. 
Descartes need not declare the whole tradition, nor any specific positions within it, to 
be the product of errors. Instead, he implicitly takes error to be the condition of the 
possibility of the conflict between different philosophical positions—or in other 
words, he takes error to be the ground of historical difference. Without suspending 
the authority of the tradition, treating all its claims as ‘tantamount to false,’ we risk 
falling into error, as have so many great minds of the past. The task of Descartes’ 
method is thus to prevent our assent to the false claims of the tradition, the errors 
which arise when we do not conduct our thinking according to the correct method. It 
 
48 DM, p.5. 
49 See section 0.3 above. 
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announces a clean break with history, and with it, an end to philosophy’s ceaseless 
straying from the true path. 
 
Part Two: Error in the Fourth Meditation 
  
In this section, we begin our account of the history of the concept of error which 
forms the second major strand of this thesis. In the introduction, we claimed that the 
differing conceptions of the relation between philosophy and its history of the 
thinkers examined in this thesis are reflected in their respective concepts of error. We 
will see throughout the remainder of the thesis that the concept of error is the 
primary concept in terms of which philosophy elaborates its relation to its own 
history. 
 As we have seen, the task of method for Descartes is explicitly to exclude 
error. In this section, we examine Descartes’ concept of error as a kind of lack or 
privation which arises through a misuse of the faculties. We argue that implicitly, the 
errant history of philosophy can be considered to be a kind of epistemological waste 
product, which can be rendered neutral by the methodological regulation of the 
faculties. By appeal to the concept of error, the historicity of thought can be both 
grounded, and set aside as irrelevant to truth.   
 
1.6 Error as an Anomaly 
 
Descartes devotes his fourth meditation to the problem of error. The fourth 
meditation constitutes a kind of exception in the broader context of the work, a 
striking interruption of the logic of the text. By the end of the third meditation, 
Descartes has reached a series of conclusions which follow from a 'clear and distinct 
perception' of God. Firstly, it has become clear that God is not a deceiver, since ‘it is 
manifest by the natural light that all fraud and deception depend on some defect.’50 
Nor can our faculties be said to deceive us, since they are of divine origin. For God 
to have given us faculties which intrinsically tend toward error would be for him to 
be the author of a defect, a possibility which has already been ruled out.   
 
50 MFP, p. 35. 
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 Descartes thus concludes that we are capable of grasping truth. Yet having 
established this, he encounters a fresh difficulty: namely, how to explain that untrue 
thoughts should ever be possible—or in other words, how errors should come about. 
As Bernard Williams puts it: 
 
at this point [...] Descartes is moved to wonder whether he may not have proved too much. 
For if indeed the benevolence of God guarantees […] that the faculty of judgement cannot be 
systematically prone to error, how does it come about that Descartes is ever mistaken? Yet it 
was precisely from the recognition that he had been very frequently mistaken that his process 
of doubt started.51 
 
That error should show up precisely as a problem that interrupts the logic of 
Descartes’ text up to this point is no coincidence. His project in the Meditations is 
premised on the natural inclination of human thought towards truth, an inclination 
which follows from the divine provenance of thought. Even as he does not seek to 
deny the existence of error, nor our entanglement in an errant history, Descartes does 
not consider this to be a positive feature of our thought, but merely a kind of brute 
fact, an obstacle to be overcome. If it is true and even unavoidable that errors obtain, 
this nonetheless seems to run contrary to the fundamental nature of thought.52 
 Error shows up here as a kind of excess over the economy of truth, something 
which, according to the logic of the Meditations thus far, ought not to be. 
 Descartes himself sums up this difficulty in a striking formulation: ‘if 
everything that is in me comes from God, and he did not endow me with a faculty for 
committing errors, it appears that I can never go wrong.’53 While Descartes posits 
such a faculty for purely rhetorically purposes, it is worth noting that we shall have 
cause to return to the idea of a faculty for committing errors. It calls to mind 
Nietzsche’s notion of a positive faculty of forgetting, which contradicts traditional 
conceptions of forgetting as a mere failure of memory.54 More significantly for our 
purposes, however, it also anticipates a strand of Kant’s account of reason we will 
 
51 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.149. 
52 In chapter two, we will see that Kant too treats errors as a kind of anomaly, considering them 
‘unnatural,’ and apparently contrary to the nature of thought. See section 2.6 below. 
53 MFP, p. 38 (translation modified, my emphasis). 
54 See Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ in Nietzsche: 
Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 57–
124; see also Heidegger’s interpretation in GA 46.  
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turn to in the next chapter. Many commentators have misunderstood Kant’s dialectic 
as a kind of ‘logic of error,’ which would seem to make of reason (at the level of 
theoretical philosophy) a faculty for committing errors of the kind Descartes 
mentions here. In fact, Kant’s claim is subtly different from this, positing reason not 
as a faculty for committing errors, but as a faculty of illusion—or the ‘seat of 
transcendental illusion.’55 
 In the absence of such a faculty for committing errors, Descartes must find 
another way of grounding error which does not undermine his conclusions at the end 
of the third meditation. 
 
1.7 Error and the Faculties: Intellect, Will and Judgement 
 
Descartes defines errors as false judgments. We err whenever we assent to a 
judgment P, where in fact not-P obtains. As such, it is in his account of judgement 
that we will find the key to his theory of error. (We will see in the next chapter that 
the same is true of Kant). 
 Yet Descartes also suggests that errors must be defined in terms of a lack. He 
insists that strictly speaking, errors have no positive being (or are not ‘a thing’),56 but 
rather denote a mere shortfall from truth. Descartes uses the scholastic concept of 
privation—the lack of some property which I ought to have, to define error. To take a 
common example: a human being can be said to be blind, because they ought to have 
the power of sight; by contrast, a tree cannot be said to be blind, since no trees 
possess the power of sight. A human being’s blindness is thus an example of 
privation, whereas a tree’s lack of sight amounts to a simple negation.57 Error is an 
example of privation because it seems to be possible that God could have given us 
faculties which never go wrong;58 and of course, cognition of truth remains the 
overriding goal of the Meditations. 
 Descartes’ definition of error in terms of privation has led some 
commentators—including Hobbes in his famous objections to Descartes—to note 
 
55 CPR B355/A298. As we shall see below, Kant maintains a strict distinction between illusion and 
error. See chapter two below, esp. section 2.13. 
56 MFP, p. 42. 
57 See Richard Davies, Descartes: Belief, Scepticism and Virtue (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 86. 
58 MFP,  p. 38. 
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that this leads to difficulties in distinguishing error from mere ignorance.59 Whereas 
ignorance simply amounts to a lack of knowledge that P (or that -P), errors involve 
the positive assent to a false judgement. They do not merely denote a lack of 
knowledge of truth; instead, they introduce a content which is wholly absent from the 
economy of truth.60 Nonetheless, Descartes is consistent in maintaining their status as 
a form of privation.   
 We return to this issue in more detail in below. For now, let us return to 
Descartes’ account of error. In order to explain the origin of error, Descartes turns to 
an analysis of our faculty of judgement. If errors do not come to us from without in 
the form of deceptions, nor do they arise naturally from our God-given faculties, they 
must have some distinct origin within the thinking subject. 
 In the fourth meditation, as elsewhere, Descartes divides human cognition 
into two primary faculties, the intellect and the will.61 He suggests that, while neither 
can itself be the origin of error, it is through the relation between the two that errors 
arise. Let us briefly consider his account of how this comes to be. 
 Descartes defines the intellect as that which ‘enable[s] me to perceive the 
ideas which are subjects of possible judgements.’62  The intellect is not a faculty of 
deliberation or decision, but rather of simple, unequivocal insight. We might say that 
the intellect merely ‘gives’ a content to be seen. It presents ideas to me, allowing me 
to see them clearly and distinctly in 'the natural light.’ As Stephen Menn notes: 
‘Intellection, by contrast with judgment, is purely receptive […] This reception is 
knowledge; so knowledge is simply the passive perception of an idea-content, where 
this is a real being deriving ultimately from God.'63 
 As already stated, Descartes has established that God is not a deceiver. That 
the intellect should provide false insights, that is, perceptions of purely false contents 
such as illusions, has thus already been ruled out. The insight with which it provides 
 
59 See René Descartes Meditations, Objections, and Replies, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Donald 
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett), 2006), p. 111. 
60 We will see that this distinction plays an important role in Kant’s theory of error, in which he insists 
that it is impossible to derive something positive (assent to a judgement) from a mere lack. See section 
2.7 below. 
61 Williams notes that Descartes makes clear elsewhere that he considers this distinction to be both 
fundamental and exhaustive. See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p. 152. 
62 MFP, p.39. 
63 Cf. Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 
311. 
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us is, as Menn states, always knowledge of ‘real being deriving ultimately from 
God.’64 As such, the intellect alone cannot be responsible for errors. 
 Nonetheless, the intellect is limited in scope. The human intellect differs from 
the divine intellect in terms of its finitude. Descartes notes that his own intellect is 
‘extremely slight and very finite,’ in contrast to which he knows God’s intellect to be 
‘supremely great and infinite.’65 
The implication is that where for God, to relate to any object is immediately to know 
it, human beings can encounter objects for which they do not yet possess an adequate 
idea. 
 This is the first juncture in Descartes’ text at which we can see how his 
account of the faculties might be invoked to explain the historicity of human thought. 
If the human intellect is finite in scope, the implication is that it will take time for us 
to reach an adequate understanding of the world around us (and indeed of being as 
such). We can thus conceive of a history in which mankind gradually progresses 
towards an increasingly perfect knowledge of the world, and in doing so draws ever 
closer to infinite divine knowledge. This does not preclude the possibility of a 
regression, i.e. a fall back into ignorance from a position of relative knowledge; nor 
does it necessarily imply the possibility that mankind should ever attain to such 
perfect knowledge, for human progress may simply take the form of an asymptote 
which draws ever nearer to such knowledge without ever touching the axis, and so 
remaining in a permanent state of relative ignorance. 
 Such ideas are pervasive in many accounts of the historicity of knowing in 
general, be it of philosophy or of scientific knowledge conceived more broadly. Even 
where this model is purged of its theological foundations, i.e. where the existence of 
a divine intellect is denied, the implication remains that human finitude means that 
we constantly fall short of an absolute knowledge which might be obtained by a 
hypothetical infinite intellect. Finitude thus denotes our distance from truth, our 
falling short of perfect knowledge. Even where the possibility of absolute knowledge 
is denied, it retains the role of a (merely hypothetical) goal toward which knowledge 
ought to strive. As we shall see in the second part of this thesis, Hegel and Heidegger 
both deviate from this model significantly, instead insisting on the immanence of 
 
64 Ibid. 
65 MFP, p. 39-40. 
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finitude to the economy of truth itself. For Heidegger in particular, finitude is 
conceived not merely as a limitation of the thinking subject, but as the defining 
characteristic of being. 
 From a Cartesian perspective, the finitude of the intellect alone allows us to 
see why thought should take time to attain to truth, thereby providing a potential 
ground for thought’s historicity. Yet in the previous section of this chapter, we 
suggested that this is not adequate to understand Descartes’ conception of his place in 
the history of philosophy. For the history of thought cannot be accounted for solely in 
terms of progress and regressions along the path from ignorance toward truth. Rather, 
this path is errant, incorporating false contents. The ‘vices’ of which the greatest 
minds are capable do not consist of a mere falling short of truth in the form of 
ignorance, but rather of an active straying from the path, into a territory which falls 
entirely beyond the economy of truth. As such, the above-mentioned distinction 
between ignorance and error, while initially unclear, will be decisive. 
 This errant history once again has its implicit root in the structure of the 
human faculties. If the intellect can only account for the difference between 
ignorance and knowing, it is with the will, the ‘faculty of choice’ as Descartes calls it, 
that the possibility of actual errors first arises. 
 By contrast to the intellect, the will is an active faculty responsible for 
decisions. Descartes defines the will as ‘our ability to do or not do something (that is, 
to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid).’66 In contrast to the singular vision of the 
intellect, then, the capacity of the will to either affirm or deny introduces the 
bivalence necessary for error. My capacity for choice makes it possible for me to do 
either the right thing or the wrong thing, to assent to what is true or to what is false. 
The bivalence of judgement which is the necessary condition of falsehood thus 
seems to have its ground in the will as the faculty of choice. 
 Nonetheless, Descartes insists that the will itself is not responsible for error. 
Appealing once more to the divine provenance of the faculties, Descartes insists that 
the human will is ‘perfect in its kind.’67 Indeed, far from being defective, the will is 
the human faculty in whose exercise we most closely resemble God. For while the 
human intellect is finite, human will is infinite. Descartes’ point is clearly not that it 
 
66 MFP, p. 40. 
67 Ibid., p. 40. 
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falls within the scope of our will to achieve anything we wish; indeed, he points out 
that in this way, we still differ from God.68 Yet he suggests that in the ‘strict and 
essential sense,’ our will is no less infinite than God’s, since there is no limit to the 
scope of its potential application. For any situation or object with which I find myself 
confronted, it is within my power to affirm or deny it, to choose to act or not to act. 
 Since both the intellect and the will are of divine origin, neither can of itself 
be responsible for error. Instead, Descartes identifies the relation between the 
intellect and the will as the true source of error. Specifically, it is due to the 
difference in scope between the will and the intellect that errors arise. Descartes 
writes: 
 
So what is the source of my mistakes? It must be simply this: the scope of the will is 
wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I 
extend its use to matters which I do not understand. (40). 
 
Descartes’ point here is straightforward. The human intellect is finite insofar as it 
discloses truth only gradually. In relating to an object, we are not necessarily 
immediately presented with an adequate idea of it by our intellect, so that we often 
lack an adequate intellectual grasp of the objects we encounter. By contrast, the will 
does not encounter any such limitations in its relation to its object. Owing to the 
unlimited scope of the will, I can reach judgements about any possible object to 
which I relate; yet this means I am often moved to reach judgements about matters of 
which I have no adequate idea, owing to the finitude of the intellect. This gives rise 
to a situation in which we reach judgements in the absence of the ‘natural light’ of 
the intellect. Where the natural light will always guarantee the absolute univocity of 
discourse, in its absence, thought strays from this singularity, and introduces 
moments contradictory of truth. Thanks to the lack of congruence between the finite 
intellect and infinite will, I can not only fail to know things (ignorance), but can also 
actively get things wrong, making false judgments about things which I do not know. 
 As such, we can see how the relation between the intellect and the will makes 
possible an errant history of human thought. Unlike a historicity founded purely on 
the finitude of the intellect, the discrepancy between the intellect and the will allows 
 
68 Ibid., p. 40. 
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us to account for the possibility of contradictory positions emerging within the 
history of thought. This history is not merely a matter of progressions and 
regressions on the path from ignorance to truth. Instead, it amounts to a series of 
dead ends, illusory contents which are simply ‘beyond’ truth.69 By forming 
judgements in the absence of the natural light of the intellect, philosophy is plunged 
into an errant history from which we can be liberated only by strict adherence to 
Descartes’ methodological precepts. 
 
1.8 Who errs? 
 
It seems that the explanatory circle has been closed, and the anomaly of error 
accounted for. God does not deceive us by giving us faculties which actively produce 
errors. Instead, error arises through the relation between the faculties. 
 Yet the question remains as to how it is that the faculties should come to 
relate to one another in this manner. Descartes assumes that, in spite of the 
discrepancy in scope between the two faculties, with the proper caution, we can 
refrain from reaching judgements in the absence of the natural light. Yet what is it 
which moved us to draw such erroneous judgements in the first place? 
 At this juncture, Descartes seems to introduce a distinction which destabilises 
his account of the self as presented in the Meditations thus far. In order to account for 
our tendency toward error, he draws a distinction between the self and the will. He 
does so repeatedly in the passages which follow, claiming that, in those instances 
where errors arise, ‘I am not using my free will correctly;’ adding a few lines later 
‘[t]he privation, I say, lies in the operation of the will in so far as it proceeds from 
me, but not in the faculty of will which I received from God, nor even in its 
operation, in so far as it depends on him.’70 While it is the discrepancy in the scope 
of the intellect and the will which makes my error possible, this is only a necessary 
and not yet a sufficient condition of error. Rather, it is my misuse of my will which 
 
69 As we will see in chapter four below, for Heidegger, such ‘errant’ paths are a necessary moment of 
the economy of truth. See esp. section 4.14 & 4.15.  
70 MFP, p. 41 (my emphasis). 
 
 
32 
 
 
bears the true responsibility.71 Thus, error proceeds not from the faculties I received 
from God, nor simply from their relation to one another, but rather from me. 
 Yet this gives rise to the following question: who or what is this ‘I,’ as 
something distinct from my will and my other faculties? The implication is that this 
‘I’ does not depend on God in the same manner as the faculties. Errors introduced by 
this ‘I’ are thus not to be traced back to a divine origin, but proceed solely from ‘me.’ 
 Bernard Williams raises an objection to Descartes' text here, suggesting that 
the implied distinction between the ‘I’ and the will is incoherent. He notes that ‘these 
uses and misuses of other faculties must themselves be a matter of the will, and to 
say that a man misuses his will could only be to imply either that his will misuses 
itself, or that he has another will which is applied to the use of the first one.’72  Either 
the will misuses itself, in which case there must be some imperfection immanent to 
the will; or we must appeal to some will distinct from the one which God has granted 
us. 
 Williams suggests that it might be possible to evade the problem by way of 
paraphrase. Perhaps the distinction that is implied in these passages is merely a 
matter of clumsy wording on Descartes’ part.73 And yet it would seem that the 
introduction of this ‘I’ coheres perfectly with Descartes’ logic up to this point in the 
Meditations. For it allows Descartes to absolve the faculties of all blame, and thus to 
entirely dissociate error from God, while nonetheless taking account of error as a 
genuine and pervasive phenomenon.74 
 This absolving of God of responsibility for error has implications far beyond 
questions of piety. By keeping error at a distance from God, Descartes is able to 
maintain a conception of truth in which error is entirely superfluous to the economy 
 
71 Or as Lex Newman puts it, ‘limitation in our intellect explains the possibility of judgment error; 
misuse of our free will explains its actuality;’ cited in Noa Naaman-Zauderer, Descartes' 
Deontological Turn: Reason, Will, and Virtue in the Later Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 85. 
72 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005),  p.156. 
Cf. Stephen Menn, who concludes that ‘[i]t is the will itself that uses and abuses itself, and no further 
cause can be assigned for its activity.’ Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 316. 
73 Williams suggests that some of the associated difficulties may be dissolved in this way, where 
others may be irresoluble. See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2005), pp. 155-6. 
74 Heidegger notes at this juncture in his reading of the fourth meditation that: ‘God is absolutely 
absolved of any responsibility for the being of error. The cupla falls to me;’ GA 23 p. 132, my 
translation.  
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of truth.75 By denying any kind of divine origin of error, Descartes suggests that such 
error is superfluous from the position of divine knowing. The economy of truth, as 
present in God’s knowledge, is entirely purged of error; the task of method is 
likewise to purge our thought of error, leaving it behind as a remainder.76 
 Descartes’ gesture of distinguishing the I from the faculties recalls an 
argument advanced by Thrasymachus in book one of Plato’s Republic. According to 
Thrasymachus, an expert never makes a mistake qua expert, but rather, only as a 
fallible individual who fails to live up to their role as an expert. It is not the doctor 
qua doctor who makes a mistake leading to the death of a patient; one is only a 
doctor insofar as one flawlessly carries out one’s medical duties. Rather, it is the 
individual ‘behind’ the doctor who errs.77  Descartes’ talk of my misuse of my will 
seems to share this structure: it is not the will that is responsible for error, but some 
other dimension of the ‘I’ behind the will. In so far as we are made in the image of 
God, we do not err. Yet we can and do fall short of the divine image. In the example 
from the Republic, it is clear what we mean when we talk about the ‘I’ who fails to 
live up to their role; every doctor is also a fallible human being. Yet who is this ‘I’ 
which misuses its faculties in the Meditations?78 
 
 
 
 
  
 
75 While such an exclusion may seem self-evident, we will see in the following chapters that it this far 
from the case. 
76 In his reading of Parmenides’ poem, Heidegger notes that it is the Goddess truth who tells 
Parmenides of the path of doxa. The implication would seem to be that even a ‘perfect’ intellect 
recognises doxa as an irreducible feature of being, and thus that an account of truth is incomplete 
without an account of doxa. The Cartesian god, however, has precisely nothing to say of regarding the 
content of errancy, since the economy of truth is entirely purged of any relation to error. Unlike 
Parmenides’ goddess, Descartes’ God cannot speak untruth. For Heidegger’s account of the Goddess 
truth, see Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). 
77 See Plato, Republic, 340d – 341a. 
78 Williams opts not pursue this question further, writing ‘[t]his sort of difficulty, however, is perhaps 
not the most profitable to pursue.’ Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.156. Nor is it a widely discussed aspect of Descartes’ text. This owes 
perhaps to the ongoing predominance of the Cartesian attitude toward error, which takes it to be a 
mere byproduct of thought which is of little philosophical interest.  
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1.9 Inter Deum et Nihil: Descartes’ Theodicy 
 
 
We have seen above that the misuse of our faculties seems to imply a dimension of 
the human which does not proceed from God. We saw that according to Descartes, 
our faculties are of divine origin. Human beings are created in God’s image, and as 
such are capable of truth. Yet if we return to the very opening of the fourth 
meditation, we find an allusion to a dimension of the I which marks its distance from 
God: 
 
so long as I think only of God, and turn my whole attention to him, I can find no 
cause of error or falsity. But when I turn back to myself, I know by experience that I 
am prone to countless errors. On looking for the cause of these errors, I find that I 
possess not only a real and positive idea of God, or a being who is supremely 
perfect, but also what may be described as a negative idea of nothingness, or of that 
which is farthest removed from perfection. I realize that I am, as it were, something 
intermediate between God and nothingness [inter Deum & nihil], or between 
supreme being and non-being: my nature is such that in so far as I was created by the 
supreme being, there is nothing in me to enable me to go wrong or to lead me astray; 
but in so far as I participate in nothingness or non-being, that is, in so far as I am 
not myself the supreme being and am lacking in countless respects, it is no wonder 
that I make mistakes. I understand, then, that error as such is not something real 
which depends on God, but merely a defect.79 
  
Here, Descartes reproduces an argument from classical theodicy. Specifically, he 
invokes our proximity to nothingness as the ground of human error in a way which 
perfectly mirrors Augustine’s invocation of the nothing to explain the possibility of 
evil.80 Augustine found himself confronted with the problem of accounting for the 
presence of evil in the world. Evil cannot be explained as a positive attribute of 
 
79 MFP, p. 38, my emphasis. Heidegger alludes to this passage in Nietzsche IV in the context of a 
discussion of Descartes. See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche IV, trans. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1991), p. 143. 
80 On Descartes’ indebtedness to Augustine, see Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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human beings, since this would ultimately have its origin in God as the creator. 
Rather, evil must be understood in terms of privation—the lack of something I ought 
to have (i.e. goodness). God is not the author of evil; instead, evil denotes mankind’s 
tendency to fall from God, a possibility which arises since man was created from 
nothing. 
 Descartes uses the same argument to account for our tendency toward error. 
Human beings are located between God and the nothing, and as such, they are at risk 
of a fall into error which is simultaneously a fall away from God. As Stephen Menn 
puts it:   
 
Descartes and Augustine conclude: the cause of my errors is found not in God, but in 
the fact that, being other than God, I have been created out of nothing, and continue 
to have some character of nothingness about me. I am not nothing, but I have been 
created from nothing purely by God's decision, and can as easily be returned to 
nothingness: so I have no prior claim on any perfections, before God decides what to 
give me. In creating me, he gives me some perfections I did not have before, but 
there are other perfections that he does not give me; the lack of these other 
perfections is not itself something that comes from God, but merely a remainder of 
the original nothingness or lack of all perfections out of which I was drawn.81 
 
For Descartes, this concept of the nothing merely delimits the space within which 
man can ‘fall short’ of divinity. That is to say, insofar as human beings are not 
identical with God, one can talk of a ‘distance’ between the human and God; and any 
such distance presupposes some kind of outer boundary that is at the furthest possible 
remove from God. As such, the nothing is merely a theoretical corollary of the 
thought that human beings do not attain to God’s perfection. 
 For Descartes, to suggest that errors arise as a result of man’s proximity to the 
nothing is simply another way of saying that they arise from man’s imperfection. Yet 
this imperfection is clearly not simply the same as the ‘finitude’ of the intellect. It is 
in this context that the significance of the distinction between error and ignorance 
discussed above becomes clear. The limited scope of the intellect can be invoked to 
explain the fact that man does not intrinsically possess all truth from the very outset, 
 
81 Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 304. 
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and indeed may never attain to the absolute insight of the divine intellect. But this 
does not explain how it comes about that human beings should actively stray from 
truth, reaching judgments which constitute a kind of excess over truth. As we 
suggested above, this would seem to suggest some impetus on the part of humans to 
misapply their will. 
 It would seem that invoking the nothing as the ground of error would allow us 
to take account of the difference between errors and ignorance. If the nothing were 
invoked as the ground of error in this way, it would be possible to elaborate a kind of 
economy of errant human thought, as distinct from divine truth. By extension, the 
historicity of philosophy would be a feature of this ‘negative’ economy in its 
difference from eternal truth. 
 Yet such a project is not conceivable within a Cartesian framework. As 
previously stated, for Descartes, the nothing is merely the outer boundary of man’s 
imperfection. It ‘is’ not, precisely insofar as it has no ground in God. Likewise, the 
errors to which it gives rise themselves strictly speaking have no being; they 
constitute a sheer lack, and nothing more. To attempt to examine their ground, or to 
elaborate a ‘logic of error,’ of the kind alluded to by Heidegger, would be to engage 
in a self-contradictory science of non-being. 
 Nonetheless, it is significant that the nothing should play such a pivotal role 
in Descartes’ fourth meditation. For at this point in his argument, Descartes 
foreshadows key aspects of both Hegel’s and Heidegger’s thought. In their respective 
accounts of the historicity of thought, neither of them begins by departing radically 
from Descartes’ conceptual framework. Instead, they call into question the notion of 
the nothing posited simply as nothing, and of error as a sheer lack. We will see that 
unlike him, they do not simply exclude negation82 from the economy of truth. In both 
Hegel’s logic of negation, and Heidegger’s ‘nothing,’ we can hear a distinct echo of 
Descartes’ appeal to the nothing in the fourth meditation. Yet where Descartes simply 
moves to exclude the nothing and the error he associates with it from his philosophy, 
Hegel and Heidegger treat them as an irreducible component of truth. In doing so, 
they come to incorporate human ‘errancy’ within their respective conceptions of 
 
82 For Heidegger, this negation cannot be understood as dialectical; see CP, p. 140. 
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truth. The history of thought is not merely opposed to truth, but belongs to it in an 
essential manner. 
 That Descartes should invoke the nothing here is not accidental. For it allows 
him to locate an aspect of the ‘I’ which is at the furthest possible remove from God's 
perfection, and thus to explain the origin of error without implicating God in this 
error.83 Nonetheless, Descartes does not thematise this nothingness in any detail, 
precisely because he posits it only in order to dismiss it, excluding the error 
associated with it from the economy of truth. Recall that error originally showed up 
as a kind of surplus, something which ought not to be, insofar as our intellectual 
capacities can be traced back to God. Locating man between God and nothingness 
allows Descartes to introduce an origin of error distinct from God, such that neither 
God nor our faculties need ever be made culpable of error. Posited as nothingness, 
which is nothing real, but rather a mere ‘negative idea,’ we can say that this ground 
of error ‘is not.’ By this logic, the excess over truth which error constitutes is itself a 
form of mere ‘non-being.’ At the same time, it seems that it is a negation of a very 
specific sort; since it is not simply identical with ignorance, or the lack of 
knowledge. Yet within Descartes’ conceptual resources, it seems that this distinction 
necessarily remains unclear. For it would be a matter of comparing one form of ‘non-
being’ with another—a project which, at least since Parmenides, has been dismissed 
by the Western tradition as incoherent. 
 While this discussion has been very abstract, it has decisive consequences at 
the level of philosophical praxis. For it authorises an approach in which human 
error—and with it, the errant history of thought—falls beyond the scope of 
philosophy’s legitimate concerns. Descartes fulfils his obligation to take account of 
our tendency to err; and yet he equally makes of this errancy a form of non-being, 
ruling out the possibility of a logic of error. As such, it is sufficient to dismiss the 
errors of the past as the result of thought’s imperfection, rather than attempting to 
account for their specific content. 
 The fact that Descartes finds in himself a ‘negative idea of nothingness’ 
alongside the ‘real and positive idea of God,’ the latter of which plays such a 
 
83 Heidegger writes: ‘But if God is God he cannot know the nothing, assuming that the “Absolute” 
excludes all nothingness.’ Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?,’ in Basic Writings, trans. & ed. 
by David Farrell Krell, revised and expanded edition (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 107-108. 
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fundamental role in determining the course of the Meditations, is rarely remarked 
upon. And yet this duality is striking in its anticipation of the opening of Hegel’s 
Science of Logic, in which the concept of pure being is followed immediately by (or 
indeed ‘co-posited’ with) the concept of the nothing. As is well known, Hegel 
deconstructs the simple opposition between these concepts, and rejects the idea of the 
nothing posited simply as nothing. 
 For now, it is sufficient to note that the appeal to the idea of nothingness 
allows Descartes to close the explanatory circle, accounting for the ground of error 
without thereby attributing it to God. Error has been accounted for in such a way as 
to hold it at absolute remove from God and from the economy of truth. Since it is 
strictly speaking nothing, a mere lack, there is no need to take further account of it—
nor of the errant history to which it gives rise. Instead, this history comes to be 
thought simply as the product of humanity’s fall from God. By regulating the use of 
the faculties appropriately, philosophy can aspire to establish itself on a new 
ahistorical foundation, leaving its errant history behind it.  
 
1.10 Descartes and the Tradition Revisited 
 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that there is a certain irony in Descartes’ 
approach to the problem of error. Descartes, who seeks to suspend all appeals to the 
authority of the tradition, falls back on an argument borrowed from traditional 
theodicy. This is, of course, far from being the only recourse that Descartes has to the 
tradition in the course of his Meditations.84 As Gueroult notes, Descartes himself 
concedes his substantial debt to the tradition in a letter to Voetius.85 Above all, the 
entire framework of his project depends on a Christian conception of a benevolent 
God who embodies eternal truth.   
 Is it not then ill-advised to suggest, as we have done, that Descartes rejects 
the authority of the tradition altogether—or as Andrew Benjamin puts it, that he 
refuses ‘the gift of the tradition?’86 
 
84 Cf. Heidegger’s discussion of this issue in BT, p. 46.  
85 Martial Gueroult, ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem,’ in The Monist (2014) 53 
(4): 563-587., p. 571. 
86 Andrew Benjamin, The Plural Event: Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger (London: Routledge, 1993)  p. 
38. 
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 Concerning Descartes’ apparent deference to the Christian tradition, A.W. 
Moore writes: 
 
If we find it puzzling that [Descartes] nevertheless accepts, seemingly uncritically, 
so much of what we find unacceptable, then we are probably overlooking both the 
extent to which thinking in general, not just Descartes’ thinking, is determined by its 
historical and cultural context and the extent to which what we find unacceptable is 
in any case, ironically, a long-term effect of Descartes’ own iconoclasm.87 
 
Moore’s point here is clear. Even as Descartes seemingly uncritically accepts many 
of the doctrines of his predecessors, his true legacy lies in his iconoclasm and his 
rejection of the authority of the tradition. Even as he borrows heavily from the 
tradition, it is his commitment to suspend all such appeals that constitutes the 
enduring lesson of his method. Much of the tradition he inspired sought to purge his 
attempt at establishing a secure foundation for philosophy of the last remnants of its 
debt to the tradition. 
 With this gesture, Descartes’ simple opposition between ahistorical truth and 
historical human knowledge, as well as the opposition between divine truth and 
human errancy, is retained, even as its theological foundation threatens to be lost 
from view. The essential faith that human cognition, on the basis of individual reason 
alone, should be able to transcend its historical setting remains dominant in much 
contemporary thought, as does the corresponding ahistorical conception of truth, 
albeit in the absence of a divine intellect acting as guarantor. 
 Derrida also notes the limitation of Descartes’ attempt to distance himself 
from the tradition. In the passage in question, Derrida remarks that Heidegger 
distances himself from all attempts at ‘beginning again in the ahistorical style of 
Descartes or perhaps (things are not so simple) of Husserl.’ He continues: 
 
 
87 A.W. Moore, the Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (New York: 
Cambridge University Press) p. 27. Cf. Bernard Williams, who claims that Descartes’ employs a 
‘religious bridge’ in order to return from the position of doubt to one of knowing. He writes: 
‘philosophy after Descartes was driven to a search for alternative ways of getting back from the 
regions of skepticism and subjective idealism in which it was stranded when Cartesian enquiry lost the 
Cartesian road back.’ Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 147. 
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Not that the Descartes of the Discourse or Husserl in his Cartesian vein decided to 
create from scratch a new language to escape from the historical heritage. In any 
case, if that had been practically possible, one can suppose that they would have 
done so and that nothing in their philosophical intention was opposed to it.88 
 
And this is the essential point: even as Descartes’ fails to insulate his thought entirely 
from the tradition, nothing in the fundamental orientation of his thinking implies any 
obligation to take account of it. In spite of the limitations of its own attempt to do so, 
his method authorises the gesture of simply forgetting the tradition, spurring 
philosophy on to complete the task of purging itself of former prejudices, and 
ultimately leading philosophy to declare the question of its own historicity to be 
irrelevant at the level of first philosophy. 
 
1.11 Conclusion to Chapter One: Method’s Belated Arrival 
 
We bring our account of Descartes to a close by confronting him with a variation on 
Heidegger’s question concerning the ‘incubation period’ of the principle of sufficient 
reason examined in the introduction.89 Given that the faculties have a natural 
normative tendency toward truth, how can we explain that the correct method for the 
application of the faculties should first emerge in the 17th century with the inception 
of Descartes’ philosophical project? Given thought’s natural tendency toward truth, 
what does Descartes have to say about the nature of this delay? 
 We raise this question only to leave it unanswered, since Descartes’ texts do 
not provide us with a clear response. Certainly, he can appeal to the idea of man’s 
imperfection to explain the fact that human thought should have erred in the past. Yet 
he cannot explain why his own method should have arisen at the specific juncture 
that it did. His near contemporary Francis Bacon, who advocated a similar 
methodological revolution, proposed a theological explanation: his project of 
instauration meant man’s return to his rightful dominion over nature as guaranteed in 
 
88 Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, ed. Thomas Dutoit, trans. Geoffrey 
Bennington, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2016), p. 24. 
89 See section 0.2 above. 
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the scriptures, thus forming part of a grand theological narrative.90 Descartes offers 
no such explicit explanation. We are left simply with the idea of an errant tradition 
which, but for the right method, need not have been, and whose gradual unfolding 
over centuries seems to be a matter of sheer contingency. Cartesian method arrives as 
a sudden, inexplicable rupture, which with a single stroke alters mankind’s relation to 
truth, transcending its historicity by appealing to a set of methodological rules which, 
much like the principle of sufficient reason in Heidegger’s lecture course, had simply 
been awaiting discovery.    
 The question is apt to strike some readers as trivial. It may seem senseless to 
pose a question to Descartes’ text which it is clearly neither equipped nor concerned 
to answer. His failure to address the question can hardly be considered fatal to his 
broader project. Nonetheless, we note the absence of a response here precisely by 
way of contrast to the thinkers considered in the remainder of this thesis. For as we 
shall see, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger all offer explanations as to why their thought 
should have in some sense been delayed or deferred, emerging only at a specific 
point in the history of Western thought. Not only are their philosophical projects 
conscious interventions in an ongoing history; they also offer an account of why this 
history should have taken the form it did. 
 Descartes’ method appears to be simply belated in its arrival. There is no 
reason why the method should have emerged when it did, nor why it should have 
been preceded by the specific developments which in fact preceded it. By contrast, 
we will see in the next chapter that Kant suggests that his project of critique had 
necessary precursors. It does not arrive merely belatedly; rather, it could not emerge 
prior to other developments made necessary by the very nature of reason. This idea 
would be developed further still by Hegel and Heidegger, albeit it radically different 
ways. 
 For Descartes, history is not intrinsic to the economy of thought. Instead, it 
marks our falling short from the economy of truth. The economy of truth is the 
economy of divine truth; our falling short falls outside the remit of philosophy 
proper, conceived as the account of truth. Like Thrasymachus’ doctor, philosophers 
do not err—or at least, not once they are equipped with the right method. By 
 
90 See Stephen A. McKnight, The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought (London: 
University of Missouri Press, 2006). 
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suspending all engagement with the tradition at the level of first philosophy, and by 
excluding error and negativity from the economy of truth, Descartes’ method 
establishes the template for philosophy’s silence concerning its own historicity.  
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Chapter Two: Kant’s Logic of Illusion and the History of 
Special Metaphysics 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, we examine the status of the history of philosophy in Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason. In particular, we consider how Kant is able to engage with certain 
aspects of this history at the level of his ‘theoretical’ philosophy by means of his 
concept of transcendental illusion. 
 In the first part of the chapter, we examine Kant’s ‘external’ comments on the 
place of critique in the history of philosophy. In other words, we are concerned with 
those marginal comments in the prefaces and other peripheral writings in which Kant 
explicitly discusses the relation of his project to the broader tradition. We will see 
that like Descartes, Kant envisages critique as a kind of methodological intervention 
intended to bring to an end the ‘errant’ history of metaphysics. Nonetheless, unlike 
Descartes, Kant suggests that there are reasons why critical philosophy should first 
arise in the wake of this errant history. The history of metaphysics admits of a certain 
necessity, such that critique only became possible after reason had passed through a 
sequence of specific stages. 
 In the second part of the chapter, we examine the extent to which Kant’s 
‘external’ account of the place of critique in the history of philosophy is grounded at 
the level of his ‘first philosophy.’ In other words, we ask whether his account of 
human reason in his CPR adequately grounds the kind of historical necessity 
described in part one. We will see that like Descartes, Kant considers philosophy’s 
historicity to be the product of thought’s tendency to err. Yet we will also see that in 
his notion of transcendental illusion, Kant provides an account of the origin of error 
far more detailed than anything Descartes had envisaged. In the dialectic of CPR, 
Kant seeks to show that the content of the history of special metaphysics arises 
necessarily as a result of the very structure of human cognition. Finally, we 
investigate the limits of this notion of transcendental illusion in explaining the 
historicity of thought. 
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Part One: Kant and the Tradition 
 
2.2 The Errors of the Metaphysical Tradition 
 
Kant added a motto taken from Bacon's preface to the Great Instauration to the 
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.91 The motto closes with the following 
words: ‘each may well hope from our instauration that it claims nothing infinite, and 
nothing beyond what is mortal; for in truth it prescribes only the end of infinite 
errors, and this is a legitimate end.’92 
 Kant’s choice of motto is telling. It suggests that, like Bacon (whom he 
admired greatly),93 he considers his own work to be a kind of instauration, a renewal 
or restoration following a period of decline. Furthermore, it suggests that this 
instauration proceeds by way of the prevention of error. 
 Kant makes this point explicit in the introduction to the work. He writes of 
critique that ‘its utility would really be only negative, serving not for the 
amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free of 
errors, by which a great deal is already won.’ (A11/B25). The task of CPR is not the 
development of a new metaphysics. Instead, Kant considers it to fulfil the task of a 
‘propaedeutic,’ which prepares the way for the actual tasks of metaphysics by 
delimiting the legitimate scope of human reason.94 Much like the Cartesian method 
of doubt, critique aims to suspend errors in order to make way for truth. 
 Throughout the prefaces to CPR, Kant refers to the need to put metaphysics 
on the ‘right path.’ We saw in the introduction to this thesis that the trope of the 
‘path’ and the associated notion of ‘errancy’ recur throughout modern accounts of 
the history of philosophy.95 For Kant, as for Descartes, metaphysics has thus far 
found itself on the ‘wrong’ path; and the task of the critical method is to return it to 
 
91 Hereafter CPR. 
92 CPR: Bii (my emphasis). 
93 On Bacon’s importance for Kant, see Shi-Hyong Kim, Bacon und Kant: Ein erkenntnistheoretischer 
Vergleich zwischen dem “Novum Organon” und der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2008). Kim argues that there is significant continuity between Bacon and Kant on the question of 
error, arguing that both make the attempt not merely to dispel the errors of the former metaphysics, 
but rather to explain and ground them. Bacon thus be considered an important forebear of the 
historical dimension of Kant’s critical project, as well as of his concept of illusion discussed in detail 
below. See esp. p. 87ff. 
94 CPR A11; on Kant’s conception of propaedeutic, see CPR A 84I/B 869. 
95 See section 0.3 above. 
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the right path—the ‘royal road,’ as Kant refers to it96—once and for all. This can 
only be brought about by a methodological revolution—whereby we must 
understand method etymologically as the search for the right path [hodos], which 
will bring the errant wandering of philosophy to an end. 
 There are nonetheless significant differences in the way in which Kant and 
Descartes frame their concern to suspend error. Descartes’ project of doubt was 
motivated by his awareness that many of his own personal opinions were dubious, 
with many proving to be simply false under closer scrutiny. We noted that this 
method of doubt also implicitly served to suspend the heritage of the ‘errant’ 
tradition; yet ultimately, Descartes cast the project in terms of the possibility of 
personal certainty.97 By contrast, Kant makes no mention of his own personal errors 
or opinions in the prefaces and introduction to the CPR, nor those of any individual, 
whether concrete or hypothetical.98 Instead, it is the contemporary state of 
metaphysics as a science which motivates his intervention. If Kant moves to suspend 
error in the CPR, he is not simply concerned with errors as such, but rather precisely 
with those errors into which metaphysics has fallen for want of an adequate method. 
Expressed positively, his concern is not with the possibility of personal certitude, but 
rather with the restoration of the science of metaphysics within its proper bounds. 
 In distinction to Descartes, Kant thus explicitly casts his project as an 
intervention at a certain juncture in the history of metaphysics. He famously 
characterises metaphysics as a ‘battlefield of […] endless controversies.’99 His own 
intervention comes at a point in time at which the former ‘queen of all the 
sciences’100 has fallen into disrepute. As John Sallis notes, Kant’s critique can thus 
be understood as a response to a certain ‘crisis of metaphysics,’101 unprecedented in 
its history. Much as Hegel would later do in his own philosophical system, Kant thus 
explicitly presents his CPR as emerging in a specific historical context. 
 
96 The German term is ‘Heeresweg;’ CPR bxii. 
97 See section 1.4 above. 
98 Of course, in the famous passage from the Prolegomena, Kant recalls the way in which Hume 
awoke him from his ‘dogmatic slumber;’ yet this too can be understood as a concern for his own 
commitment to a particular historical form of metaphysics (dogmatic rationalism). See Immanuel 
Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Gary Hatfield, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p. 10 
99 CPR Aviii 
100 CPR, aviii. 
101 John Sallis, The Gathering of Reason, second edition (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), p. 3ff. 
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2.3 Errancy, Science and Revolution 
 
In the preface to the second edition of CPR, Kant writes: 
 
If after many preliminaries and preparations are made, a science gets stuck as soon as it 
approaches its end, or if in order to reach this end it must often go back and set out on a new 
path; or likewise if it proves impossible for the different co-workers to achieve unanimity as 
to the way in which they should pursue their common aim; then we may be sure that such a 
study is merely groping about, that it is still far from having entered upon the secure course 
[den sicheren Gang] of a science; and it is already a service to reason if we can possibly find 
that path [Weg] for it, even if we have to give up as futile much of what was included in the 
end previously formed without deliberation.102 
In this citation and the passages which follow it, Kant takes what may be seen as 
evidence for the impossibility of metaphysics as a science, and recasts it in the 
context of a broader historical narrative. Where the sceptic might see the failures of 
dogmatic metaphysics as cause to abandon it altogether, Kant understands the 
contemporary crisis of metaphysics to be the final stage in its history before it is 
finally set upon the ‘path’ which will lead it to its fulfilment. To lend this narrative 
greater plausibility, Kant develops a comparison between the history of metaphysics 
and those of other sciences, which he notes all passed through an initial stage of 
‘groping about’ before finally finding their respective ‘royal roads.’ 
 Kant contrasts metaphysics with three further sciences: logic, mathematics, 
and physics. Of these sciences, logic was the first to find the correct path. Kant notes 
that it has long since travelled a ‘secure course’ [sicherer Gang], not being forced to 
take a single backward step since at least Aristotle.103 Mathematics, too, ‘has from 
the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable 
people the Greeks, travelled the secure path of a science.’104 He notes, however, that 
its path was not so simple as that of logic, and that it spent a lot of time ‘groping 
about’ looking for the right path, primarily among the Egyptians.105 It was only 
thanks to a revolution among the Greeks that it finally found the ‘royal road.’ Finally, 
 
102 CPR, Bvii. 
103 As the citation above makes clear, a backward step is proof of the lack of an adequate foundation, 
of a science not having found the ‘right path.’ 
104 CPR, Bx. 
105 CPR, Bxi. 
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natural science took far longer to find the ‘highway of science,’ finally achieving this 
only with the methodological revolution proposed by Francis Bacon.106 
 Kant introduces his own famous ‘Copernican revolution’ after the pattern of 
these prior revolutions in mathematics and natural science. The implication is that, 
just as mathematics and physics took time to find the right path, so too, he 
understands his own critical project as a revolution which arises following a long 
history of failure. That metaphysics should have thus far proved fruitless is no cause 
to abandon it, but rather indicates that it still awaits its ultimate foundation. 
 Furthermore, for Kant, the order in which these sciences were set upon the 
right path is far from contingent. Rather, he argues that it is the relative difficulty of 
each science which accounts for the delays. This question of difficulty is not simply a 
matter of complexity, but has its root in the varying relations between the faculties 
which obtain in each science. Thus, logic arrives at its proper method earliest, since 
in logic, the understanding must engage only with its own laws.107 Mathematics and 
physics are more difficult, since they involve the application of the understanding to 
objects of experience. Finally, metaphysics is the most difficult science, precisely 
because it has to do with objects which fall beyond experience. Kant thus claims that 
it is by no means contingent that metaphysics, in spite of being the oldest science, 
should also be the last of the sciences to reach maturity.108 
 As such, it is already clear that for Kant, it is not a matter of sheer accident 
that his critical project should have been delayed in its arrival. The revolution in 
metaphysics arrives later than other scientific revolutions owing to the intrinsic 
difficulty of its content. This revolution will finally bring metaphysics’ centuries of 
errant wandering to an end, much as the revolutions in the other sciences had done so 
previously: ‘it is on this path, the only one left, that I have set forth, and I flatter 
myself that in following it I have succeeded in removing all those errors that have so 
far put reason into dissension with itself in its nonexperiential use.’109 
 Kant claims here that the critical path is the only one remaining for 
metaphysics. The revolution entailed by critique is final. It does not amount to one of 
those periodic revolutions in the sciences for which Thomas Kuhn coined the term 
 
106 CPR, Bxii. 
107 CPR, Bix. 
108 CPR, Bxiv. 
109 CPR, Axii. 
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‘paradigm shift.’110 By locating the critical path, Kant has brought an end to the 
errancy of metaphysics, and finally put it on the path to truth. Accordingly, he ends 
the critique on a triumphant note. He invites the reader to consider whether, now that 
the critical path has been discovered, ‘that which many centuries could not 
accomplish might not be attained even before the end of the present one: namely, to 
bring human reason to full satisfaction in that which has always, but until now 
vainly, occupied its lust for knowledge.’111 
 Kant thus hopes that within less than two decades,112 metaphysics might 
attain the goal it has striven after in vain for centuries. 
 Kant’s claims regarding the difficulty of metaphysics go some way to 
explaining why critique should have been delayed in its arrival. Nonetheless, his 
account of the reasons for this delayed arrival of the critical project go far beyond 
this mere appeal to difficulty. Indeed, Kant not only explains why metaphysics 
should find its royal road later than the other sciences; he also accounts for the 
specific forms through which it had to pass before its revolution could take place. 
 
2.4 The Posteriority of Critique 
 
Various commentators have noted the explicit historical dimension of Kant’s 
conception of his critical project. Yovel and Henrich both argue that for Kant, critical 
philosophy can only emerge after the limitations of metaphysics have been made 
explicit by its failings. Yovel summarises this as follows: 
 
Kant […] had a strong sense both of the historical nature of philosophy and of the 
new, trans-historical era that was opening. Even before Hegel, he was the first 
philosopher of the “end of philosophy” in the historical sense of the word. Many 
philosophers before him considered that their work had reached the final truth. But 
for them the history of previous philosophy was accidental, a contingent series of 
errors and opinions, unessential to the emergence of truth through their own work. 
 
110 See Thomas Kuhn, the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2012). 
111 CPR, A855/B883. 
112 Cf. Eckart Förster, the Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady 
Bowman, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
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Kant, on the other hand, situates his revolution at the end of a necessary process of 
gradual explication, a process that has made his own system possible and has been 
preserved and systematized by it. Kant's philosophy is the conclusion and 
overcoming of the inevitable historization of reason, its need to undergo a process of 
self-explication.113 
 
Similarly, Henrich claims that for Kant, 
 
before there can be an insight that there is some illusion in [...] metaphysics, there 
has first to be an original metaphysics. Only then can one start on the program of 
critical philosophy. In this sense, Kant is, so to speak, the inventor of the 
philosophical history of philosophy. Because, in his view, one cannot get to the truth 
all at once at the beginning, there are necessary stages of the development of 
philosophy.114 
 
We have seen above that Kant considers the critical path to be the only one left open 
for metaphysics. Henrich suggests that for Kant, this path itself could not come into 
view until the other paths pursued by metaphysics had proven to be dead ends. The 
‘mistakes’ of former metaphysics were in fact not simply contingent, superfluous 
errors; rather, their failings constituted a kind of epistemological prerequisite for the 
project of critique. 
 Certainly, in CPR, there is ample evidence that Kant does not believe former 
metaphysics to have been simply contingent. He ends the CPR with a chapter entitled 
‘the History of Pure Reason’—though he notes that this title names a task which is 
yet to be fulfilled, and that he will only cast a ‘cursory glance’ at the problem.115 In 
this chapter, he considers a set of opposed schools of thought which have 
characterised metaphysics since the Greeks, showing how each of them relates to his 
transcendental account of human reason. 
 Nonetheless, nowhere in CPR does Kant claim that this history is strictly 
necessary in the manner Henrich suggests here—that is, that critique should only be 
 
113 Yirmiyahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, (Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 225. 
It is clear that Yovel’s comments on philosophers prior to Kant cohere with our account of Descartes 
in the previous chapter. 
114 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p. 32. 
115 CPR A852/B880 ff. 
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possible after these earlier stages had been passed through. To find an explicit 
statement to this effect, we have to turn to Kant’s posthumously published, 
fragmentary ‘Progress’ essay.116 There, Kant writes that there are 
 
three stages which philosophy had to traverse in its approach to metaphysics. The first was 
the stage of dogmatism; the second that of skepticism; and the third that of the criticism of 
pure reason. 
This temporal sequence is founded in the nature of man’s cognitive capacity. Once the first 
two stages have been passed, the state of metaphysics can continue to vacillate for many 
centuries, leaping from an unlimited self-confidence of reason to boundless mistrust, and 
back again. But a critique of its own powers would put it into a condition of stability, both 
external and internal, in which it would need neither increase nor decrease, nor even be 
capable of this.117 
 
The history of metaphysics thus does not comprise a sheer contingent development, 
but passes through three necessary stages. The first stage is dogmatism, in which a 
priori reason is applied uncritically, extending to objects beyond the bounds of 
experience.118 This illegitimate employment of reason gives rise to a series of 
contradictions, forcing metaphysics to return over and again to the beginning, 
starting along a new, equally inadequate path. The second stage, he notes, is ‘almost 
as ancient as the first,’ and is ‘based on the total failure of all attempts in 
metaphysics.’119 Skepticism intervenes on the basis of dogmatism’s failings, 
consequently rejecting all a priori knowledge as unfounded (or indeed, in its most 
radical forms, even the evidence of the senses).120  It falls finally to critical 
philosophy to circumscribe the legitimate uses of a priori reason, and the possibility 
of synthetic judgments a priori, a task it can fulfil only after the limitations of the 
two previous positions of dogmatism and skepticism have become apparent.121 
 
116 Immanuel Kant, ‘What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of 
Leibniz and Wolff,’ in Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy After 1781, ed. Henry Allison and 
Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 349 ff. The essay was written in the 
1790s for an essay competition, but remained incomplete. See Henry Allison’s introduction, Ibid., p. 
339 ff. 
117 Ibid., p. 357. 
118 Ibid., p. 355. 
119 Ibid., p. 356. 
120 Ibid., p. 356. 
121 Ibid., p. 357. 
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 Note that in this passage, Kant claims that this history is inscribed in the very 
constitution of the human faculties, writing: ‘[t]his temporal sequence is founded in 
the nature of man’s cognitive capacity.’ We argued above that Cartesian errancy, too, 
has its implicit ground in the constitution of the human faculties; Kant renders this 
point explicit. Furthermore, in contrast to Descartes, for Kant, not only does the 
ground of this history lie in the faculties, the actual concrete temporal sequence in 
which it unfolds follows from the very nature of human cognition. It will be our task 
in the second part of this chapter to trace the way in which the controversies of a 
certain domain of the pre-critical philosophical tradition, namely special 
metaphysics, have their origin in the very nature of human reason, and why Kant 
considers them to have been necessary precursors to his own project. 
  In the previous chapter, we claimed that Descartes’ method is characterised 
by its belated arrival. There is no reason why it should have emerged at the particular 
historical juncture that it did; nor does it stand in any necessary relation to that which 
preceded it. By contrast, as we have seen, Kant argues that critique can only emerge 
after certain other forms of thought have been passed through. We refer to this as the 
posteriority of critique, i.e. its necessary ‘coming after,’ to distinguish it from the 
belatedness of Cartesian method.122 
 The idea that historicity should be a function of the limitations and 
interactions of human faculties is distinctive of the modern era, and is common to 
Kant and Descartes. The implications of this thesis are wide-ranging. For it suggests 
that it is the structure of the faculties which accounts for the very being of the history 
of thought, such that this history must be understood as a product of the operations of 
the atemporal and eternally fixed structure of human reason. 
 For Kant, as for Descartes, the fact that truth should become manifest over the 
course of a history is not an irreducible feature of truth itself. Instead, it is a 
consequence of the structure of human cognition, i.e. of the conditions of our access 
to truth. Once again, it is in its distance from truth that this history unfolds; and this 
history will ultimately prove to have been a product of error. 
 In spite of the significance of Kant’s divergence from Descartes, he clearly 
stops short of the Hegelian project of a full reconciliation between reason and its 
 
122 We return to this distinction in section 2.14 below, where we show that the distinction is, in fact, 
not as straightforward as it may appear. 
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history.123 Nonetheless, in a series of notes written in preparation for his Progress 
essay,124 Kant does strike a series of distinctively Hegelian notes. At one point, he 
speculates as to 
 
whether a schema could be drawn up a priori for the history of philosophy, with 
which, from the extant information, the epochs and opinions of the philosophers so 
coincide, that it is as though they had had this very schema themselves before their 
eyes, and had progressed by way of it in knowledge of the subject. Yes! if, that is, 
the idea of a metaphysic inevitably presents itself to human reason, and the latter 
feels a need to develop it, though this science lies wholly prefigured in the soul, 
albeit only in embryo.125 
 
In a further formulation, striking in its anticipation of Hegel’s position, Kant writes 
that such a history of philosophy would be the ‘history, not of the opinions which 
have chanced to arise here or there, but of reason developing itself from concepts.’126 
 Kant never undertook the task described here. It seems unlikely that Hegel 
ever read these posthumously published fragments; and yet their anticipation of his 
own project is undeniable. 
 In spite of all of this, the motto with which Kant opens his CPR stands: the 
task of critique is the suspension of the errors which constitute the history of 
metaphysics, even if these errors admit of a certain necessity. Although he moves to 
take account of a certain necessity at work in this history, it remains a form of 
historia stultitiae, albeit of a very specific kind.127 In part two of this chapter, we will 
see that the key to understanding the necessity at work in the history of philosophy 
can be found in Kant’s concepts of error and illusion [Schein]. 
  
 
123 See chapter three below. 
124 Published as ‘Jottings for the Progress of Metaphysics’ in Theoretical Philosophy After 1781, ed. 
Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 413 ff. 
125 Ibid., p. 418-9. 
126 Ibid., p. 419. We will see in chapter three below that Hegel develops a detailed critique of the idea 
of the history of thought as a sequence of mere ‘opinions.’ 
127 On the distinction between historia stultitiae and historia sapientiae, see section 0.3 above.  
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Part Two: Kant, Error and Illusion 
 
In this part of the chapter, we examine how Kant takes account of the relation 
between critique and the tradition at the level of his first philosophy—specifically, in 
the context of the dialectic of the CPR.128 In accordance with the fundamental aim of 
this thesis, we show that the relation of critique to the tradition is reflected in his 
conception of error.   
 As such, before turning to CPR, we begin with an account of Kant’s general 
theory of error, which he develops most extensively in his Lectures on Logic. The 
account of error given here helps us to better understand both his motivations and his 
conceptual framework in the dialectic of the CPR. We will see that Kant’s account of 
error differs substantially from Descartes,’ denying the possibility of absolute error, 
and positing a positive ground of error, which he calls illusion [Schein]. We will see 
that this concept of illusion is central to his conception of a necessary history of 
philosophy, and to an ambiguity at the heart of his account of critique’s place within 
this history.  
 
2.5 The Lectures on Logic 
 
Kant’s most detailed account of error is contained in his Lectures on Logic. Kant 
lectured on logic over a forty-year period, beginning in his pre-critical years and 
continuing into the 1790s.129  His lectures were based on Gottfried Friedrich Meier’s 
Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (1752), which served as a kind of textbook for students 
taking the course. The lectures address formal logic, rather than the transcendental 
logic that Kant would first develop with his critical turn. Several course transcripts, 
as well as a book version of the lectures edited by his student Jäsche, have survived. 
The reliability of these transcripts is a matter of some dispute, and it is clear that the 
 
128 The restriction to the CPR is of course artificial; a comprehensive account of Kant’s position would 
need to take into account all of his critical and late writings. The restriction is imposed partly for 
restrictions of space, and partly because it is in the CPR that the link between error and the history of 
philosophy is most explicit. 
129 Gerd Irrlitz, Kant Handbuch: Leben und Werk, 2nd Edition (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler), 2010, p. 495. 
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volume edited by Jäsche mixes together material from different points in Kant’s 
career, as well as adding material found in none of the lecture transcripts.130 
 Nonetheless, the account of error in these lectures is remarkably consistent, 
save for a subtle but decisive shift accompanying Kant’s critical turn.131 Furthermore, 
Kant does not simply present a summary account of Meier’s conception of error. 
Rather, from the earliest surviving transcripts onward, he is highly critical of Meier’s 
position, presenting his own competing theory in response. We will see that Kant’s 
revision of Meier’s account of error provides important clues to the motivation for 
his account of dialectic in CPR. 
 Before turning to the detail of Kant’s critique of Meier, it is important to note 
a major continuity between Descartes and Kant on the topic of error in these 
lectures—namely, its status as an anomaly. 
 
2.6 Error as an Anomaly 
 
 Like Descartes, Kant defines error as the positive assent to a false judgement.  
Errors thus obtain wherever we reach a judgement that P where in fact not-P (or vice 
versa).132 
 Like Descartes, Kant begins with the fundamental assumption that the human 
faculties are fundamentally oriented toward truth.133 This assumption presents Kant 
with a fundamental difficulty in explaining the phenomenon of error, similar to the 
one encountered by Descartes in the fourth meditation. If human cognition tends 
naturally toward truth, how can we explain its pervasive tendency to fall into error? 
 
130 Ibid. 
131 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop a comparative reading of the various drafts of the 
Lectures on Logic and the significance of the changes which his concept of error undergoes with his 
critical turn. Tillmann Pinder provides a partial account of this development; see Tillmann Pinder, p. 
90ff. ‘Zu Kants Logik-Vorlesung um 1780, anläßlich einer neu gefundenen Nachschrift,’ in Kant 
Forschungen: Band 1, Reinhard Brandt & Werner Stark (eds.) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987), pp. 79-
104. Throughout, I draw on the most relevant passages from the various drafts, distinguishing between 
the pre-critical and critical periods. 
132 In distinction to Descartes, Kant defines judgement as an operation not of the will, but of the 
understanding.  For Kant, the understanding is self-legislating, operating according to its own intrinsic 
rules. As an isolated faculty, there is no reason why it should ever go wrong; nonetheless, it is clear 
that errors do occur.   
133 Stephen Watson identifies this assumption on Kant’s part as a fundamental assumption of the 
metaphysics of presence; see Stephen Watson, 'Regulations: Kant and Derrida at the End of 
Metaphysics,’ in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. by John Sallis 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp.71-86. 
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 As such, from the outset, Kant frames errors as an anomaly. Throughout the 
various transcripts of the Lectures on Logic, Kant points to the unnatural nature of 
error. In the Blomberg Logic, he writes that ‘every error is a phaenomenon, a puzzle 
in regard to the concept of its own possibility. It is, as it were, a wholly unusual, 
unnatural appearance, which contradicts the laws of nature.’134 Similarly, in the 
Jäsche Logic, we read: 
 
It is easy to have insight into how truth is possible, since here the understanding acts 
in accordance with its essential laws. But it is hard to comprehend how error in the 
formal sense of the word, i.e., how the form of thought contrary to the understanding 
is possible, just as we cannot in general comprehend how any power [Kraft] should 
deviate from its own essential laws.135 
 
Kant’s characterisation of error as unnatural and anomalous echoes the initially 
paradoxical status of error in Descartes’ Meditations. Descartes encounters this 
problem because he assumes a fundamental orientation toward truth on the part of 
the faculties, which follows from their divine provenance. Throughout the lectures, 
Kant puts the same point in terms of natural forces: no natural force, he claims, can 
of itself deviate from its course. 
 Like Descartes, Kant attempts to incorporate an account of the conditions 
which give rise to error without sacrificing the assumption that thought is 
fundamentally oriented toward truth. Indeed, his task is to provide an adequate 
account of error which does not undermine this fundamental assumption. Kant 
certainly recognises the obligation to account for thought’s tendency to err; yet it is 
important to note that from the outset, he fundamentally assumes that it is the task of 
philosophy to overcome error. Error remains an exception, and one which it is the 
task of method to eliminate altogether. The Heideggerian notion, considered in detail 
in chapter four below, that error intrinsically belongs to our thinking relation to the 
world, is thus foreclosed as a possibility from the very beginning.136 
 
134 LL, p.79. 
135 LL, p. 560. 
136 Nonetheless, we will argue below that Kant comes closer to Heidegger‘s position than is initially 
apparent – while error does not belong intrinsically to our thinking relation to the world, illusion does. 
See section 2.10 below. 
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 This corresponds perfectly to Kant’s conception of the historicity of 
philosophy. For Kant, the errant history of metaphysics will itself have been a kind of 
anomaly, a state of exception in which reason has not yet reached maturity. Even as 
Kant claims that this history admits of a certain necessity, so nonetheless, it is only 
when philosophy puts this history behind it—only, that is, when it has brought a 
close to the era of endless errors—that it will have arrived at its proper state, i.e. that 
it will fulfil its proper task of cognising ahistorical truth. That thought should ever 
have been historical amounts to a kind of exception, mirroring the anomalous status 
of error. 
 
2.7 Kant’s Critique of Meier: The Positive Ground of Error 
 
Meier’s account of the origin of error in the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre 
corresponds closely to Descartes’ account in his fourth meditation. Meier identifies 
the primary source of error as a combination of ignorance (Unwissenheit) with 
overhastiness (Übereilung).137 This clearly echoes Descartes, for whom errors arise 
through judgements reached by the will in the absence of adequate intellectual 
insight.138 As such, Kant’s critique of Meier proves a valuable point of comparison, 
serving as a kind of indirect demonstration of how Kant departs from Descartes’ 
conception of error. 
 Already in the earliest full transcript of Kant’s lectures, the so-called 
Blomberg Logic, which dates from his pre-critical period,139 Kant takes issue with 
Meier’s account of error. He argues that the account fails, since errors can never arise 
simply from a combination of ignorance and overhastiness. Kant’s criticism thus 
returns us to one of the key problems of the fourth meditation: namely, the distinction 
between error and ignorance. Kant writes: 
 
Does error not arise [...] from the lack of reason combined with the desire to judge? 
Answer: He who knows certainly that he is ignorant will not presume to judge about 
 
137 Georg Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Halle: 1752), §110. 
138 See section 1.8 above. 
139 The precise dates are not clear, though evidence suggests the text is based on a course given in the 
early 1770s. See Paul Guyer, ‘Introduction’ in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, trans. by J. Michael 
Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. xxiv. 
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something that he does not understand. But assuming that he did not feel himself 
unable, and that he thought he knew much and thus wanted to judge about much, 
then nothing more would arise from this, his efforts to judge would be in vain.140 
 
Kant’s conclusion here initially seems surprising. In stark contrast to Descartes, he 
seems to suggest that, even if we seek to form judgements in the absence of 
intellectual insight, we will not be able to do so. 
 For Kant, this does not mean that we never fall into error through 
overhastiness. Rather, his point is that overhastiness combined with ignorance is not 
sufficient to account for error. 
 To explain Kant’s point here, we need only consider the fact that, in the event 
that we do pass judgement in the absence of adequate insight, this can only be 
because we are presented with some content which misleads us. To take an empirical 
example: suppose I am ignorant of the true cause of the rising and setting of the sun. 
It is clearly possible that I might reach some false judgement regarding this cause: 
for example, that the sun rotates around the Earth. Yet in this case, it is clear that I 
cannot reach this judgement through the desire to judge alone; on Kant’s account, 
there must be some positive ground for my believing that this should be the case. A 
whole chain of reasoning, the evidence of the senses etc., thus lie behind my 
judgement. Furthermore, even if I were to come to a completely outlandish 
conclusion with absolutely no mooring in reality, this would involve some other 
faculty such as the imagination stepping in to provide a fictitious content. 
 Note that in the latter case, in which the imagination is the origin of a purely 
false content, we can still talk about the imagination as the ‘ground’ of the 
judgement. To be grounded thus does not necessarily mean to contain an element of 
truth—it simply implies that some origin must be posited as the ground of my 
judgement. In this sense, while my judgement may be false, it is never entirely 
without ground—and as such, however false it may be, it cannot be explained solely 
by appeal to a combination of ignorance and overhastiness. 
 In arguing this, Kant addresses the major problem we identified with 
Descartes’ conception of error in the previous section—namely, that if error is 
defined solely in terms of a lack, it seems we cannot account for its fundamental 
 
140 LL, p. 78 
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difference from ignorance. Where ignorance denotes a shortfall from truth, error 
constitutes a kind of excess over truth. We suggested that it is not enough to invoke 
the imperfection of human thought to explain how this excess should come to be, and 
that—to employ Kant’s terminology—there must be some force which grounds this 
deviation from truth.141 
 As Pinder notes, Kant’s critique of Meier rests on the fact that Meier attempts 
to derive something positive—the taking to be true [Fürwahrhalten] of a false 
judgement—from something negative, i.e. a lack.142  Kant puts this point explicitly in 
the (pre-critical) Philipi Logic: 
  
Errors do not arise from the limitations and weakness of the understanding. This can only 
give rise to ignorance, and not to error. Whenever a force which moves a body diminishes, 
the body in question does not change direction, but merely goes more slowly. To error 
belongs a positive moment, and not merely a lack.143 
 
Defined in terms of natural forces, we can thus say that some secondary force must 
intervene which causes the understanding to deviate from its natural course. As such, 
any account of error is incomplete without an explanation of this external force.  
 We saw in the previous chapter that in order to resolve this same question, 
Descartes appealed to the nothing. This allowed him to posit a ‘ground’ of error, yet 
one which he located outside of both the economy of truth and of the faculties of 
human thought in their proper operation. Indeed, qua nothing, this ground is 
technically not at all, such that Descartes offers no further account of it. By contrast, 
Kant insists on the need to account for this ground in positive terms. We will see in 
the later sections of this chapter that this involves the introduction of a distinction 
between the economy of truth on the one hand, and the economy of human reason on 
the other.  
 
 
141 See section 1.8 above. 
142 Pinder, Tillmann, ‘Zu Kants Logik-Vorlesung um 1780, anläßlich einer neu gefundenen 
Nachschrift,’ in Kant Forschungen: Band 1, ed. by Reinhard Brandt & Werner Stark (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1987),, p.92-3. 
143 My translation. Kant Werke 24,1 1:1; p.403. Cf. CPR, A293-295/ B350-351 
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2.8 Against Absolute Error 
 
 This notion of a positive ground of error goes hand in hand with a further dimension 
of Kant’s conception of error. In distinction to Descartes, Kant excludes the 
possibility of absolute error. Kant states this explicitly in the critical era Dohna-
Wundlacken Logic, where he states that ‘[n]o judgment could be found that would be 
wholly false. This cannot occur as long as our judgments are derived from the 
understanding.’144 
 I take it that, contrary to initial appearances, in making this claim, Kant does 
not wish to suggest that in every false judgement, there is some degree of truth, 
however slight. This would ultimately commit Kant to a pluralist conception of truth 
at odds with his entire philosophical project. Instead, it follows from his claim that 
no error is entirely ungrounded. While the judgement reached may be absolutely 
false, for Kant, there is always some explanation as to why the understanding should 
have reached this judgement.  
 This rejection of absolute error is of central importance in understanding the 
historical dimension of Kant’s critical project. For it suggests that Kant’s attempts to 
take account of the errors of former metaphysics is not motivated first and foremost 
by a desire to account for the historicity of thought. Rather, giving an account of the 
grounds of thought’s errant past is made necessary by Kant’s conviction that human 
cognition is fundamentally oriented towards truth, and as such can never fall into 
absolute error. His conception of historicity is grounded in his concern to ward off 
the spectre of absolute error, rather than the other way around. Irrlitz puts this point 
negatively, claiming that Kant’s rejection of absolute error has nothing to do with any 
kind of ‘cultural relativism,’ nor with a ‘synchretism in the bad sense, according to 
which everyone is right to a certain extent.’145 
 Nonetheless, Irrlitz also notes that this move on Kant’s part does introduce an 
implicit moment of historicity into his account of reason.146 For if Kant does away 
with the notion of absolute error, this means that philosophy’s past, too, cannot 
 
144 Kant, LL p. 458, (Dohna-Wundlacken). 
145 Gerd Irrlitz, Kant Handbuch: Leben und Werke, (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2002) p. 238. 
146 Ibid., p. 239. 
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simply constitute a sequence of contingent, absolute errors, but must be grounded in 
some way. Kant’s own attempt to position critique in relation to the broader history 
of philosophy can thus be understood as a corollary of his rejection of the notion of 
absolute error. By grounding them in the nothing, Descartes treats the ‘errors’ of the 
history of philosophy as a form of absolute error. As such, he recognises no 
obligation to give any further account of their origin. By contrast, Kant sees himself 
obliged to explain where these errors come from, thereby offering an account of the 
ground of philosophy’s historicity.  
 
2.9 Illusion as the Ground of Error 
 
In versions of the Lectures on Logic dating from Kant’s critical turn onward, Kant’s 
account of error undergoes a fundamental terminological shift. We saw above that 
even in the earliest drafts, Kant had suggested that the limitations of human cognition 
alone cannot explain the tendency to err. Instead, it is necessary to identify a positive 
ground of error—a force which intervenes from without, resulting in the 
understanding’s deviation from its natural trajectory.147 In the manuscripts dating 
from the era of Kant’s critical turn, Kant begins to refer to this positive ground of 
error as illusion [Schein].148 
 It is here that the import of Kant’s conception of error for an adequate 
understanding of the dialectic of the CPR becomes apparent. In CPR, Kant defines 
dialectic as a ‘logic of illusion.’149 As we shall see below, he identifies reason as the 
‘seat of transcendental illusion’ —a set of illusory ideas which have historically 
constituted the content of the disciplines of special metaphysics. In the light of the 
Lectures on Logic, we know that ‘illusion’ is not simply identical with error, but 
rather constitutes the ground of error; and we have also seen that Kant is obliged to 
 
147 As we will see in more detail in the following sections on transcendental illusion, this force is not 
alone responsible for error. It is also necessary that we should assent to the judgement in question, 
which remains a free decision. We are thus never compelled to assent to such a judgement. See section 
2.13.  
148 On this terminological shift, see Tillmann Pinder, ‘Zu Kants Logik-Vorlesung um 1780, anläßlich 
einer neu gefundenen Nachschrift,’ in Kant Forschungen: Band 1, Reinhard Brandt & Werner Stark 
(eds) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987), pp. 79-104; p. 90ff. 
149 CPR, B68.  
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provide such an explanation owing to his commitment to the impossibility of 
absolute error. 
 There is, however, one major inconsistency between CPR and the Lectures on 
Logic on the question of illusion. In the context of the latter, Kant identifies not 
reason, but sensibility as the ground of illusion. He writes: 
  
How is it possible for a power to depart from its own laws?—The restrictions on the 
human understanding are not the ground of errors. They are grounds of a great lack 
in our cognition {—of ignorance (which we cognize only after [acquiring] much 
science of reason)}, but not of contradiction. Now since it is nothing negative, and 
the understanding alone by itself cannot err, it must be something positive—
sensibility. The oppositum of the understanding does not judge at all, however. Now 
we have no other source. We see, then, that it occurs through the combination of the 
understanding and sensibility {thus we call the subjective in our representations}. 
Insofar as this ground lies in sensibility, we call it illusion [Schein]. This is usually 
explained as the subjective that is falsely held to be something objective.150 
 
Why does Kant identify illusion solely with sensibility as the origin of error here, 
where in CPR he will claim that reason constitutes a source of illusion? This 
contradiction is the subject of ongoing discussions in secondary literature on Kant.151 
A possible explanation for this fact is that, as mentioned above, Kant is solely 
concerned with formal logic in the lectures. For Kant, at the level of formal logic, 
neither understanding nor reason can ever be a source of error, since both function 
solely according to their own intrinsic and valid laws, unless sensibility exerts an 
unnoticed influence on them. Where we commit an error at the level of formal logic, 
this error cannot issue solely from either the understanding or reason, since each 
 
150 LL (Dohna-Wundlacken), p. 457. 
151 Indeed, the problem is heightened by an account of error which Kant gives at the opening of the 
dialectic of CPR. There, Kant repeats his claim from the Lectures on Logic that it is an unnoticed 
influence of sensibility which leads the understanding to fall into error (B 349/A293 ff.). Allison notes 
that this seems to be flagrantly contradicted by his claim in the passages which follow that reason is 
the source of illusion; see Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged 
Edition, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 323. One possible solution would be to 
suggest that it is precisely by treating the ideas of reason in terms of the pure forms of sensibility, i.e. 
space and time, that transcendental illusion arises. As such, one could claim that transcendental 
illusion, even as it has its origin in the ideas of reason, actually arises as the result of a certain 
influence of sensibility on the faculty of reason. Cf. Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental 
Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 116 ff.  
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faculty always operates according to its own laws. As we know, a judgement or 
syllogism can be logically correct, even though it is empirically false, owing to the 
falsity of its premises. Such empirical falsity is of no relevance when considering the 
merely formal logical function of the faculties. It is first at a transcendental level that 
reason becomes a source of illusion—that is, once it steps beyond the bounds of 
formal logic and begins to make claims concerning objective reality. 
 At a general level, collating the accounts given in the Lectures on Logic and 
in CPR, it seems we can define illusion as the unnoticed influence of one faculty on 
another. As Michelle Grier puts it, for Kant, errors arise ‘through the failure to take 
notice of the source of our conceptions.’152 In the Lectures on Logic, this takes the 
form of sensibility exercising an illegitimate influence on logical judgements. In 
CPR, this role is played by the ideas of reason. 
 In the Lectures on Logic, having identified illusion as the ground of error, 
Kant indicates that it is never enough to simply expose an error; rather, we must seek 
to explain the ground of the error in question: 
 
To avoid errors—and no error is unavoidable, at least not absolutely or without 
qualification, although it can be unavoidable relatively, for the cases where it is 
unavoidable for us to judge, even with the danger of  error—to avoid errors, then, 
one must seek to disclose and to explain their source, illusion [Schein]. Very few 
philosophers have done that, however. They have only sought to refute the errors 
themselves, without indicating the illusion from which they arise.153 
 
Kant’s claim here might easily be mistaken for mere pedagogical guidance. Indeed, 
he goes on to suggest that it is a matter of ‘fairness’ to the one whose thought one is 
criticising.154 Yet as we have seen above, his reasons go far beyond this. It is only by 
explaining the errors in which reason becomes entangled that Kant can maintain his 
commitment to the idea of a natural tendency of human cognition toward truth. 
 Kant suggests that very few philosophers have ever sought to expose the 
illusions underlying errors, instead merely seeking to refute them. In his own critical 
 
152 Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 109. 
153 LL, p. 562. 
154 Ibid., p. 563 
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project, he will attempt to do just this. This obligation on Kant’s part is key to 
understanding his conception of the relation between critique and the history of 
philosophy.155 As we will see, where Descartes was content to merely dismiss the 
errors of the tradition, Kant recognises an obligation to give an account of the 
illusions which give rise to these errors—illusions which, as we will see, are made 
necessary by the very structure of human reason. In this way, he provides an account 
of the ground of thought’s errant history. 
 In sum, we can see that Kant’s account of error coheres with Descartes’ in 
several ways. It is once again through the interaction of the faculties that errors arise. 
The task of critique is thus to regulate the use of the faculties, prescribing their 
proper limits, and thereby overcoming the errors into which the tradition had fallen. 
 Yet Kant’s account differs precisely insofar as he insists on the necessity of 
accounting for the ground of these errors. As we will see, this allows him to give an 
account of historicity not simply in terms of a kind of contingent epistemological 
waste product, but rather as a necessary product of the faculties. By examining the 
way in which the faculties interact, Kant is able to construct a typology of the errors 
of the tradition. There is nothing contingent about the specific errors into which the 
tradition falls; instead, they are inscribed in the very nature of the faculties. 
 We stated in the previous section that Kant does not provide a comprehensive 
account of the root of this history in reason, merely proposing the possibility of a 
‘history of reason’ which would fulfil this task. Nonetheless, in the Transcendental 
Dialectic of CPR, he realises a fragment of this project, explaining how the structure 
of reason gives rise to the conflicts which define a major strand of the Western 
philosophical tradition, namely special metaphysics. 
  
 
 
155 Karin de Boer identifies Kant as an early practitioner of ‘immanent critique,’ a practice which 
Hegel would later develop more fully. While a detailed discussion of this conception of immanent 
critique is not possible within the scope of this thesis, it is closely related to the idea that the positions 
of previous philosophers cannot simply be dismissed as errors, but must be explained from within the 
conceptual resources of one’s own philosophical project.  See Karin de Boer, (2012) ‘Hegel's 
Conception of Immanent Critique: Its Sources, Extent and Limit’ Conceptions of Critique in Modern 
and Contemporary Philosophy, ed by Karin de Boer and Ruth Sonderegger, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan) p.83 ff. 
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2.10 Transcendental Illusion in CPR: Is the Dialectic Redundant? 
 
Kant divides the Transcendental Logic of the CPR into a Transcendental Analytic 
and a Transcendental Dialectic. While the former gives an account of the categories 
of the understanding necessary for our cognition of actual objects of experience, the 
concepts of reason dealt with in the latter do not yield any actual knowledge 
concerning possible objects of experience. While the understanding has its legitimate 
use in its discursive exchange with sensibility, reason has no legitimate application to 
sensibility. Accordingly, Kant refers to the analytic as a ‘logic of truth’ (B87/A62), 
while dialectic, insofar it is applied in an attempt to expand our theoretical 
knowledge, is a ‘logic of illusion’ (B85-6/A60-62).   
 As such, it seems that the task of the dialectic is purely negative in a more 
radical sense than the remainder of the CPR. While the whole task of the CPR is 
negative, inasmuch as it seeks to circumscribe the limits of possible knowledge, 
dialectic seems to be concerned solely with a form of cognition which intrinsically 
transgresses the bounds of possible theoretical knowledge, such that it makes no 
positive contribution to our knowledge.156 By contrast, in the analytic, by 
establishing the proper limits of the understanding, i.e. its dialogue with sensibility, 
Kant is able to establish principles for actual theoretical knowledge which proceed 
directly from the understanding. 
 This has led some critics to suggest that the dialectic is superfluous to the 
essential task of Kant’s CPR. In particular, it seems that, since the analytic has 
already established that the understanding is valid only insofar as it works in 
conjunction with sensibility, and the dialectic concerns a form of conceptual 
knowledge which never enters into direct relation with sensibility, the conclusions of 
the analytic alone are enough to prevent the errors which arise from dialectic. As 
Henry Allison puts it, ‘the lengthy critique of the pretensions of reason is frequently 
viewed as largely redundant, since much of the demolition of traditional metaphysics 
was already accomplished in the Analytic through the limitation of knowledge to 
possible experience.’157   
 
156 In fact, dialectic does in fact play a modest positive role, albeit at a purely subjective level. We 
discuss this in section 2.11 below. 
157 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged Edition, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004), p.307. Both Allison and Grier provide a detailed overview of these 
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 Bennett thus begins his book-length study of Kant’s dialectic by casting doubt 
on the validity and value of the entire undertaking. It is worth dwelling briefly on 
Bennett’s reading, since his underlying assumptions reflect a broader pattern of 
neglect of the dialectic of Kant’s CPR, particularly within the analytic tradition—a 
tendency which in turn reflects a set of fundamental assumptions about the relation 
of philosophy to its own past. While Bennett finds certain arguments within the text 
to be of philosophical interest,158 he considers the broader framework to be highly 
problematic, in as much he takes it to consist in a critique of errors which Kant 
alleges must arise according to the very structure of human cognition. Bennett claims 
that Kant does not ‘seriously explain why there are just such and such metaphysical 
problems,’ adding that it is simply ‘Kant’s undignified attempt to derive his choice of 
topics from the structure of human reason rather than the philosophical 
preoccupations then current in German universities.’159 
 To understand the value that Kant attributes to dialectic, we need only recall 
his account of error presented in the previous section of this chapter. There, we saw 
that for Kant, human cognition can never fall into absolute error. He argues that it is 
never enough to simply expose errors, but rather that we must take account of their 
origin. 
 Seen from this standpoint, it seems evident that Bennett remains attached to 
an essentially Cartesian conception of error. That is to say, his account implies that it 
should be enough to simply dismiss the errors of metaphysics, and begin again with a 
clean slate, much as Descartes had done. He is not committed to the Kantian thesis 
that thought does not produce absolute errors, nor does he recognise any obligation 
to explain the ground of the errors of the tradition. For Kant, on the other hand, it is 
not enough to simply expose the error; if his account of thought is to be consistent, 
he is obliged to explain why reason should go wrong in the way it does. 
 Particularly striking is Bennett’s claim that in the dialectic, Kant simply 
inscribes the ‘philosophical preoccupations’ of his time into the structure of reason. It 
seems that for Bennett, the ideas that constitute the objects of the different branches 
of special metaphysics are little more than fictions which modern philosophy, 
 
skeptical responses to the dialectic. See Ibid., p. 307ff., and Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of 
Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 4ff. 
158 Jonathan Bennett Kant’s Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 2. 
159 Ibid., p. 3. 
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liberated from the prejudices of former ages, can simply leave behind—while 
‘useful’ ideas from this tradition can be freely retained. By approaching the dialectic 
in this manner, Bennett exemplifies a form of the enlightenment ‘prejudice against 
prejudice’ discussed in the previous chapter.160 For Bennett, the prejudices of former 
ages are mere errors which can be simply dismissed by contemporary philosophical 
method. The obligation to engage with these prejudices, or to take account of their 
origin in some manner, is simply alien to his philosophical orientation. 
 In this way, we can recognise Kant himself as a kind of early critic of the 
prejudice against prejudice, albeit within certain strict limits. For Kant, it is certainly 
not a matter of treating prejudice broadly conceived as a positive source of 
understanding, as Gadamer would later do. Instead, it amounts to the claim that a 
specific set of ‘prejudices’ which characterise the history of metaphysics are not 
simply contingent, and that this history is not a matter of entanglement in absolute 
error.161 By contrast to Descartes, for Kant, it is not enough to simply put the 
prejudices of the tradition to one side; instead, if he is to account for the 
entanglement of the history of metaphysics in these illusions without appeal to the 
concept of absolute error, he must grant these prejudices a certain necessity, even as 
he seeks to banish them as legitimate objects of theoretical reason.162 
 As Sebastian Gardner puts it, ‘the dogmatic philosophers who have sought to 
describe reality have not selected their topics at random, nor are their doctrines 
arbitrary fabrications. Rather they give voice to convictions that are natural to human 
beings (above all, according to Kant: that there is a God, that our wills are free and 
that we have immortal souls.)’ As such, ‘[c]ritical philosophy must explain why 
transcendent speculation takes the particular forms that it does, and why we are 
disposed to form certain beliefs concerning transcendent reality, and it must resolve 
the conflicts that result therefrom.’163 
 Furthermore, if our account of the ‘posteriority’ of Kantian critique in part 
one of this chapter is correct, it would seem that these prejudices are indeed a kind of 
precondition of reason’s capacity to give a reflexive account of itself. For it is only 
 
160 See section 1.3 above. 
161 Indeed, in the following, we will see below that the specific prejudices associated with special 
metaphysics, the ideas of reason, play a positive role in human knowing.  
162 Of course, in the context of practical philosophy, these ideas are clearly no mere prejudices. For 
Kant, they become prejudices only insofar as they are posited as objects of theoretical reason. 
163 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 137. 
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by examining the disputes of the philosophical tradition that the limits of reason first 
come into view. 
 At this juncture, it is worth recalling Heidegger’s claim concerning the logic 
of error cited in the introduction to this thesis. Heidegger writes: ‘We have no logic 
of error, no real clarification of its essence, because we always take error as negative. 
This is the fundamental error that dominates the entire history of the concept of 
truth.’164 We suggested that for Heidegger, it is this lack of a positive understanding 
of error which has prevented the tradition from raising the question of the history of 
being. As we shall see in chapter four, the key to his own account of Seinsgeschichte 
is a rehabilitation of the concept of error, which makes of it an irreducible moment of 
truth. 
 Kant’s dialectic is not quite a ‘logic of error’ of the kind Heidegger envisages, 
but rather a logic of illusion as the ground of error. We consider the nature and 
significance of this difference in more detail below. Nonetheless, Kant’s attempt to 
ground error in the dialectic means that, unlike Descartes, he is able to account for 
the historicity of thought at the level of his first philosophy. This confirms our claim 
in the introduction that the capacity of a philosophical system to take account of its 
own place within the history of thought is reflected in its attitude toward error. It also 
demonstrates that, contrary to Heidegger’s claim, the question of error has not simply 
been neglected throughout the Western philosophical tradition; nor is his own 
account of historicity in terms of a form of irreducible errancy without important 
precursors within the tradition. Kant’s dialectic presents us with something closely 
resembling Heidegger’s absent ‘logic of error,’ and brings with it a turn towards the 
integration of historicity at the level of first philosophy, albeit within strict limits. 
 We turn now to the text of the dialectic itself, in order show how Kant’s 
‘logic of illusion’ reflects his account of the place of critique within the broader 
history of philosophy. 
 
 
164 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 177. 
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2.11 Reason as a Source of Concepts (The Transcendental Ideas) 
 
Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic introduces a third faculty of human cognition, 
reason, in addition to those of sensibility and the understanding, treated in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic respectively. Kant defines 
reason as the highest faculty, in as much as ‘all our cognition starts from the senses, 
goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is 
nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it under 
the highest unity of thinking.’165 
 Reason thus stands in a relation to the understanding analogous to the relation 
of understanding to sensibility. If the understanding introduces conceptual unity to 
the manifold of sensibility, reason serves to bring the manifold of the understanding 
under systematic unity (B671/A643 ff). In doing so, like the understanding, it follows 
its own intrinsic principles, which are unique to it. 
 Reason fulfils this task by means of the logical function of syllogistic 
reasoning.166 As Sebastian Gardner defines it, ‘syllogistic reasoning is concerned 
with the general conditions under which one piece of knowledge follows from 
another; as when ‘all men are mortal’ provides the condition under which the 
mortality of a particular man, Socrates, may be inferred from Socrates’ being a 
man.’167 
 Gardner notes that alongside this ‘descending’ function of reason, Kant also 
posits an ‘ascending’ function.168 The ‘descending’ function provides the mediating 
premise or middle term of a syllogism which allows for one piece of knowledge to be 
inferred from another. Yet reason is not content to remain here. As Allison puts it, 
‘the unifying process does not cease with the subsumption of a given cognition under 
a universal rule by means of a mediating premise;’ rather, ‘the rule itself requires its 
rational grounding, which it can receive only by being derived from a higher 
 
165 CPR, A298/B355. 
166 A299/B355 
167 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 140-1. 
168 Ibid., p. 141. 
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principle, and so forth.’169 For every mediating premise, reason compels us to seek 
out the conditions of this premise, in a series of ‘ascending’ prosyllogisms. 
 Yet nor is reason content to simply posit an endless chain of such ascending 
prosyllogisms. Instead, it assumes that for any conditioned sequence, it must be 
possible to find the totality of conditions. In Kant’s words, reason obeys the maxim 
to ‘find the unconditioned for the conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with 
which its unity will be completed.’170 As Allison notes, this maxim can be considered 
to be the ‘supreme principle’ of reason.171 
 In seeking out the unconditioned, reason clearly oversteps the bounds of 
possible experience. While the different conditions in a series of prosyllogisms can 
be confirmed in experience, the totality of this series can never be given. To take an 
example, a causal chain of events can be given at the level of experience. The 
application of the concept of causality is legitimate here, having been established as 
an a priori condition of sensible experience. Yet reason goes a step further in positing 
the world as the total causal chain of events. Yet even though reason compels us to 
deduce this totality—since we are compelled to assume that this causal chain cannot 
go on indefinitely, but must rather have some ultimate origin172—this deduction 
remains illegitimate, since the world itself can never be given as an object of 
experience. 
 In spite of this, Kant claims that this task of introducing unity to the manifold 
of the understanding by seeking out the unconditioned is legitimate so long as it is 
limited within subjective bounds. Indeed, Kant devotes the ‘appendix’ of the dialectic 
to an account of the ‘regulative’ use of reason.173 Here, Kant argues that the 
imperative to seek out the unconditioned functions to introduce systematic unity to 
our knowledge. This unity is merely a projected unity, i.e. one toward which reason 
strives, as its normative principle, even as it is intrinsically unobtainable.174 It thus 
 
169 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged Edition, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004), p. 311. 
170 CPR, A307/B364. 
171 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged Edition, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004), p.312. 
172 In fact, reason compels us to assume both that such causal chains go on indefinitely, and that they 
do not. It is this tension which gives rise to the antinomies of pure reason. 
173 CPR, A642/B670 ff. 
174 CPR, A647/B675. 
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functions solely to bring order to our knowledge, allowing us to unite them into an 
(always open-ended and incomplete) system. 
 However, alongside this legitimate, regulative use, the compulsion to find the 
unconditioned for any sequence of conditions also means that reason functions as a 
unique source of concepts. Kant refers to these concepts as ideas.175 They are distinct 
from the concepts of the understanding, in that they have no legitimate application to 
objects of possible experience. Indeed, the objects to which they refer cannot ever be 
given in experience, but instead are purely products of reason’s own intrinsic 
imperative to search for the unconditioned for any sequence of conditions. 
 According to Kant, there are three such transcendental ideas—that is, ideas 
which have their origin a priori in the faculty of human reason: the soul, the world 
and God. Kant deduces the ideas of reason from the forms of syllogism. He notes 
that this runs parallel to his ‘metaphysical deduction’ of the categories of the 
understanding from the forms of judgement.176 Allison notes that this deduction is 
perhaps the worst received doctrine in the entirety of the CPR. Both Allison and 
Grier177 mount a detailed defence of the plausibility of this deduction; a more 
detailed treatment of their arguments lies beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be 
clarified, however, that Kant does not simply claim that to make use of syllogistic 
reasoning automatically implies appealing to the transcendental ideas—i.e. that to 
make use of syllogistic logic in some sense entails appealing to the ideas of the soul, 
the world and God. Rather, as Allison notes, Kant merely claims that it is ‘one and 
the same function (seeking the totality of conditions for a given unconditioned) that 
is operative in both syllogistic reasoning and the metaphysical reasoning leading to 
the transcendental ideas as distinct concepts of the unconditioned.’178 Similarly, Grier 
concludes that ‘to say that the ideas are derived from the forms of syllogism is to say 
merely that they are the ways of determining a particular through universal concepts 
 
175 CPR A312/B368 ff. Kant adopts the name from Plato, on the basis that Plato’s ideas precisely 
transcend all possible experience. 
176 A323/B379; Cf. Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged Edition, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 313. 
177 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged Edition, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004), p.314ff; Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 133 ff. 
178 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Revised and Enlarged Edition, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004), p. 314-5. 
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(rules) entailed in categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements, 
respectively.’179 
 The logical rules associated with each of these three forms of syllogism each 
give rise to an idea—the categorical syllogism gives rise to the idea of the soul; the 
hypothetical to the idea of the world, and disjunctive to the idea of God. Kant notes 
at this point that each of these ideas is the object of a particular discipline from the 
history of philosophy—namely psychologia rationalis, cosmologia rationalis and 
theologica transcendentalis.180 These three disciplines make up the traditional 
discipline of special metaphysics, in contrast with general metaphysics, i.e. ontology. 
The distinction dates back to Aristotle, though Kant seems to have followed Wolff’s 
division of special metaphysics into precisely these three disciplines.181 
  Grier notes that Kant’s dialectic thus offers ‘an account of the ultimate source 
of the disciplines of special metaphysics.’182 Kant treats these three disciplines of 
special metaphysics in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, the Antinomy of Pure 
Reason, and the Ideal of Pure Reason respectively. In each of these chapters, Kant is 
concerned to demonstrate how the illusions which motivate each of these disciplines 
arise naturally from reason, while equally dispelling the errors which follow from 
them. The errors arise because the disciplines treat the ideas of reason as actual 
objects. In Kant’s terminology, they ‘hypostatize’ the ideas.183  
As such, Kant derives the objects of the three disciplines of special 
metaphysics a priori from the very nature of reason. For Kant, these disciplines are 
all examples of dogmatic metaphysics, i.e. of an extension of reason beyond the 
realm of possible experience. Significantly, Kant’s account of their origin in pure 
reason allows him to consider these disciplines, and the place they occupy in the 
history of metaphysics, to be no mere contingent inventions of individual 
 
179 Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 136. 
180 CPR, A334-5/B391-2. 
181 Lucas Thorpe, The Kant Dictionary (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 225. 
182 Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 118. 
183 See e.g. CPR A384. Kant claims that this hypostatization of the ideas follows from the erroneous 
assumptions of a position he calls ‘transcendental realism,’ which takes the subjective conditions of 
space and time to apply independently of our sensibility. See CPR A369, and Michelle Grier, Kant’s 
Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 98 ff.  
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philosophers. Instead, in developing these disciplines, the tradition was following the 
imperatives of reason itself. 
 Kant refers to the ideas which function as the objects of the disciplines of 
special metaphysics as transcendental illusions. In order to understand their precise 
place in Kant’s system, as well as the function they play in explaining thought’s 
historicity, we need to examine Kant’s definition of illusion in more detail. In 
particular, we need to understand why for Kant, the illusions are necessary, even if 
the associated metaphysical errors are not, and furthermore to consider what 
implications this has for the relation between Kantian critique and the history of 
philosophy. 
 
2.12 Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion 
 
Kant’s account of the positive, ‘regulative’ task of reason occupies a minor place 
within the CPR, confined largely to the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.184 
He opens the Dialectic with an account of reason as a source of illusion; and it will 
be his primary task throughout the remainder of the dialectic to dispel the associated 
errors. 
 As already noted, the ideas are illusory precisely because, although they seem 
to be actual, they refer to objects which fall beyond the realm of possible experience. 
Nonetheless, as we saw above, this seems to be analogous to the application of the 
categories of the understanding beyond the realm of experience. What is distinctive 
about the concepts of reason such that Kant singles out reason as the ‘seat of 
illusion?’185 
 In the opening section of the dialectic, Kant notes that the hypostatization of 
the ideas differs from the ‘transcendental employment’ of the categories beyond the 
bounds of experience. The ideas are different from the categories of the 
understanding, in that they do not merely admit of illicit use beyond the realm of 
experience; rather, they actively invoke us to transgress these boundaries.186 Reason 
 
184 CPR A642/B670 ff.) 
185 In fact, in the chapter on ‘Phenomena and Noumena,’ Kant suggests that the understanding, too, 
can be a source of a kind of illusion or ‘deception’ [Täuschung]. See CPR B305.  
186 Cf. Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p.114. 
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is thus the source of what Kant calls ‘transcendent principles,’ that is, principles 
which actively compel us to transgress the limits of experience.187 Kant writes: 
 
We will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completely within the 
limits of possible experience immanent, but those that would fly beyond these 
boundaries’ transcendent principles. But by the latter I do not understand the 
transcendental use or misuse of categories, which is a mere mistake of the faculty of 
judgment when it is not properly checked by criticism, and thus does not attend 
enough to the boundaries of the territory in which alone the pure understanding is 
allowed its play; rather, I mean principles that actually incite us to tear down all 
those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes no 
demarcations anywhere. Hence transcendental and transcendent are not the same. 
The principles of pure understanding we presented above should be only of 
empirical and not of transcendental use, i.e., of a use that reaches out beyond the 
boundaries of experience. But a principle that takes away these limits, which indeed 
bids us to overstep them, is called transcendent.188 
 
As such, while the categories of the understanding admit of an application beyond 
the realm of experience, there is no ‘rule’ immanent to the understanding which 
compels us to their transcendental application. By contrast, reason itself compels us 
to stray beyond the bounds of experience, and hypostatize the ideas. As Grier puts it, 
‘the demand for the systematic unity of thought is necessarily conceived by reason as 
a transcendental principle which is objective.’ She thus notes that we cannot help but 
treat the demand for the unconditioned as objective.189 
 This has important consequences. Firstly, inasmuch as these illusions follow 
necessarily from the structure of reason, which actively compels us to seek an 
objective correlate to the ideas, they do not first arise as products of our misuse of the 
faculty of reason. Indeed, Kant claims that the ideas ‘are sophistries not of human 
beings but of pure reason itself,’ adding that ‘even the wisest of all human beings 
cannot get free of them; perhaps after much effort he may guard himself from error, 
but he can never be wholly rid of the illusion, which ceaselessly teases and mocks 
 
187 CPR A296/B353. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 121. 
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him.’190 The illusions are thus not simply contingent, nor the product of some failing 
on our part; instead, they are irreducible features of our cognitive capacities. 
 It is for this reason that Kant identifies reason as ‘the seat of transcendental 
illusion.’191 It gives rise to illusions because it positively bids us to treat merely 
subjective principles as objective, and thus to posit the ideas as actual objective 
entities. 
 As such, the dogmatic disciplines of special metaphysics are not the mere 
contingent invention of individual philosophers. The ‘endless disputes’ of the 
tradition are not merely a product of human error in the Cartesian sense—a 
contingent wandering of human thought through a shadowy realm of error which 
might just as well never have taken place. We saw in the first part of this chapter that 
Kant claims this history is inscribed in the very nature of human cognition; his 
account of dialectical illusion shows how this claim is integrated into his project at 
the level of first philosophy. 
 
2.13 Is Reason a ‘Faculty for Committing Errors?’ 
 
The idea of reason as a ‘seat of illusion’ seems to draw us very near to the ‘faculty 
for committing errors’ which Descartes introduced in a purely rhetorical mode in his 
fourth meditation.192 This would seem to contradict Kant’s commitment to the idea 
that the faculties are fundamentally oriented toward truth, and cannot in and of 
themselves give rise to errors.  
 Nonetheless, in spite of the necessity of these illusions, Kant stops short of 
identifying reason as a source of necessary error. Michelle Grier claims that this is 
one of the most frequent misunderstandings of Kant’s dialectic.193 While the illusions 
are necessary, and persist even once they have been exposed, nothing makes the 
associated errors necessary. Kant identifies illusion as the ground of error. By 
exposing this ground, we can explain how special metaphysics came to fall into the 
errors it did, without however necessarily succumbing to the same errors ourselves. 
 
190 CPR A339/B397. 
191 CPR A298/B355. 
192 See section 1.6 above. 
193 Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 4ff. 
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Even as the illusion persists, we need not err further once the ground of illusion in 
reason has been exposed by critique. 
 Kant uses an analogy borrowed from astronomy. He notes that the moon 
appears to be larger when it is rising. The astronomer knows that the moon is in fact 
constant in size, and can explain the perspectival illusion which makes it appear 
otherwise. Nonetheless, in spite of her knowing better, the astronomer cannot prevent 
the moon from appearing to be larger to her senses (B354). She is no longer 
‘deceived’ by the illusion; and yet it persists in its seeming to be so. Her vision is 
doubled, at once perceiving the illusion and understanding the science which 
contradicts and explains it. Even as she assents solely to the latter, dismissing the 
truth value of the former, so nonetheless, she cannot dispel its hold on her altogether. 
 It is by way of a reassessment of such illusions, the ground of our errors, that 
Kant comes to inscribe the historicity of thought into the very structure of reason. By 
redefining illusion not as a mere excess over reason, but rather as a product of reason 
in its proper functioning, Kant is able to ascribe a new necessity to the ideas of 
special metaphysics. At the same time, by maintaining that the associated errors are 
not necessary, he is also able to retain his commitment to the theory that the faculties 
do not in and of themselves generate errors. This also allows him to maintain that 
this history can be brought to an end by means of the critical method. 
 It is worth emphasizing the radicality of Kant’s notion of illusion. To 
appreciate this, we need only consider how we ordinarily understand the term. 
Within the Western philosophical tradition, it has largely been understood as that 
which obscures truth. Furthermore, it is something which, on being recognised for 
what it is, gives way to truth. To get to grips with an illusion is precisely to ‘see 
through’ it, and to rob it of its power to deceive. For the majority of the tradition, 
illusion is something to be overcome; once overcome, it need no longer be of further 
concern to us.194 This ‘will-to-overcome’ is inscribed in our very definition of 
illusion. Rarely do we ask after its origin, or consider it in terms of its necessity, 
since, when it is thought against the horizon of the goal of insight into truth, our task 
is always its dissolution.195 Furthermore, it is generally by means of reason (in the 
 
194 Nietzsche is a kind of exception here, insofar as he claims illusions can only be replaced with 
further illusions.  
195 Heidegger thus notes that for the vast majority of the philosophical tradition, untruth has always 
been treated as ‘what is to be cleared away [das zu Beseitigende];’ see CP p. 277 / GA 65 p. 350.  
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broadest sense) that illusion is to be overcome. The idea of an illusion which is not 
dissolved through reason, but rather positively follows from the nature of reason, is 
thus a highly distinctive feature of Kant’s critical project. 
 Kant’s understanding of illusion remains traditional in the sense that he 
ultimately treats the errors it gives rise to as something to be overcome. Nonetheless, 
his claim that these illusions follow necessarily from the structure of reason, such 
that philosophy is obliged to take account of them, constitutes a significant deviation. 
Why do these illusions persist? And, even granted that they do, why does Kant go to 
such lengths to ground them when they are, after all, nothing but illusions? This is 
precisely the point at which many commentators find the motivation behind Kant’s 
undertaking obscure. 
 Within Kant’s broader system, we can offer up various answers to this 
question. As we have seen above, the ideas are made necessary by reason’s search 
for totality, independent of any ‘use’ to which we may put them. Furthermore, they 
fulfil a legitimate subjective role in providing unity to our discourse. Finally, even 
where they violate the strictures of theoretical reason, the ideas of reason play an 
irreducible role in practical reason.196  
 For our purposes, however, what is significant is how this doctrine of 
necessary illusion relates to the question of the relation between critique and the 
history of special metaphysics. For Kant is able not only to prevent future errors; he 
is also able to explain the particular errors that have dogged the metaphysical 
tradition. 
 
2.14 Conclusion to Chapter Two: Belatedness, Posteriority and Ultimacy 
Revisited 
 
We have seen in the above that Kant’s notion of transcendental illusion as the ground 
of error allows him to explain certain moments from the history of philosophy. He is 
able both to give a plausible account of why his own method was delayed in its 
 
196 Deleuze thus suggests that transcendental illusion is merely a matter of a ‘shadow’ of the ‘higher 
interest’ of practical reason cast over theoretical philosophy. See Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties (London: Continuum, 1984), p. 27. 
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arrival, and to account for a certain necessity running through the history of special 
metaphysics. 
 Nonetheless, the limits of his approach are equally apparent. It is clear that 
Kant did not recognise any obligation to engage in a reading of the tradition writ 
large. Even as he proposes the possibility of a ‘history of reason,’ both in the closing 
chapters of CPR and in the posthumous writings, he never carries out this project. 
Furthermore, it seems that, unlike the account of special metaphysics in CPR, any 
such project would constitute a mere supplement to Kant’s thought, rather than an 
integral moment within his first philosophy. 
 Let us return to the questions we asked at the outset of the introduction: Does 
raising a philosophical question entail an engagement with the history of this 
question? In Kant’s case, we can answer this question in the affirmative. The very 
project of critique presupposes the ‘dead ends’ of rationalist metaphysics and 
skepticism before it can get underway. An undertaking such as the Dialectic of CPR 
would not be possible without reference to this history. Special metaphysics is not 
considered to be a merely contingent product of human errancy, but rather a 
necessary stage in the development of the critical method. 
 In spite of this, it is worth casting a critical glance over the success of Kant’s 
explanation of this delay. It remains to be seen whether it is truly sufficient to explain 
the ‘incubation time’ of Kant’s critical project. Does transcendental illusion provide 
us with the resources to explain why metaphysics should for so long have strayed 
from its true path? 
 We saw in the previous section that while transcendental illusion is 
unavoidable, the associated errors are not. Indeed, we argued that were these errors 
necessary, Kant could no longer defend his thesis that the human faculties tend 
naturally toward truth; reason would be a ‘faculty for committing errors,’ and would 
thus ultimately be deceptive. 
 Grier writes: ‘although the illusions that ground the metaphysical errors are, 
in each case, “unavoidable,” and “necessary,” the subsequent errors (fallacies) are 
not.’197 Grier writes in the present tense here. The conclusion she draws is in 
 
197 Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 304 
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complete accord with Kant's text. Nonetheless, we can put a slightly different 
question to Kant's text: is it necessary that we should ever have been deceived?  
 As we saw above, Kant’s external account of the place of critique in the 
history of philosophy suggests that this is indeed necessary. He argues that reason 
first had to pass through the stages of dogmatism and skepticism in order that the 
limitations of reason come into view; only then is the critical path opened. In part 
two, however, we set out solely to investigate whether Kant’s a priori account of 
human cognition has the conceptual resources necessary to support this argument. 
We must thus ask: is Kant able to ground the necessity of these errors a priori in the 
structure of human cognition? Is there anything about the structure of the human 
faculties that prevents us from seeing illusion for what it is from the very beginning? 
Is there any reason that the ‘incubation period’ of metaphysics should have lasted 
many centuries, rather than a decade, or perhaps even no time at all? In Kant’s 
‘external’ account of the place of critique within the broader tradition, he was able to 
switch freely between tenses. Yet the question strains against the grammar of the 
CPR itself, a text whose logic is bound to the present tense.  
 The ambiguity is heightened in the light of a footnote to the introduction to 
the CPR, which seems to contradict his claims in the Progress essay that the history 
of metaphysics was a necessary precursor to critique. In the passage in question, 
Kant has just introduced the question concerning the possibility of synthetic 
judgements a priori. In the footnote, he writes: ‘If it had occurred to one of the 
ancients even to raise this question, this alone would have offered powerful 
resistance to all the systems of pure reason down to our own times, and would have 
spared us so many vain attempts that were blindly undertaken without knowledge of 
what was really at issue.’198 
 Here, Kant seems to suggest that nothing need have prevented the Greeks 
from raising this question; and that, had they done so, a good deal of the history of 
metaphysics might have been circumvented. To be sure, this does not imply that the 
entire history of metaphysics was simply superfluous. And yet it exposes the 
limitations of Kant’s approach to explaining the delays of the history of philosophy; 
for it suggests that, but for the lack of the right method, we might after all have been 
 
198 CPR A10/B23. 
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spared many of the delays which characterise the history of philosophy. There is 
nothing ‘positive’ to this passage through history, as it amounts to nothing more than 
the overcoming of a shortfall. As such, had we been handed the key in advance, we 
need never have passed through it. Here, as we will see, Kant differs substantially 
from Hegel.   
 This ultimately suggests that the arrival of the critical method is poised 
somewhere between belatedness and posteriority. Even as Kant maintains that the 
passage through metaphysics was necessary before critique was possible, this 
passage serves only to bring us to the correct starting point, such that it can be safely 
bracketed off as a mere errant past.  
 It is perhaps this limitation of Kant’s approach which John Sallis has in mind, 
when he writes (in stark contrast to the claims of Yovel and Henrich cited above): 
 
not even that concealment that has rendered metaphysics a battleground of endless 
controversies (A viii) is intrinsically necessary; it is merely the consequence of the 
fact that “the common principle” had not previously been discovered—sheerest 
accident astray at the very source of all necessity.199 
 
Sallis follows these comments with the following remark: 
 
It is almost as though the history of metaphysics ought not to have been, as though it 
were, at most, the passage of reason through childhood. Having now reached the 
maturity marked by the inception of critique, reason would establish its own self-
possession beyond the reach of any radical crisis.200 
 
Sallis is surely correct to note the extremely limited scope of the historicity of Kant’s 
project. Regardless of the ambiguity as to whether the errors associated with illusion 
are ever strictly necessary—which sees critique ultimately suspended between 
belatedness and posteriority—it is clear that for Kant, historicity is a feature of 
thought in its immaturity. This makes of the history of metaphysics a kind of 
‘childhood of reason.’ Certainly, this passage through childhood is necessary. Yet 
once thought has attained to ‘maturity,’ it becomes irrelevant.  
 
199 John Sallis, The Gathering of Reason, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 7. 
200 Ibid., p. 8. 
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 Furthermore, much like Cartesian method, Kantian critique is the ‘ultimate’ 
philosophy, bringing the history of thought to a close. The historicity of thought is 
thus not an enduring feature of reason, but at most a product of its immaturity, its 
childhood—and one that is simply cancelled as soon as the critical method puts 
metaphysics onto its royal road.  
 
2.15 Intermezzo: The Economy of Cognition and the Economy of Truth 
 
We have seen that Kant claims that reason produces necessary illusions. While these 
illusions are necessarily generated by reason, they have only limited value at the 
level of theoretical philosophy, inasmuch as they have no legitimate application to 
objects of experience. Once we have identified their transcendental origin, we need 
only guard ourselves against succumbing to the associated errors. The ideas of reason 
continue to play an important regulative role, enabling us to expand our objective 
knowledge of the empirical regularities of nature. The content of the history to which 
they give rise, however, is simply left behind. It is by means of this ‘excess’ of reason 
over truth that Kant is able to give an account of a necessary history of philosophy. 
He maintains that it is only after human thought has fallen into the mistakes of 
dogmatic metaphysics that critique can intervene, giving an account of the proper 
limits of human reason. 
  Given this necessity of illusion at the level of reason, and its lack of truth 
value, we can draw the following conclusion: for Kant, the economy of human 
cognition [Erkenntnis] is distinct from the economy of truth. That is to say, human 
cognition, whose goal is the attainment of truth, intrinsically produces moments in 
excess of truth under conditions of its own normal, correct operation.201 To explain 
this more fully, it will be helpful to once more draw a comparison with Descartes. 
Recall that for Descartes, the intellect was a faculty of pure insight. So long as the 
will did not overstep its bounds by reaching judgements in the absence of intellectual 
insight, there was no reason why human cognition should ever stray from truth. 
 
201 Again, it is important to emphasize that we are concerned here solely with the economy of 
‘theoretical’ truth for Kant. It is clear that one of Kant’s reasons for restricting theoretical knowledge 
was to make way for a different form of knowing, i.e. practical reason, within which the ideas of 
reason play an important part. Yet this does nothing to alter the fact that for Kant, the history of 
special metaphysics is precisely a product of the excess of reason over ‘theoretical’ truth. 
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Properly employed, the human intellect admits of the same univocity as truth. For 
Descartes, the errors of the history of philosophy have their origin beyond both truth 
and beyond the proper economy of human cognition. As such, we can say that for 
Descartes, the economies of cognition and truth simply coincide; any error must be 
explained by appeal to some element which falls beyond the bounds of cognition. 
They are a natural feature neither of the economy of truth, nor of the human faculties. 
 By contrast, in Kant, the correct functioning of the faculties, which together 
make up the economy of human cognition, is not alone enough to guarantee the truth 
of their conclusions. Unlike for Descartes, the fact that the structure of human 
cognition necessarily compels us to a certain conclusion does not entail the truth of 
this conclusion. Instead, critique is first necessary to delimit the legitimate usage of 
reason. In the absence of critique, human cognition necessarily tends to fall into the 
‘errors’ associated with the misapplication of reason, thus generating moments 
entirely superfluous to truth.  
 Irrlitz captures the import of this distinction well when he writes that for 
Kant, ‘false theories do not arise from faulty thinking, but rather from the innocence 
of our predisposition for metaphysics. To look at the world and ourselves directly 
means to see them falsely.’202 This predisposition for metaphysics is a product of the 
economy of human cognition not in its faulty usage, but precisely in its correct 
operation. If we attempt to explain the world beginning from the natural vantage 
point of human cognition, we necessarily become entangled in illusion. The task of 
critique is to identify the law of this distortion, and so to render it neutral, even as the 
distortion persists. 
 We can thus define the errors associated with transcendental illusion as a 
necessary moment of the economy of cognition, which nonetheless has no objective 
place in the economy of truth. Transcendental illusion persists even after its falsity 
has been revealed precisely because it is an irreducible feature of the natural 
economy of human cognition. The task of the first critique is precisely to make 
explicit the gap between the two economies. That is to say, Kant wishes to prevent 
human cognition from simply circulating between the poles of the contradictions 
which are intrinsic to its own natural economy, and restrict its usage in such a way 
 
202 Gerd Irrlitz, Kant Handbuch: Leben und Werk, 2nd Edition (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2010), p. 239, 
my translation. 
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that it attains to the univocity proper to truth.203 Even as the illusions of reason can 
never be dispelled entirely, we can guard against succumbing to the error of treating 
the associated illusions as necessary moments in the economy of truth.  
 It is in this disjunction between the economies of human cognition and truth 
that Kant locates the origin of the historicity of thought. The history of special 
metaphysics unfolds in this space, generated by the natural inclinations of the 
faculties of human cognition. The necessary moments of the history of special 
metaphysics can thus be deduced by accounting for the precise way in which the 
economy of human cognition deviates from the economy of truth. The ‘errors’ into 
which it falls are thus far from contingent, but rather follow from a failure to reflect 
on this disjunction between truth and reason.   
 It is worth dwelling on this distinction further here, as it is will play a major 
role in the remainder of this thesis. Indeed, it is possible to situate all of the thinkers 
considered in this thesis schematically in terms of this distinction. Furthermore, in 
each case, this distinction is crucial to their account of the ground of thought’s 
historicity.   
 We have already located Descartes and Kant in terms of this distinction. In 
the next two chapters, we will see that Hegel once more posits the identity of the two 
economies. However, his position is distinct from Descartes,’ precisely because he 
introduces the mediations and contradictions immanent to the economy of human 
cognition into the economy of truth itself. He thus does not return to the idea of a 
static, self-identical economy of truth; rather, he claims that reason, with its intrinsic 
differences and contradictions, reflects a series of mediations at the level of truth 
itself.204  This mediation, which Hegel calls negativity, accounts for the historicity of 
reason as a necessary product of the nature of truth. As we shall see, this coincidence 
of the dynamic economies of truth and reason accounts for the fact that Hegel is the 
only thinker in this thesis who rejects explanations of historicity in terms of error.  
 
203 Again, it is important to emphasize that this applies only at the level of theoretical philosophy; the 
ideas play a legitimate role at the level of practical reason. 
204 As such, we reject ‘transcendental’ readings of Hegel, exemplified by Pippin’s classic study Hegel’s 
Idealism, as well as various pragmatist readings, which are premised on a similar distinction between 
reason and truth to the one we find in Kant. We claim that Hegel’s account of the historicity of thought 
gives us reason to reject such transcendental readings. When we refer to the ‘ontological’ nature of 
Hegel’s thought, it is this we have in mind. See Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions 
of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
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 Finally, for Heidegger, the economy of truth is dynamic, yet in such a way 
that it exceeds the economy of reason. The history of being precisely exceeds the 
grasp of human thought conceived as reason, without thereby entailing that it cannot 
be thought at all. As we shall see, a whole chain of Heideggerian terminology, 
including the notions of Abgrund (abyss or un-ground) and Verbergung 
(concealment) can be understood as his attempt to render this excess of truth over 
reason explicit. The history of being means that truth is historical in a way which 
cannot be reduced to the dynamism of reason, but rather requires a different mode of 
thinking. For Heidegger, ‘untruth’ no longer names a falling short of truth, but rather, 
the surplus of truth over the economy of thought. It is this excess which gives rise to 
the history of being; and it is in as much as modern human beings fall deeper and 
deeper into a relation to truth founded solely on the reason of the thinking subject 
that this history threatens to draw to a close. 
 This overview is purely schematic, and will need to be justified in the 
chapters to follow. Nonetheless, it serves as a point of orientation, and helps make 
explicit how Kant relates to the other thinkers considered in this thesis. We have 
reached a point at which the different potential relations between ‘first philosophy’ 
and the history of the discipline have begun to take on definite conceptual shape, 
centred around the disjunction between thought and truth, and the place of error in 
relation to these economies. 
 As such, both Descartes and Kant can be said to ground historical difference 
in a form of epistemological difference—that is to say, in the tendency of human 
thought to fall short of truth. Philosophy has a history precisely because of thought’s 
tendency towards error, an excess over truth generated by the faulty application of 
the faculties. The differences proper to the history of philosophy thus ultimately have 
an epistemological ground.   
 By contrast, we will see that for Hegel and Heidegger, historical difference is 
grounded in forms of difference immanent to truth itself.  
 Let us return briefly to Kant. In the light of his distinction between the natural 
economy of human cognition and the economy of truth, it seems that, in spite of all 
the differences separating Kant from Descartes, Derrida’s formulation regarding the 
metaphysical attitude toward history remains valid for Kant: thought has a history 
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insofar as it errs, i.e. in its distance from truth.205 For Descartes, this tendency 
towards error is not made necessary by the nature of thought itself, but arises from 
‘our’ misuse of thought. By contrast, Kant takes it that these errors arise as a result of 
the natural tendencies of our faculties. Nonetheless, they concur that, once these 
errors have been overcome, the history of errancy preceding their own projects 
ceases to be of ongoing philosophical relevance. Philosophy’s past has no positive 
content, serving ultimately only as a cautionary tale about the limits of human 
cognition. 
 This underlying agreement should not serve to conceal the differences 
between the two. The conceptual apparatus of transcendental illusion allows Kant to 
insert critique into history in a far more sophisticated manner than was available to 
Descartes. Yet ultimately, this history remains the product of the shortfall of the 
economy of reason from that of truth. Even as the economy of reason will have made 
the illusions of special metaphysics necessary, the task of method remains that of 
dispelling the associated errors—and so putting an end to the errant history of 
metaphysics once and for all.  
  
 
205 See section 0.3 above. 
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Chapter Three. Hegel’s Onto-logical History of Philosophy 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, we noted that Hegel constitutes an exception to our 
core thesis: namely, that the relation of first philosophy to its history is reflected in 
the concept of error. By contrast to both Descartes and Kant, Hegel understands 
thought’s historicity not as evidence of its errancy, but rather as a consequence of a 
development intrinsic to the economy of truth. 
 In the first part of this chapter, we begin with an account of Hegel’s critique 
of the idea of understanding the history of philosophy simply in terms of the opinions 
or errors of the great thinkers of the past. In the Differenzschrift, he defends a variant 
of the doctrine of historia sapientiae: the idea that the history of reason is a 
manifestation of mankind’s eternal reason. Nonetheless, at this stage in his 
development, Hegel had no way of accounting for historical difference: the 
contradictions between different historical philosophical systems, nor for the 
incubation period of his own system. 
 We then show that Hegel set out to respond to this problem in his mature 
system in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. While these lectures have been 
relatively neglected in the reception of Hegel’s thought, we suggest that they 
constitute an essential part of his philosophical system. In the lectures, Hegel 
suggests that the development of the history of philosophy runs parallel to the 
immanent development of the idea in his Science of Logic. 
 In part two, we turn to an assessment of this claim. We show that Hegel’s idea 
of a correspondence between his Logic and the VGP can be understood as an 
extension and radicalization of Kant’s grounding of the history of special 
metaphysics in the Dialectic of the CPR. 
 We will see that, while this allows Hegel to account for historical difference 
without appeal to the concept of error, his account of incubation ultimately sees him 
revert to the idea that thought’s historicity is the result of an epistemological 
shortfall—thus invoking the epistemological difference as the ground of historicity. 
While Hegel’s account remains consistent on its own terms, this ultimately means 
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that he does not escape the association between historicity and epistemological 
shortfall. 
 
 
Part One: Hegel’s Project of a Philosophical History of Philosophy 
 
3.2 Prelude: History in the Differenzschrift 
 
From his earliest works onwards, Hegel was critical of any strict separation between 
first philosophy and the history of philosophy. In the opening pages of his early Jena 
era essay The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, the 
so-called Differenzschrift, he develops a critique of what he calls the ‘historical view 
of philosophical systems.’206 By this, he understands an approach to philosophy’s 
history which disregards the truth value of past systems, instead treating them as a 
succession of ‘opinions’ to be categorized and collected in the manner of a 
contingent series of historical artefacts. While this satisfies a certain curiosity on the 
part of the collector, it ultimately destroys what is ‘living’ in a philosophical system, 
by fully disregarding its relation to truth. While noting that all philosophies are 
susceptible to being treated in this manner, Hegel suggests that the ‘spirit’ immanent 
to any given philosophical system will only reveal itself to the ‘kindred spirit’ 
[verwandter Geist] of another philosopher engaged in the search for truth.207 
 Hegel notes that an alternative to the sheer indifference to truth can be found 
in Reinhold’s approach to the history of philosophy. He claims that for Reinhold, the 
study of the 'idiosyncratic' views of past philosophers constitutes a kind of invaluable 
'preliminary exercise' [Vorübung] for philosophy. By exposing the limits of these 
earlier philosophical systems, we may hope to improve on them, and thus to finally 
succeed where they had failed. In contrast to the sheer indifference of the historian, 
Reinhold thus envisages the history of philosophy as a kind of ‘useful,’ indeed 
perhaps indispensable resource for contemporary philosophy. 
 Nonetheless, Hegel is once again critical of this approach. The precise details 
of his critique are worth examining, as they reveal a great deal about the radicality of 
 
206 DS, p. 80. 
207 Ibid., p. 81. 
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his own position. Hegel caricatures Reinhold’s position by suggesting that he treats 
philosophy as a kind of ‘handicraft.’ He writes: 
 
As can be seen, the project of such an investigation presupposes an image of 
philosophy as a handicraft, something that can be improved by newly invented turns 
of skill [Handgriffe]. Each new invention presupposes acquaintance with the turns 
already in use and with the purposes they serve; but after all the improvements made 
so far, the principal task remains. Reinhold evidently seems to think of this task as 
the finding of a universally valid and ultimate turn of skill [ein allgemeingültiger 
letzter Handgriff] such that the work completes itself automatically for anyone who 
can get acquainted with it.208 
 
Hegel argues that Reinhold views philosophy as a kind of ‘handicraft’ whose ‘turns 
of skill’ or techniques [Handgriffe] are gradually improved over time. Knowledge of 
prior philosophy can help us to improve this technique; yet ultimately, those familiar 
with the latest techniques are always better equipped to deal with philosophy’s tasks 
than their predecessors. Above all, Reinhold considers his own task to be the 
discovery of a ‘universally valid ultimate turn of skill,’ which would effectively 
allow anyone who had mastered it to resolve the tasks of philosophy once and for all. 
The history of philosophy would thus be overcome and rendered obsolete by the 
mastery of this new Handgriff. 
 In fact, this is a figure that can be found in many more recent engagements 
with the history of philosophy. Such readings assume that earlier thinkers lacked the 
necessary conceptual means to correctly phrase the problems of philosophy, instead 
expressing them in an imperfect vocabulary, which thus hindered their ability to 
solve them. Ultimately, this amounts to the claim that the history of philosophy has 
been a question of awaiting the development of the right method. For Reinhold, as 
indeed for Descartes and for Kant, it is the discovery of such a method that finally 
puts philosophy on a secure footing. 
 Viewed from the perspective of this universally valid final Handgriff, all prior 
philosophical systems are thus reduced to nothing more than ‘the preliminary 
 
208 DS, p. 86. 
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exercises of great minds,’209  or worse still, mere ‘mental confusions.’210 They may 
have been a useful or even necessary stage along the way to the development of this 
method; yet ultimately, they are rendered obsolete by the new method, which allows 
anyone who has learned it to answer the questions of philosophy as if 
‘automatically.’ 
 Hegel insists, on the contrary, that all philosophical systems must be 
understood as a product of reason, which is itself a manifestation of the absolute, 
which is eternally ‘one and the same.’211 Philosophy is not a matter of learning to 
apply some set of rules or principles worked out over the course of a contingent 
history. On the contrary, he claims that wherever reason ‘has complied with and 
recognised itself,’ it has produced a ‘true philosophy,’ thus fulfilling philosophy’s 
task, which is ‘the same for all ages.’212 
 At the time of the composition of the Differenzschrift, Hegel understood the 
history of philosophy in terms of historia sapientiae, as defined in the introduction to 
this thesis. The history of philosophy is not the history of humanity’s perpetual 
errancy, but rather a manifestation of its eternal reason. The most surprising element 
of Hegel’s account here is his claim that, with regard to the inner essence of 
philosophy, there are neither ‘predecessors nor successors’ in the history of 
philosophy.213 This clearly contradicts his position in the published versions of the 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, where he envisages this history in terms of a 
progress culminating in his own system.214 Indeed, Eckart Förster writes of Hegel’s 
position in the Differenzschrift that ‘it is hard to imagine a more dramatic about-face 
than Hegel’s announcement four years later in a lecture on the history of philosophy 
that “the further this development advances, the more perfect philosophy 
becomes”.’215 
 
209 DS p. 87; translation modified. 
210 Ibid., translation modified. 
211 DS, p. 87. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Indeed, Jaeschke notes that Hegel’s own arguments against Reinhold’s position in the 
Differenzschrift would later be used against him as criticisms of his own mature conception of the 
history of philosophy. See Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule, (Stuttgart: J.B. 
Metzler, 2010), p. 115. 
215 Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady 
Bowman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 287. 
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 Nonetheless, I take it that Hegel’s mature approach to the history of 
philosophy does not constitute a simple reversal of his position in the 
Differenzschrift, such that the critical dimension of his account here remains valid 
from the perspective of his mature system. On the one hand, while Hegel clearly 
revokes the idea that there are no ‘predecessors and successors’ in the history of 
philosophy, he remains committed to the idea that philosophy is never a matter of 
mere ‘opinions.’ 
 Indeed, the only substantial shift is in Hegel’s ‘positive’ account of the 
historicity of philosophy. In the Differenzschrift, Hegel has no way of taking account 
of historical difference. On the one hand, he has effectively rejected the notion that 
historical difference is the product of epistemological difference, as it was for 
Descartes and for Kant. For Hegel suggests that the various philosophical systems of 
the past are not the products of some of epistemological shortfall, but are always an 
expression of reason itself, and are always perfect in their kind. 
  On the other hand, he maintains that reason is eternal and self-identical. His 
account implies that all philosophical systems are effectively ‘timeless’ 
manifestations of universal reason, and are thus universally valid. Hegel draws a 
comparison between philosophy and art here. He writes: 
 
Just as the works of Apelles or Sophocles would not have appeared to Raphael and 
Shakespeare—had they known them—as mere preparatory studies, but as a kindred 
force of spirit, so reason cannot regard its former shapes as merely useful preludes to 
itself.216 
 
The implication is that, just as it makes little sense to talk of progress in art, 
automatically considering later artists superior to their predecessors, so too there is 
no reason to assume the superiority of later philosophical systems. 
 Walter Jaeschke notes that the analogy between art and philosophy here is 
imperfect. In particular, the multiplicity of the different forms in which philosophy 
appears requires further explanation in a way that the multiplicity of art does not, 
precisely because for Hegel, philosophy makes a claim to truth.217 It may well be that 
 
216 DS, p. 89. 
217 Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2010), p. 116. 
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we can treat the tragedies of Sophocles and Shakespeare as equally ‘perfect’ 
realizations of tragedy, each relative to its own time, such that talk of progress or 
decline is senseless. Yet since philosophy makes a claim to expressing the truth of the 
absolute, which is ‘eternally one and the same,’ Hegel must offer some explanation 
as to the different forms that philosophy takes over the course of history—either 
explaining away apparent differences as manifestations of one and the same reason in 
superficially different guises,218 or by conceding substantial differences, and thus 
ultimately the superiority of some philosophical systems to others. 
 In his mature system, Hegel set out to explain the multiplicity of 
philosophical systems, as well as their temporal succession, without thereby 
renouncing his claim that philosophy is an expression of the eternal and self-identical 
absolute—and thus without appeal to the epistemological difference in the form we 
have encountered it so far. His most extensive engagement with the question can be 
found in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. In the following, we will not 
engage in a reading of the full lecture course. Instead, we will focus on Hegel’s 
introductions to his various lecture courses on the history of philosophy.219 For it is 
here that he develops both his critique of the traditional approach to the history of 
philosophy, as well as his own positive account of the historicity of philosophy. 
 
218 Hegel hints at this solution in the Differenzschrift when he claims that ‘The true particularity of a 
philosophy lies in the interesting individuality which is the organic shape that reason has built for 
itself out of the material of a particular age. The particular speculative reason [of a later time] finds in 
it spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh, it intuits itself in it as one and the same and yet as another living 
being.’ DS, p. 88. 
219 Various versions of Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy have been published. For many 
years, the only readily available version was based on a collation, in which Hegel’s manuscripts were 
mixed with students notes from the various lecture courses spanning Hegel’s entire philosophical 
career. In this chapter, I will draw on the edition published by Felix Meiner based on the original 
manuscripts (referred to here as VGP). For the most part, our reading will focus on the 1820 and 1823 
manuscripts of the introductions to the lecture course – the only versions written in Hegel’s own hand. 
Where appropriate, we draw on students’ notes from the later lecture courses. See Walter Jaeschke, 
‘Einleitung’ in G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Teil 1. Einleitung in 
die Geschichte der Philosophie; Orientalische Philosophie, ed. by Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1993), p. xxxiv. A comprehensive English translation of this edition has not yet been 
published; in the following, all translations are my own. 
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3.3 The Philosophy of the History of Philosophy 
 
The Lectures on the History of Philosophy have generally received far less critical 
attention than Hegel’s other lecture courses.220 Yet as Walter Jaeschke notes, besides 
logic and metaphysics, there is no single topic to which Hegel returned so frequently 
in his teaching.221 He first lectured on the topic in Jena in 1805/6, returning to it in 
Heidelberg and in alternating years throughout his time in Berlin. Jaeschke adds that 
the frequency of Hegel's lectures on the topic is all the more remarkable for the fact 
that, in spite of the burgeoning interest in the topic, the history of philosophy did not 
at the time belong to the standard syllabuses of German philosophy departments.222 
 The relative neglect of these lectures itself reflects prevailing assumptions 
regarding the strict division between philosophy and its history. We saw in the 
introduction to this thesis that the history of philosophy is generally treated as a kind 
of secondary subdiscipline. The study of philosophy’s history can be a useful 
resource for systematic philosophy, providing potentially useful insights, or helping 
us to avoid falling into the same errors as past philosophers. Yet this history is rarely 
understood to constitute a necessary moment of systematic philosophy. Above all, 
first philosophy rarely confronts itself with the question as to why philosophy has a 
history. As such, it is frequently assumed that, where we are concerned with Hegel’s 
systematic philosophy, his account of the history of philosophy is of at best 
secondary importance. 
 
220 Notable studies and collections of essays of Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy include 
Klaus Düsing, Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie: Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und 
Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983); Quentin Lauer, Hegel’s Idea of 
Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983); David Duquette (ed.) Hegel's History of 
Philosophy: New Interpretations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); and Dietmar H. 
Heidemann and Christian Krijnen (eds.) Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007). 
221 Walter Jaeschke, ‘Einleitung’ in G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 
ed. by Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993), p. vii. 
222 Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2010), p. 478. 
A comparative study of the various lecture courses lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In any case, 
little is known of the lecture courses from Jena and Heidelberg, for which neither Hegel's own 
manuscripts, nor students’ notes, are extant. Nonetheless, Jaeschke notes in the above cited text that 
already in Jena, Hegel presented the history of philosophy in terms of a dialectical progression, rather 
than a mere succession of opinions – a position which made a strong impression on his audience. 
Interestingly for our purposes, Jaeschke suggests that there was a far less developed connection 
between logic and history in these early lectures. This is also supported by the lack of historical 
remarks in the Jena drafts of the Metaphysics and Logic. 
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 By contrast, Quentin Lauer argues that the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy can be understood as the final part of Hegel’s triad of lecture courses on 
absolute spirit, which begin with the philosophy of art and the philosophy of religion, 
corresponding to the threefold division of absolute spirit in his Encyclopaedia.223 
They do not constitute a merely external series of reflections on the history of 
philosophy, but instead comprise the final part of Hegel’s system. As Emil Angehrn 
puts it, ‘the history of philosophy, which did not belong to the traditional canon of 
philosophical subjects (such as metaphysics, ethics etc.), is here treated as part of 
philosophy itself for the first time.’224 As such, Hegel’s task is not merely to give a 
summary of the philosophical standpoints of the great thinkers of the past. On the 
contrary, much as he did with regards to art and religion, he seeks to understand the 
history of philosophy as a necessary moment of spirit’s development. 
 Hegel poses the problem he confronts in the VGP in two distinct but closely 
related formulations. On the one hand, he treats it in terms of the problem of the 
multiplicity of competing philosophical systems. He writes: ‘it is certainly a 
sufficiently grounded matter of fact that there are and have been different 
philosophies. Yet truth is One—this insurmountable feeling or belief belongs to 
reason’s instinct.’225 This is the problem of historical difference, which he had failed 
to adequately address in the Differenzschrift. A genuine science of the history of 
philosophy must explain how, although truth is one, it comes to be manifest in a 
series of often conflicting and apparently mutually exclusive philosophical systems. 
 On the other hand, Hegel poses the problem in terms of temporality. This is 
the question as to why ‘philosophy appears as a development in time, and has a 
history.’226 Again, Hegel confronts us with an apparent contradiction. On the one 
hand, the idea is timeless and eternal. Yet philosophy as the comprehension of truth 
appears in time, in the form of a gradual progression. If human thought is always an 
instantiation of eternal truth, as he claimed in the Differenzschrift and continues to 
maintain throughout the VGP, why does the history of this thought take the form of a 
progressive development which unfolds over the course of time? 
 
223 Quentin Lauer, Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), p.9. 
224Emil Angehrn, ‘Das Denken der Geschichte. Hegels Theorie des Geistes zwischen 
Geschichtsphilosophie und Philosophiegeschichte,’ in International Yearbook of German Idealism, 
Vol. 10/2012, p. 207. My translation. 
225 VGP. p. 19. 
226 VGP, p. 29. 
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 Although Hegel does not pose the question in precisely these terms, this 
ultimately amounts to the question of the ‘incubation period’ of philosophy discussed 
in the introduction to this thesis. For it involves answering the question as to why 
truth should not be given to thought ‘all at once’ and from the very beginning, but 
should rather only emerge at the end of a long history. Hegel presents his own 
philosophical system as an a priori presentation of the idea in its eternal presence. In 
posing the question as to why the idea should appear in time, Hegel thereby poses the 
question as to the ‘delayed’ arrival of both the various systems of the history of 
philosophy, and ultimately of his own system. 
 Throughout the remainder of this chapter, our concern will be to assess 
Hegel’s responses to these two distinct but closely related problems. 
 It should be emphasized at this juncture that Hegel’s project in the VGP 
constitutes a fundamental shift in the relation between philosophy and its history. By 
posing the questions of historical difference and incubation at the level of first 
philosophy, moving them from their traditional place in the prefaces to philosophical 
texts to questions worthy of consideration in their own right, Hegel refuses the strict 
separation between philosophy and its history which dominates much of the 
philosophy of the modern era, as well as contemporary philosophy. In the 
introduction, we cited Jean-Luc Nancy’s claim that Heidegger and Derrida’s projects 
of deconstruction mean that ‘from now on, philosophy cannot be absolved from the 
question of its own historicity.’227 The same claim could equally be made of Hegel’s 
project in the VGP. 
 While Hegel’s very project of a rational reconstruction of the history of 
philosophy is often met with skepticism, or otherwise simply ignored as an 
inessential moment of his system, I take it that for Hegel, it was a problem of first 
philosophical rank. Ultimately, one cannot understand Hegel’s very conceptions of 
truth and reason without engaging in these questions. To dismiss them out of hand at 
the level of a reading of Hegel’s system risks either falling back into a strict 
separation between philosophy and its history, thus leaving the problem of historicity 
unaddressed; or else reverting to an essentially Cartesian conception of historicity, 
according to which the history of philosophy is nothing other than, in Hegel’s words, 
 
227 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Philosophy Without Conditions,’ in Peter Hallward (ed.), Think Again: Alain 
Badiou and the Future of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2004), p.44. 
 
 
94 
 
 
a ‘gallery of follies,’ or of the ‘aberrations [Verirrungen] of people who immerse 
themselves in thought and mere concepts.’228 
 
3.4 The Parallel Between History and Logic 
  
In the VGP, Hegel maintains his commitment to the idea of historia sapientiae he 
defended in the Differenzschrift—namely, that the history of philosophy is a 
manifestation of eternal reason. Nonetheless, he now commits himself to his famous 
thesis that the multiplicity of philosophical systems can be traced back to a 
development immanent to the truth itself. The various systems of philosophy of the 
Western philosophical tradition are now understood in terms of a gradual progress, 
corresponding to different stages within his own system. 
 As such, his readings in the history of philosophy are from the beginning 
guided by the results of his own philosophical system. He notes that the science of 
the history of philosophy is by no means without presuppositions, but rather requires 
that we must ‘bring the knowledge of the idea with us.’229 The study of the history of 
philosophy is thus not a study of the contingent opinions of great thinkers of the past, 
but rather ‘the study of philosophy itself, above all of the logical.’230 
 Indeed, Hegel asserts a direct parallel between the history of philosophy and 
the immanent development of the idea presented in his Science of Logic. All of the 
extant versions of the introduction to the VGP contain a variant of the claim that the 
course of the history of philosophy corresponds to the development of the idea as 
presented in the Science of Logic.231 In the 1820 manuscript, Hegel writes: ‘The 
succession of philosophical systems in history is one and the same as the succession 
of logical categories in the development of the idea. The one is merely the counter-
image [Gegenbild] of the other.’232 
 
228 VGP, p. 15. 
229 VGP, p. 28. 
230 VGP, p. 222. 
231 Cf. Walter Jaeschke, ‘Einleitung’ in G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der 
Philosophie, ed. by Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993), p. xvii. 
232 VGP p. 27. Hegel makes a similar claim in the Encyclopedia Logic: ‘The same development of 
thinking that is portrayed in the history of philosophy is also portrayed in philosophy itself, only freed 
from its historical externality, purely in the element of thinking.‘ G.W.F Hegel, The Encyclopaedia 
Logic, with the Zusätze (1830): Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. by 
Théodore F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), p. 42-43. 
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This point is put even more explicitly in the 1829/30 lecture course: 
 
The course of the Science of Logic and the history of philosophy must be in and for 
themselves one and the same. […] The progress of the Logic thus serves to verify the 
history of philosophy, and vice versa.233 
 
The task of the history of philosophy is thus not to give a comprehensive account of 
the claims made by any given philosopher. Rather, Hegel argues that the task consists 
in ‘stripping away’ the external form of the successive systems of the history of 
philosophy, exposing their ‘fundamental concept.’234  Hegel explicitly sets out with 
the assumption that all past philosophical systems contain such a ‘fundamental 
concept’ or ‘highest principle,’ which corresponds to a specific category in his own 
logic. 
 Taken at its most extreme, this would seem to imply a strict one-to-one 
correspondence between the succession of the categories presented in the Science of 
Logic, and the sequence of ‘highest principles’ in the history of Western philosophy. 
 Walter Jaeschke notes that this claim was already called into doubt in the 
1830s in the debates immediately following Hegel’s death. It was objected that, 
while Hegel makes a ‘programmatic’ claim concerning this correspondence, ‘he only 
singled out a few cases to illustrate such a correspondence between the historical and 
the logical ordo, and in even fewer cases were these illustrations plausibly grounded.’   
He concludes that further investigation of this idea of a strict parallel can only result 
in its discreditation.235 
   It is certainly true that Hegel gives relatively few examples of such a strict 
correspondence between the Science of Logic and the VGP, and that those he does 
give are often problematic. Perhaps the most famous example is the parallel between 
the passage from being and nothing to becoming in the opening pages of the Logic 
and the passage from Parmenides’ account of pure being to Heraclitus’ principle of 
 
233 VGP  p.321. It should be noted that the 1829/30 lecture course is not written in Hegel’s own hand, 
but is based on student transcriptions. 
234 VGP, p. 27. 
235 Walter Jaeschke, ‘Einleitung’ in G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 
ed. by Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993), p. xviii. 
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flux. Not only is it founded on the now widely rejected assumption that Parmenides 
preceded Heraclitus.236 Moreover, it would seem to involve placing Parmenides at 
the beginning of Western philosophy—where on Hegel’s own account, he was 
preceded by both the Ionian and Pythagorean schools.237 
 We will return to this problem later in this chapter; yet it is already clear that 
the claim concerning the parallel is at least problematic. Nonetheless, I take it that 
Hegel posits this parallel between logic and history for essential reasons. There is 
every evidence to suggest that he intended it to be taken seriously, given that he 
repeated it in one form or another in every extant version of the lecture course, 
spanning the years 1819 to 1831. Many of the readings which reject or play down the 
significance of the parallel are concerned to protect the integrity of Hegel’s broader 
system. Given the low importance attributed to the problems of the philosophy of the 
history of philosophy as a discipline, its loss could hardly be considered a fatal blow 
to Hegel’s broader thought or significance. 
 Our concern, however, is with the conceptual structures which allowed Hegel 
to posit a new form of relation between first philosophy and the history of 
philosophy. Even if we assume that the parallel between logic and history is 
insufficiently empirically grounded over the course of the VGP, or even that such a 
grounding is impossible,238 we can still endeavour to understand the conceptual shifts 
which led Hegel to make the claim, and assess its merits relative to Descartes’ and 
Kant’s grounding of historicity in error. 
 I take it that the plausibility of Hegel’s ‘parallel’ claim can best be 
investigated by treating separately the questions of historical difference and 
incubation. On the one hand, Hegel’s assertion of the parallel is intended to explain 
the multiplicity of past philosophical systems, demonstrating that, even in cases 
where they clearly contradict one another, they are nonetheless manifestations of one 
and the same eternal reason. To justify this part of his claim, Hegel simply needs to 
 
236 See Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2010), p. 
480; cf. Clark Butler, Hegel's Logic: Between Dialectic and History (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2011), p. 39. 
237 Jaeschke adds that there is no historical parallel to the concept of ‘nothing;’ Walter Jaeschke, Hegel 
Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2010), p. 480. 
238 Fulda insists that this impossibility should by no means be taken for granted; see Hans Fulda, 
‘Hegels These, dass die Aufeinanderfolge von philosophischen Systemen dieselbe sei wie die von 
Stufen logischer Gedankenentwicklung,’ in Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by Dietmar 
H. Heidemann and Christian Krijnen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007) p. 12. 
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show that the idea presented in the Science of Logic constitutes a kind of 
‘transcendental ground’ of the various systems of the Western philosophical tradition. 
Any position defended over the course of the history of philosophy must merely be 
shown to correspond to a certain stage in the development of the idea in the Science 
of Logic, while the question of the specific order in which these systems appear falls 
away. 
 On the other hand, Hegel also intends the parallel to explain the ‘incubation 
time’ of the various philosophical systems, and ultimately of his own philosophical 
system—the delay separating the passage from one system to the next, and ultimately 
to his own system as the a priori presentation of atemporal truth. It is this second 
claim which gives rise to the most problematic dimension of the parallel, namely the 
question of the specific order in which the philosophical systems emerge. 
 Hegel clearly intends the ‘parallel’ thesis to provide an answer to both of 
these questions. Nonetheless, it is surely not by accident that he poses the two 
questions separately several times in the various introductions to the VGP. Indeed, 
we will see that the conceptual underpinning of his response to each problem is 
different. It is to an investigation of these conceptual underpinnings that we now turn 
in the second part of the chapter. 
 
 
Part Two: Logic and History, Negation and Time 
 
 
3.5 The Science of Logic 
 
 Hegel’s Science of Logic is the cornerstone of his mature philosophical system. It 
commences from the standpoint of the identity of thought and being, such that it is at 
once a deduction of the pure categories of thought, and an ontology, i.e. an account 
of the fundamental structure of being.239 It is thus concerned not merely with the 
categories of human thought which determine the horizon of human experience—the 
 
239 See Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity (Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 2006), p. 115 ff.; cf. André Doz, La Logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels 
de l’ontologie (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. VRIN, 1987), p. 26. 
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project pursued by Kant in the Analytic of the CPR. Rather, it is a deduction of the 
universal logos which reveals the horizon of the determinacy of beings themselves. 
 The work opens with the most indeterminate category—pure, indeterminate 
being—before progressing through a series of ever more determinate categories. This 
progression unfolds in accordance with a strict logical necessity, such that each 
subsequent category emerges immanently from the preceding category. 
 In the first two sections of the work, the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine 
of Essence, the passage from one category to the next unfolds without any reference 
to the idea. In the former, the categories pass over into one another in the form of a 
transition [Übergang].240 While each category follows logically from the previous, 
they nonetheless appear to retain a certain independence from one another. While the 
categories become more closely integrated in the Logic of Essence, they nonetheless 
retain an independence from one another.241 
 This process comes to a halt in the final chapter of the work, the Absolute 
Idea. For at this stage, we reach another category characterized by the ‘simple unity’ 
and immediacy of the very first category, being. In distinction to being, however, 
which was empty, excluding all determinacy from itself, the absolute idea is a 
mediated immediacy. It is no longer opposed to any external moments, but rather, 
contains all of the prior moments within it as the moments of its own development. 
 In the final section of the work on the absolute idea, it becomes clear that this 
development was all along the development of the idea. This can only become 
apparent retrospectively, the result of an immanent process of which the idea is the 
culmination, and not the starting point.  
 As such, the absolute idea is not merely one ‘final category,’ which 
supersedes all of those which preceded it. Instead, it is the self-generating totality of 
the various categories through which the logic has passed up to this stage. The idea 
cannot be thought in abstraction from the process leading up to it, but is by its very 
nature a result. 
 As such, the categories of the logic are all affirmed as ‘true,’ necessary 
moments in the development of the idea. At the same time, they are now 
 
240 See SL, p. 121. 
241 Cf. Michael Theunissen, Sein und Schein: Die Kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), p. 25 ff. 
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incorporated within the absolute idea, which functions as the principle of their 
underlying unity. Each category retains its validity only as a moment generated by 
the self-development of the idea. 
  Miguel de Beistegui thus notes that the Logic: 
 
reveals the various ways in which beings can be said to be (the traditional role of the 
categories); at the same time, however, it reveals the fundamental unity of being, 
which is no longer simply of the order of the homonym, of analogy, or even of 
univocity, but of the self-unfolding of thought itself in the element of thought.242 
 
In other words, while all of the categories contained in the logic are ‘ways’ of being, 
it is only the absolute idea which provides us with the principle of the unity of these 
different ways of being. Each category is true, and plays a distinctive role in 
constituting the unity of the idea; and yet its truth ultimately derives from its 
belonging to this higher unity.  
 Over the course of the work, Hegel appends a series of ‘remarks’ to his text, 
in which he relates various stages of the development to moments in the history of 
philosophy. Commentators generally agree that these comments must be understood 
as external to the immanent development of the logic. That is to say, these remarks 
play no role in moving the dialectic forward—rather, it unfolds according to the strict 
logical necessity of the development of the idea. 
 Nonetheless, it is worth asking after the precise nature of the ‘externality’ of 
these remarks to the text. While it may be true that they do not play any role in 
advancing the dialectic, they reflect Hegel’s ambition to demonstrate that the 
development of the categories in the Logic ‘reflects’ the development of the history 
of philosophy. 
 We return to this question of the externality of the remarks below. First, we 
turn to an account of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s conception of dialectic in the Science 
of Logic. We saw in the previous chapter that for Kant, the Dialectic of the CPR 
constituted an a priori refutation of the discipline of special metaphysics. In the 
following, we will claim that Hegel’s thesis of a parallel between the VGP and the 
 
242 Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 85. 
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Science of Logic can be understood as a radicalisation of Kant’s claims concerning 
the relation between dialectic and history. By rejecting the idea that dialectic has no 
objective application at the level of theoretical truth, Hegel is able to offer a 
comprehensive account of the historicity of reason—not as a shortfall from truth, but 
as a reflection of a development immanent to the economy of truth. 
 
3.6 Kant and Hegel on Dialectic 
 
We have seen above that Hegel considers the dialectical progression in his Science of 
Logic not as the work of ‘external reflection,’ but rather as immanent to the idea 
itself. In the introduction to the work, however, Hegel claims that dialectic has 
generally been understood as an ‘external, negative activity that does not pertain to 
the matter itself.’243 He notes elsewhere that, while it had the status of a science 
among ancient philosophers, it has largely been misunderstood in the modern era.244 
 Nonetheless, he suggests that Kant’s thought has served to restore the dignity 
of dialectic in the modern age. He writes that it is among Kant’s ‘greatest merits’ that 
he treated dialectic not merely as an arbitrary external act, but rather as a necessary 
function of reason itself. He goes on to claim that Kant’s merit is to have vindicated 
‘the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to 
the nature of thought determinations.’245 
 On the face of it, this assertion seems patently false. For Kant claims 
precisely that the illusions which arise from pure reason have no objective 
legitimacy, but must instead be treated as purely subjective ideas.246 Why does Hegel 
claim, on the contrary, that Kant considers this illusion to be objective? 
 We saw in the previous chapter that Kant treats dialectic as a logic of illusion. 
The contradictions which arise from the application of the ideas of reason to things in 
themselves was shown to give rise to the incompatible positions adopted across the 
 
243 SL, p. 56. Cf. The discussion in the work’s final chapter on the ‘Absolute Idea,’ where Hegel 
writes: ‘Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as though it rested on a subjective talent and did 
not belong to the objectivity of the concept.’ SL, p. 831. 
244 SL, p. 831. 
245 SL, p. 56. 
246 Hegel also here overlooks the fact that for Kant, it is not reason itself that is contradictory; rather, 
contradiction arises when reason is applied to objects of experience. He draws this distinction 
elsewhere; see G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. by Théodore F. Geraets, W. A. 
Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §48. 
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history of special metaphysics. Kant concluded on this basis of these contradictions 
that the ideas of reason have no legitimacy at the level of theoretical truth, except as 
‘subjective principles’ providing unity to our theoretical discourse.247 
 Nonetheless, we also saw that Kant argues that, even once the ground of these 
errors is identified, the illusions of reason persist. While the critical philosophy 
allows us to avoid falling into the associated errors, it nonetheless does not simply 
dissolve the associated illusions. Rather, they are shown to be necessary products of 
reason operating according to its own internal rules. 
 As such, Hegel’s claim is that Kant correctly established the fact that the 
economy of reason intrinsically contains contradictions. These illusions are 
‘objective,’ not in the sense that they belong to the economy of truth, but rather in the 
sense that they are unavoidable and necessary products of human reason. 
 In the final chapter of the Logic on Absolute Knowing, Hegel writes of Kant’s 
dialectic: ‘It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once 
more recognized as necessary to reason, although the result to be drawn from it is 
must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant.’248 On the basis of the contradictions 
arising from the application of reason to things in themselves, Kant draws the 
conclusion that reason has no legitimate application at the level of objective truth. He 
moves to resolve the contradiction generated by the illusions of reason by drawing a 
distinction between the economy of reason and the economy of truth. By contrast, 
Hegel collapses this distinction. The contradictions to which reason gives rise are 
contradictions immanent to truth itself. He thus draws the ‘opposite’ conclusion to 
Kant, in the sense that he does not seek to resolve the contradiction by limiting the 
pretensions of reason to truth, but rather sees the contradictions associated with 
reason as the highest expression of truth. Grasped in its ‘positive aspect,’ dialectic is 
‘nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul, 
the principle of all natural and spiritual life.’249 
 Seen in this light, I take it that we can see Hegel’s thesis of a parallel between 
the Science of Logic and the history of philosophy as an extension of Kant’s project 
in the dialectic of the CPR of a partial rational grounding of the historicity of 
 
247 See section 2.11 above. 
248 SL, p. 831. 
249 SL, p. 56. 
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thought. In the dialectic of the CPR, Kant endeavoured to show that the errors of 
special metaphysics arise necessarily as a consequence of the structure of human 
cognition. This did not entail the reduction of his dialectic to a merely ‘historical’ 
narration of human errancy. On the contrary, he provided an a priori account of the 
ground of the history of special metaphysics. 
 I take it that Hegel’s ambitious project in the VGP is to demonstrate that his 
own Science of Logic provides a similar a priori account of the ground of the history 
of Western philosophy—not merely of the specific subset of special metaphysics, but 
rather of fundamental principles underlying each successive system throughout the 
entire history of Western metaphysics. This clearly does not entail the reduction of 
the Logic to a mere series of reflections on the history of philosophy. Yet at the same 
time, it implies that Hegel’s broader project involves showing how the dialectic 
immanent to pure thought is itself reflected at every turn in the history of philosophy. 
I take it that Hegel’s system is ultimately incomplete without this demonstration. 
 This also serves to explain the status of the historical ‘remarks’ appended to 
the text throughout the Logic. It is certainly true that they are ‘external’ to the 
immanent development of Hegel’s text, in the sense that they never serve to move the 
dialectic forwards. Nonetheless, this does not mean that they are reduced to the status 
of mere ‘illustrative examples,’ intended solely to assist the reader in getting to grips 
with the abstract categories presented in Hegel’s text. Rather, I take it that they 
constitute a fragmentary attempt, to be realized more comprehensively in the VGP, to 
demonstrate that the historicity of philosophy is itself grounded in the immanent 
dialectical development of the idea.  
  
*** 
 
We have seen that Hegel’s project in the VGP has its roots in an extension and 
reversal of Kant’s conception of dialectic. Where for Kant, the history of special 
metaphysics was shown to be grounded in the a priori structure of reason, Hegel 
attempts a more ambitious synthesis, accounting for the entire history of Western 
philosophy in terms of his a priori account of pure thought in the Science of Logic. 
 The major difference between Kant and Hegel on this score comes in the role 
of error in explaining historicity. For Kant, the history of thought was held at one 
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remove from the economy of truth. While the illusions of reason are necessary, the 
associated errors are not. While passage through these errors may have been 
necessary in overcoming the gap between the natural economy of thought and the 
economy of truth, once this breach has been overcome, they simply fall away, and 
play no positive role in the economy of truth itself. The space of history was thus 
opened up by the fall into error. Indeed, it is only thanks to the faulty application of 
the faculties that thought has a history at all. 
 As such, Kant effectively reduces one of the most fundamental and 
irreducible aspects of thought—its historicity—to the status of a mistake, an excess 
over truth which strictly speaking ‘ought not’ be. A whole modality of our thinking 
engagement with the world is reduced to the status of a product of a ‘mismatch’ 
between the faculties which, but for the want of the right method, need never have 
been. The nature of the historical difference separating us from the thinkers of the 
past—the object of study of the disciplines of philology, hermeneutics, and the 
history of philosophy—is to be treated as a mere chimera produced by a distortion in 
the economy of truth. Though a passage through this illusory history was a necessary 
condition of our ascent to the economy of truth, it can in no way be considered a 
history of truth itself.  
 This returns us to the second major strand of this thesis, namely, the history of 
the concept of error. We have already stated that Hegel constitutes an exception 
among the thinkers considered in this thesis, in that he dissociates historicity from 
error. As we have seen, the history of philosophy does not unfold in the ‘space of 
error,’ but rather is grounded in the dialectical development of pure thought. 
 In the following, we will see that Hegel claims that a science of the history of 
philosophy is only possible if we begin by suspending the ordinary concept of error. 
This reflects a broader suspicion on Hegel’s part concerning the role played by error 
and falsity in philosophical thought that extends throughout his entire system. 
 
3.7 ‘The Abstract Opposition between Truth and Error’ 
 
In the VGP, Hegel suggests that the ordinary concept of error is an obstacle to the 
correct understanding of the history of philosophy. Nonetheless, he notes that error 
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has long been the primary means by which philosophy explains its own past. In the 
1820 manuscript, he explains the logic behind this attitude: 
 
it is certainly a sufficiently grounded matter of fact that there are and have been 
different philosophies. Yet truth is One—this insurmountable feeling or belief 
belongs to reason’s instinct. And so only One philosophy can be the true philosophy, 
and since they are all so different, the conclusion is drawn that all others must be 
errors.250 
 
Indeed, we saw in chapters one and two that this is the logic behind both Descartes’ 
and Kant’s attitudes toward the history of philosophy. Since truth is univocal, and 
does not tolerate contradictions, both Descartes and Kant appealed to error as the 
ground of the multiplicity of competing philosophical systems. It was necessary to 
appeal to some ‘external force’ which distorts thought’s natural tendency toward 
truth, and so introduces a separation between finite thought and the economy of truth. 
 We saw in the previous section that for Hegel, this attitude can be traced back 
to a misapprehension of dialectic. Descartes attributes no importance to dialectic, 
insisting that thought in its proper operation reflects the univocity of truth. For Kant, 
on the other hand, the dialectic which gives rise to illusion is intrinsic to reason—yet 
on this basis, he draws the conclusion that reason can play no legitimate objective 
role in finite human cognition. 
 Hegel writes: ‘the philosophical knowledge [Erkenntnis] of what truth and 
philosophy are allows for an altogether difference sense of this multiplicity than 
according to the abstract opposition between truth and error.’251 In other words, the 
recognition of the dialectical nature of pure thought gives us a means to explain the 
multiplicity of philosophical systems without appeal to the concept of error. The 
genuine ground of thought’s historicity is the negativity immanent to the idea itself, 
as presented in the Science of Logic. It is only by recognizing that negation is not the 
product of a defect of thought, or of a falling short of its object, that the genuine 
nature of thought’s historicity can be understood. 
 
250 VGP, p. 19. 
251 VGP, p. 20. Cf. VGP, p. 121: ‘From the perspective of genuine thought, the usual abstract 
opposition between truth and falsity drops out completely. By the very fact that a philosophy is, it is 
true.’ 
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 Hegel had already developed a critique of the abstract opposition between the 
true and the false at the end of his Jena period, in the preface to his Phenomenology 
of Spirit. There, he notes that the tendency to understand the negative in terms of 
falsity ‘obstructs’ the approach to truth.252 He explains that falsity is generally 
understood to denote a ‘disparity’ between knowledge and substance. Where thought 
contradicts its object, it is generally concluded that thought has gone astray, 
falsifying its object. Yet he suggests that this disparity must not be understood as 
revelatory of a defect on the part of thinking. Rather, it reflects a disparity or 
negativity immanent to substance itself.253 
 As such, the passage through disparity is not the product of thought’s 
falsification of its object. Rather, the negative moment is an irreducible moment of 
truth. Truth is attained where thought overcomes this disparity, such that the resultant 
identity is truth. He writes: ‘But it is not truth as if the disparity had been thrown 
away, like dross from pure metal, not even like the tool which remains separate from 
the finished vessel; disparity, rather, as the negative, the self, is itself still directly 
present in the true as such.’254 
 It is important to note that Hegel is not claiming here that falsity per se is 
somehow an intrinsic dimension of the truth—so that all patently false statements 
must be understood to contain some element of truth.255 Rather, Hegel claims that 
when confronted with a contradiction, it is the first instinct of ‘ordinary thought’ (but 
also of past philosophers) to try to explain this contradiction by appeal to the concept 
of falsity or error. While Hegel thus stops short of treating error per se as a moment 
of truth, he nonetheless incorporates contradiction into the economy of truth, which 
has traditionally been treated as a mark of error. 
 
252 PS, p. 22. 
253 Hegel writes: ‘Although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the ‘I’ and its object, it 
is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself;’ Ibid., p.21 
254 Ibid., p. 23. 
255 Cf. Frederick G. Weiss, who claims that Hegel ‘equates falsity (not truth) with otherness or self-
discordance, and holds that the true must in some way contain the false as a vanishing element in 
itself.’  Frederick G. Weiss, ‘Cartesian Doubt and Hegelian Negation’ in Hegel and the History of 
Philosophy, ed. by J. J. O’Malley et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 87. I take it rather that 
Hegel’s claim is that negation – the moment of otherness or self-discordance – is frequently 
mistakenly understood to be grounded in falsity, where in fact it constitutes a necessary moment of 
truth’s self-development. Nonetheless, I take it that the main thesis of Weiss’ article is correct – 
namely, that we can best understand Hegel’s difference from Descartes through an examination of the 
concept of error.   
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 The concepts of error, falsity and untruth are conspicuous by their absence in 
Hegel’s system. Even in his ‘philosophy of mind,’ the Psychology in the third part of 
his Encyclopaedia, Hegel offers no explanation of how it is that thought should ever 
go wrong—to say nothing of the spectre of a ‘faculty for committing errors’ which 
Descartes was moved to entertain.256 
 I do not take this to imply that for Hegel, thought never goes wrong.257 
Rather, it reflects the fact that for Hegel, truth is no longer defined primarily by way 
of the exclusion of error. For Hegel, the task of philosophical method is not the 
Kantian task of clearing away the ‘infinite errors’ of the past in order to make way 
for truth. Rather, it is to develop a comprehensive ontology of spirit, which includes 
giving an account of its past, not merely as an errant wandering, but as a necessary 
dimension of spirit’s concrete existence. 
 We have thus reached a crucial juncture in the development of our thesis 
concerning the connection between error and historicity. In the introduction to this 
thesis, we suggested that error is the major concept in terms of which philosophy 
attempts to take account of its own history. Not only does Hegel reject this model; he 
also offers an account as to why philosophy has generally made use of the concept of 
error, showing that it rests on a misapprehension of the nature of negation. 
 Hegel’s position sees us confronted with several crucial questions. Does the 
overcoming of the abstract opposition between truth and error allow Hegel to provide 
a more comprehensive explanation of philosophy’s past? This would mean that 
ultimately, error has no role to play in accounting for historical difference. Or does 
his dissolution of the opposition between truth and error ultimately prevent him from 
 
256 See section 1.6 above.. Hegel comes closest to giving error a place in his system in his §408 of the 
Encyclopaedia Anthropology on derangement [Verrücktheit]. Here, however, error [Irrtum] is not 
treated in terms of false judgements in general, but rather of an inability to distinguish subjective 
representations from objectivity. Hegel has in mind unrealistic wishes or hopes – an inability to 
reconcile one‘s own conception of the world with its reality. He writes: ‚Unintelligent people have 
empty, subjective representations, unrealizable wishes, which all the same they hope to actualize in 
the future. They confine themselves to entirely individualized aims and interests, cling to one-sided 
principles and thereby come into conflict with actuality. But this narrow-mindedness and those 
mistakes are still not in the least deranged if the unintelligent are at the same time aware that their 
subjectivity does not yet exist objectively. Error and folly only become derangement in the case where 
someone believes he has his merely subjective representation objectively present to him and clings to 
it in face of the actual objectivity standing in contradiction with it.‘ G.W.F Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 119.   
257 Indeed, in the passage on falsity from the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel claims is necessary to 
distinguish the negative from the false ‘on account of the importance of designating the moment of 
complete otherness’ - i.e. of actual falsity. PS, p. 23. 
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offering a genuine account of the historicity of thought? Is the only genuinely 
historical thought an errant thought? These questions will occupy us above all in the 
final chapter on Heidegger.  
In the following, we examine in more detail Hegel’s account of historical 
difference in terms of the negativity immanent to the idea. By giving an account of 
his concept of refutation, we will explore in more detail the relation between his 
Logic and the different stages of the history of philosophy. We will see that while 
Hegel’s dissolution of the opposition between truth and error allows him to explain 
historical difference, it nonetheless renders his response to the question of incubation 
problematic, and that ultimately, he ends up having to posit a form of epistemological 
shortfall to explain it—thus reverting to a position far closer to that of Descartes and 
Kant than is immediately apparent. 
  
3.8 Refutation and One-Sidedness 
 
Hegel’s conception of the nature of the historicity of philosophy is perhaps most 
succinctly expressed in his doctrine of refutation [Widerlegung]. It is here that he 
reflects most explicitly on the nature of the relation between the ‘highest principles’ 
of the systems of the history of philosophy, and the comprehensive account of the 
idea in his Science of Logic. 
 According to Derrida, the very concept of refutation goes hand in hand with 
an ahistorical conception of truth. For to engage in the refutation of past philosophies 
implies that the task of an engagement with former systems is simply to show up 
their falsity, making way for one final account of truth. He writes: 
 
the concept of refutation belongs—implicitly—to an anti-historical metaphysics of 
truth. If it is possible to refute, this is because the truth can be established once and 
for all as an object, and only particular conceptions of truth, more or less valid 
approximations to this ahistorical truth, belong to history. Only knowledge, and not 
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truth, would on this view be historical, and it would be so only to the extent of its 
distance from truth, that is in its error.258 
 
Derrida notes that Hegel goes a long way towards overcoming this traditional notion 
of refutation, and with it the anti-historical metaphysics of truth. Nonetheless, he 
claims that there are essential reasons why Hegel cannot completely abandon the 
idea of refutation.259 Indeed, Hegel remains caught between a rejection of refutation, 
and its necessary retention. In the 1819 lecture course introduction, he writes: ‘With 
regards to refutation, we can say: no philosophy has been refuted; but equally: every 
philosophy is refuted and true.’260 In the following, we will need to consider in what 
sense Hegel considers past systems to nonetheless have been ‘refuted’ by his own 
system, even as he continues to affirm their truth. 
 Hegel’s most extensive account of this notion of refutation can be found in 
the chapter entitled ‘The Concept in General,’ which functions as an introduction to 
the Logic of the Concept. In the chapter, Hegel gives a summary of the transition 
from the Logic of Essence to the Logic of the Concept. At the end of his account of 
this transition, he turns to a discussion of Spinoza’s concept of substance. 
 In the third section of the Logic of Essence, Hegel claims that Spinoza’s 
concept of substance corresponds to the category of the absolute.261 In other words, 
Spinoza’s thought takes the absolute as its ‘highest principle,’ around which his 
entire system is built. 
The absolute is the ‘totality’ of all prior determinations presented in the Logic. 
Nonetheless, it still falls far short of Hegel’s absolute idea. This is because the unity 
of the absolute stands in an abstract opposition to the moments of determinacy, 
remaining indifferent to them. In contrast to Hegel’s idea, it contains no internal 
principle of self-differentiation which would give rise to its moments of difference. 
While these moments are ‘traced back’ to the absolute, they nonetheless do not ‘take 
 
258 Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), p. 2. Derrida suggests that Hegel does not completely escape the traditional 
logic of refutation; we return to this point below. 
259 Ibid., p. 3. 
260 VGP, p. 119. Hegel does not extensively discuss refutation in his hand-written drafts of the lecture 
manuscripts; nonetheless, as we will see below, he repeats this conception of refutation SL. 
261 SL, p. 536. In fact, Hegel distinguishes between the absolute and substance, distributing his 
engagement with Spinoza across the two categories. See SL, p. 541 ff.  
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their beginnings’ from the latter.262 Instead, the absolute persists as a self-identical 
unity, with no way of incorporating internal differences, or particularizing itself.263 
 Hegel claims that this captures the relation between substance and its 
attributes in Spinoza’s system. In his lectures on Spinoza in the VGP, he thus asserts 
that ‘if thinking stops with this substance, there is then no development, no life, no 
spirituality or activity.’264 
 Nonetheless, in the introductory section of the Logic of the Concept, Hegel 
insists that we cannot conclude on the basis of the limitations of Spinoza’s 
conception of substance that it is simply false. Indeed, the category of the absolute is 
a necessary stage of the development of the idea, and as such constitutes an integral 
part of Hegel’s own system. Hegel writes: 
 
‘speculative thinking finds itself necessarily occupying that standpoint and to that 
extent the system is perfectly true; but it is not the highest standpoint. Yet this does 
not mean that the system can be regarded as false, as requiring and being capable of 
refutation; on the contrary, the only thing about it to be considered false is its claim 
to be the highest standpoint.’265 
 
What is ‘refuted’ is not Spinoza’s position as such, but merely its elevation to the 
status of the ‘highest principle.’ As a necessary moment of the idea, Spinoza’s 
conception of substance is ‘true.’ Nonetheless, it remains one-sided as an ontology—
an account of the fundamental structure of being. 
 As such, Spinoza’s system cannot be ‘refuted’ by simply contrasting it with 
the absolute idea, the highest principle of Hegel’s own system, externally. Rather, the 
only legitimate critique comes in occupying Spinoza’s own position, and 
demonstrating that it contains the principle of its own refutation within itself. Hegel 
writes: 
 
 
262 SL, p. 537. 
263 See Yovel, Yirmiyahu, ‘Substance Without Spirit – On Hegel‘s Critique of Spinoza,’ p. 78. 
264 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lectures of 1825-1826 Volume III Medieval and 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Robert F. Brown 1990, p. 155. 
265 SL, p. 580. 
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‘the only possible refutation of Spinozism must therefore consist, in the first place, in 
recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that 
standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic.’266 
 
In other words, it is in the Logic itself that the refutation of Spinoza is carried out. 
For the category of the absolute demonstrates itself to be merely one moment of the 
idea’s self-development.267 By tracing the immanent transition of the absolute to the 
stage of the concept, we achieve the ‘sole and genuine refutation of Spinoza.’268 
 Taken strictly, this means that the refutation is carried out not by external 
reflection, but rather by the categories themselves. The category of the absolute 
arises as a necessary moment in the logical development of the idea, and is 
‘overcome’ or sublated by this same logic. It is thus retained as a necessary category, 
which ultimately proves to be a necessary moment of the idea. This refutation is thus 
not merely a discursive operation, carried out by Hegel in his ‘remarks’ to the text 
and his VGP. Rather, it is a form of ‘onto-logical’ refutation—a self-overcoming 
immanent to the economy of truth.269 
 I take it that Hegel intends his account of his refutation of Spinoza to be 
paradigmatic for his engagement with the entire history of philosophy. He writes in 
the VGP of ‘refuted’ systems: 
 
‘The content has thus not been refuted; all that has been refuted is its status as the 
highest, exclusive [principle]. The refutation is thus simply the reduction of a 
determination to a subordinate status, to a moment.’ (VGP p. 227) 
 
 
266 SL, p. 581. 
267 Yovel thus notes that we can best understand Hegel’s critique of Spinoza not through an 
engagement with the relevant passages from the VGP, but rather by ‘examining the concluding part of 
the ‘Objective Logic’ (the chapter on ‘Actuality,’ with special attention to the sections of the 
‘Absolute’ and the ‘Absolute Relation’) and its passage to the ‘Subjective Logic,’ in order to see — 
following Hegel’s own advice — how the major Spinozistic ideas, such as the Substance or the 
Absolute, are integrated, developed and aufgehoben in the systematic unfolding of the Logic.’ 
Yirmiyahu Yovel, ‘Substance Without Spirit – On Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza’ in Spinoza : His 
Thought and Work. Entretiens in Jerusalem, 6-9 September 1977, ed. by Nathan Rotenstreich and 
Norma Schneider, (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983), p. 73. 
268 SL, p. 581. 
269 Derrida refers to Hegel’s concept of refutation as an ‘ontological extension’ of what is ordinarily 
understood as a ‘discursive and logical operation’ carried out at the level of discourse. Jacques 
Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2016), p. 6. 
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 As such, no philosophical system is refuted, as they all correspond to a necessary 
moment in the development of the idea. Instead, what is refuted is its elevation to the 
status of the highest principle—and the only legitimate refutation is the one carried 
out by the specific category concerned in each case as presented in the Science of 
Logic. Every successive system in the history of philosophy corresponds to a 
necessary stage in the development of the idea. They are refuted only inasmuch as 
they prove to be merely one-sided determinations of the idea—and thus inadequate 
to the project of a systematic ontology. 
 Hegel’s doctrine of refutation can be understood to follow from his reversal 
of Kant’s understanding of dialectic.270 We saw that for Kant, the dialectic of the 
CPR provided an a priori account of the ground of special metaphysics. Kant did not 
simply ‘refute’ the ideas of special metaphysics externally. Instead, he saw himself 
obliged to account for the ground of their errancy. They were not strictly speaking 
‘refuted,’ in the sense of being traced back to a mere mistake. Instead, they were 
acknowledged to constitute a necessary moment in the correct operation of the 
economy of cognition. The ‘errors’ arose solely due to the failure to recognize the 
limits of human cognition. 
 For Hegel, Kant’s distinction between the economies of human cognition and 
truth collapses. Like Kant, Hegel traces the positions of the history of philosophy 
back to their ground in reason. Unlike Kant, however, Hegel does not conclude that 
the contradictions of historical difference arise through the faulty application of 
reason. Instead, he takes it that these contradictions are immanent to the economy of 
truth, and they are ‘refuted’ only inasmuch as they remain one-sided. 
 I take it that this continuity between Kant and Hegel helps to explain Hegel’s 
motivation for pursuing his thesis of a parallel between the categories of the Logic 
and the VGP. It is not a doctrine which emerges from nowhere, but rather one which 
emerges from Hegel’s Kantian heritage. It is surely no accident that the relation 
between the CPR and the history of thought on the one hand, and the Logic and the 
 
270 Karin de Boer understands Hegel‘s notion of refutation as a form of ‘immanent critique,’ and 
suggests that it has its heritage in the dialectic of the CPR. See Karin de Boer, ‘Hegel's Conception of 
Immanent Critique: Its Sources, Extent and Limit,’ in Conceptions of Critique in Modern and 
Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by Karin de Boer and Ruth Sonderegger (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), p. 83-100.  
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history of thought on the other, is reflected in the differences between Kant and 
Hegel at the level of their a priori philosophical projects. 
 
*** 
 
Hegel’s Science of Logic can be understood to fulfil the role of an account of 
historical difference—the multiplicity of philosophical systems—without appealing 
to the concept of error. Like Kant, Hegel shows that core problems in the history of 
philosophy can be traced back to the structure of a priori reason. Yet Hegel 
conceives of a way of integrating these differences into the economy of truth itself—
such that this history is never anything other than a manifestation of truth. This was 
the question he had failed to answer in his early Differenzschrift, as his solution only 
became possible with his mature understanding of the idea as a self-developing 
process. 
 We have seen that for Hegel, the operation of ‘refutation’ is no longer 
understood as an external act carried out by the philosopher. Instead, the only 
genuine refutation of a philosophical system consists in identifying its ‘highest 
principle,’ and demonstrating that it logically gives way to a higher position in which 
it is preserved. It is thus demonstrated to be a necessary moment in the development 
of the idea, and thus true—and yet is at the same time refuted as a merely one-sided 
account of the idea. 
 As such, the transition from the Logic of Essence to the Logic of the Concept 
constitutes the only genuine refutation of Spinoza. Yet at this point, we are 
confronted with a pressing question.  For Hegel must offer some explanation as to 
why Spinoza should have remained at this ‘one-sided’ conception of the absolute. 
What led Spinoza to posit the absolute as the ‘highest principle’ of his philosophy? If 
Spinoza’s system contains within it the ‘immanent dialectic’ by means of which it is 
refuted, why does Spinoza himself not recognize this? If Spinoza’s own thought is 
nothing but a manifestation of eternal reason, according to what defect does he 
remain at this underdeveloped conception of the idea? 
 In his own immanent critique of special metaphysics, Kant was able to appeal 
to the disparity between the economy of reason and the economy of truth to explain 
this delay. It was necessary that philosophy should ‘fall into’ the errors generated by 
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the misapplication of pure reason before it could recognise the limits of reason, such 
that dogmatic philosophy necessarily preceded Kant’s own critical philosophy.271 
 In Hegel’s case, however, there can be no such appeal to a disjunction 
between reason and truth. For the ‘highest principles’ of the philosophical tradition 
are not mere errors awaiting dissolution, but moments of truth itself. Expressed in 
Kantian terms, we can ask: what force is responsible for this arrestation of the 
development of eternal reason? 
We cannot expect to find an answer to this question in the Logic itself. For the Logic 
is a presentation of pure thought in its eternal truth.272 Instead, we must turn once 
more to the VGP. For it is here that Hegel explains the particular nature of the 
‘externality’ of history to the idea. 
 
3.9 The Incubation of the Idea 
 
In part one of this chapter, we saw that Hegel poses two distinct questions in the 
introduction to his VGP. On the one hand, he asks why it is that, given the intrinsic 
unity of reason, the history of philosophy incorporates multiple, apparently mutually 
exclusive philosophical systems. We referred to this as the question of ‘historical 
difference.’ On the other hand, he asks why it is that philosophy appears in the form 
of a development in time. This is the question of the ‘incubation time’ of 
philosophy—the question as to the temporal lapse which separates the different 
systems of the history of philosophy, and ultimately the question as to the delayed 
arrival of his own system. 
 This latter question is the one with which we found ourselves confronted at 
the end of the previous section. According to what necessity did Spinoza come to a 
standstill at the level of the absolute? The same question can be posed of any thinker 
within the tradition—what ‘force’ intervened to arrest the timeless self-development 
 
271 See sections 2.4 & 2.14 above. 
272  Macdonald thus notes there is ‘no logic of failure’ in Hegel’s Logic by means of which he might 
explain why thought should come to a halt at a particular point in its development. I take it that there 
is no place for such a logic of failure in the Logic, precisely because it is an account of pure thought. 
Instead, we must turn to the VGP to answer this question. Iain Mcdonald, ‘The Concept and Its 
Double: Power and Powerlessness in Hegel’s Subjective Logic’ in Hegel’s Theory of the Subject, ed. 
by David Gray Carlson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 82. 
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of the idea at a particular stage, causing a subordinate category to be elevated to the 
status of the highest principle? 
 In the 1820 manuscript, he writes: ‘the idea, thought in its repose, is indeed 
timeless.’273 The question is thus how, if philosophy is nothing other than the 
cognition of the eternal, timeless idea, philosophy itself should come to be manifest 
over the course of a history, characterized by temporality. 
 Hegel’s response to this question is to claim that the history of philosophy is 
nothing other than the idea in its concrete existence in the external element of 
time.274 It is at this point that the relation of the VGP to Hegel’s broader system 
comes into play. At the end of the Logic, Hegel argues that, having posited itself as 
the absolute unity of the pure concept, the absolute idea passes over into nature.275 
Having developed thus far at a purely logical level, prior to space and time, the idea 
now ‘freely releases’ itself into the external elements of space and time.276 
 Hegel never wrote a full ‘systematic’ account of the idea’s passage through 
the element of external existence. Nonetheless, in his Encyclopaedia, he shows how 
the idea first determines itself as nature, before passing over into the realm of spirit. 
It is over the course of this externalization that the idea takes on concrete shape. His 
Philosophy of Right and lectures on the philosophy of world history, art and religion 
all constitute moments of his account of the passage of the idea through the realm of 
spirit. At the level of spirit, the self-realization of the idea takes the form of a history, 
over the course of which human institutions are gradually transformed into 
instantiations of the freedom proper to the absolute idea. 
 In accordance with the positioning of philosophy as the final form of absolute 
spirit in the Encyclopaedia, the VGP constitute the final moment of the idea’s 
passage through external existence. Nonetheless, we will suggest that Hegel 
considers the development of the history of philosophy to run in parallel with spirit’s 
development in its other modes.   
 Inasmuch as this development unfolds in the element of time, each successive 
stage is a reflection of its own age, as the stage of development that the idea has 
 
273 VGP, p. 30. 
274 VGP, p. 30-31. 
275 SL, p. 843. 
276 On this notion of ‘release,’ see Christopher Lauer, The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and 
Schelling (London: Continuum, 2011), p. 163 ff. 
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reached in its concrete existence. Hegel thus writes that ‘precisely because it is a 
presentation of a particular stage in the development, every philosophy belongs to its 
age, and is caught in its limitation.’277 
 Hegel thus claims that we cannot ‘blame’ past philosophers for lacking the 
higher determinations of the idea, because these determinations did not yet belong to 
their stage in the ‘development [Bildung]’ of spirit.278 It is only once the idea has 
completed its passage through time that the idea can become manifest as the ‘highest 
ontological principle.’ 
 Stephen Houlgate notes that for Hegel, in distinction to Kant, the categories 
of thought are not transhistorical. In other words, they are not universally accessible 
to human thought at any point over its history, but instead only gradually become 
manifest over the course of this history. He notes that for Hegel: 
 
human thought generates the basic categories over a period of time, so they are not 
all to be found—or at least not all given the same prominence—in every epoch of 
history or in every culture. Consequently, although Hegel believes that all the 
categories discussed in the Logic will be familiar to the inhabitants of our post-
Reformation Western world, they would not necessarily all be familiar to ancient 
Egyptians or Greeks.279 
 
What is the nature of the ‘limitation’ which applies to the ancient Egyptians or 
Greeks, but not to subjects of the contemporary world? I take it that for Hegel, the 
idea cannot be recognized as the ‘highest’ principle, the fundamental structure of 
being, until it has fully permeated the totality of spirit’s reality. In other words, the 
‘freedom’ proper to the idea cannot be recognized by thought as the fundamental 
structure of being until it has been realized in the institutions of spirit’s world. 
Indeed, it is only with the freedom proper to the highest forms of art, religion and 
political institutions that the idea has demonstrated itself to be the highest principle 
of spirit’s being.280 
 
277 VGP, p. 48. 
278 VGP, p. 40-41. 
279 Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity (Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 2006), p. 13. 
280 Hegel suggests this when he notes that the inhabitants of ancient Greece and Rome lacked an 
understanding of the freedom of spirit. They did not know that man is born free. In this passage, Hegel 
associates the emergence of this consciousness of freedom with the emergence of Christianity. I take it 
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 Hegel develops this idea in the final chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit 
on Absolute Knowing. There, he claims that, when the immediate unity of thought 
and being is initially posited in the sphere of religion, spirit ‘recoils in horror’ from 
the abstract unity. For the earliest forms of religion—the religion of light—spirit does 
not recognize the animating principle of its own subjectivity, instead being 
confronted with a mere ‘self-less substantiality.’281 He claims that ‘only after it has 
externalized this individuality in the sphere of culture, thereby giving it an existence, 
and establishing it throughout the whole of existence’282 can it affirm the unity of 
thought and being. 
 This account confronts us with multiple problems. Above all, it would be 
necessary to show how the history of philosophy, as the history of the idea thinking 
itself, correlates with the other branches of history—world history, art and religion. 
Such a synthesis of the different ‘modes’ of spirit’s historicity would clearly be an 
immense undertaking. That Hegel should not have fulfilled the task at an empirical 
level need not be taken to imply its impossibility.283 
 It is not our task here to examine the argument that Hegel presents for this 
idea of the passage of the idea through time, nor to give an extensive account of it. 
Rather, our question is how it allows Hegel to respond to the question concerning the 
incubation time of philosophy. 
 Hegel’s account of the idea’s passage through time implies that the finite 
thinkers of the history of philosophy necessarily fall short of an adequate grasp of the 
absolute idea. It is only once this process reaches a close that Hegel’s own systematic 
account of the idea can be realised. Yovel thus writes: 
 
 
that Hegel‘s point is that the freedom which characterizes the concept cannot be thought as the highest 
principle of being until it has been actualised at the level of spirit‘s concrete existence. In this case, the 
conditions of this actualisation involve both political and religious institutions. See Hegel, VGP, p. 36-
7.   
281 PS, p. 489. 
282 Ibid. 
283 At the same time, we might wonder why the institutions which constitute the conditions of 
accession to Hegel’s philosophical system should take time to emerge. Hegel writes ‘Concerning the 
slowness of world spirit, one must consider 1. that it need not hurry, that it has plenty of time, - 1000 
years before you are like a day – it has plenty of time, precisely because it is itself outside of time, and 
eternal.’  VGP, p. 35. I take it that Hegel’s point is that, while world spirit is infinite, the individuals 
who carry out the ‘labour of history’ are themselves finite; yet from the perspective of world spirit, 
this passage through history is ultimately negligible. 
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‘From the viewpoint of their historical sequence, systems of philosophy are properly 
refuted in that one accepts the element of partial truth contained in them while 
developing their logical implications to the point where their inconsistencies—due to 
the partiality and one-sidedness of their governing principle — are brought to light. 
This calls for transcending the system towards a more satisfactory one that preserves 
the basic ideas of the former in a more coherent form. This process continues as long 
as the final system of philosophy — the synoptic synthesis of ‘absolute knowledge’ 
— is not attained. However, when the final system emerges, we gain a new and 
better viewpoint for refuting former philosophical theories.’284   
 
This ‘better viewpoint’ is ‘better’ precisely because it is no longer encumbered with 
the epistemological limitations imposed by spirit’s passage through time. Hegel’s 
own system could only emerge once this sequence of refutation was complete at the 
level of concrete history. The arrival of Hegel’s system is thus not ‘belated,’ but 
presupposes everything which went before it. Nonetheless, from the vantage point of 
this system, the epistemological shortfall proper to spirit in its history is overcome, 
and a complete account of the idea can be developed, allowing for a fully rational 
reconstruction of philosophy’s past. 
 It should be noted that Hegel’s account is perfectly consistent here. His 
account of the idea’s passage through time allows him to close the explanatory circle, 
answering the question of incubation. Yet for the purposes of our thesis, the 
important point is that he is only able to resolve the question concerning incubation 
by appeal to a form of epistemological shortfall. While this does not involve any 
appeal to ‘error’—for there is no false content in the history of philosophy—it 
nonetheless means that the space of historicity is once again opened up by the 
epistemological difference. It is once again as a result of a form of epistemological 
shortfall—albeit of a very particular kind—that characterises thought’s historicity. 
  
 
284 Yirmiyahu Yovel, ‘Substance Without Spirit – On Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza’ in Spinoza : His 
Thought and Work. Entretiens in Jerusalem, 6-9 September 1977, ed. by Nathan Rotenstreich and 
Norma Schneider, (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983), p. 72. 
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3.10 Negation and Time: Historical Difference and Incubation 
 
Hegel is thus able to answer the question concerning historical difference without 
appeal to the idea of error or an epistemological defect. Each successive system in 
the history of philosophy is an instantiation of the self-development of the idea. 
There is thus nothing ‘false’ in the history of philosophy except for the elevation of 
limited categories to the status of totality. The Science of Logic can be taken to 
provide the immanent principle of self-differentiation underlying the multiplicity of 
difference systems. 
 Nonetheless, Hegel cannot explain the incubation of philosophy without 
appeal to the idea of some form of epistemological shortfall. This does not constitute 
an inconsistency in the context of Hegel’s system. Nonetheless, it means that, like 
Descartes and Kant, Hegel ultimately traces historicity back to a form of 
epistemological defect. Certainly, this defect is not a ‘mistake’ on the part of 
individual thinkers within the philosophical tradition. The absolute idea cannot be 
articulated by philosophy until such time as the idea has completed its becoming at 
the level of its immediate existence. No philosopher can ‘leap over’ their own time. 
As such, we cannot talk of Spinoza, Plato or Parmenides’ ‘failing’ to attain to the 
level of the absolute idea—for it was structurally beyond their reach. Indeed, it is 
only through their thought that it gradually became manifest. In each case, the 
epistemological shortfall is a consequence of the idea’s passage through time. 
 I take it that this disjunction between Hegel’s accounts of historical difference 
and incubation accounts for the fundamental division in the reception of Hegel’s 
thought among philosophers seeking to take historicity seriously. On the one hand, 
Hegel is celebrated for his refusal to denounce philosophy’s past as a mere 
succession of errors, instead allowing us to conceive of this history as a becoming of 
reason itself. On the other, Hegel’s detractors suggest that he fails to take historicity 
seriously, ultimately subordinating it to logic.  
 I take it that this reflects a fundamental ambiguity in the relation between 
negativity and time in Hegel’s system. Jean Hyppolite famously noted that: 
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This passage from history to absolute knowledge, the passage from the temporal to 
the eternal, is Hegelianism's most obscure dialectical synthesis; history is self-
creating, like the Logos, but this creation is there temporal, here eternal.285 
 
Negativity is not refuted—such that historical difference is always preserved, albeit 
as sublated. The space of history is not a ‘space of error,’ a mere accident into which 
spirit happens to fall—a space beyond the absolute from which philosophy must 
liberate itself by means of one final ‘Handgriff’ which sets it on the ‘royal road’ to 
science. It is not a ‘foolish detour [törichte Umweg]’286 taken by spirit, but rather a 
path which it must follow, a necessary moment in its own becoming. Pace Descartes 
and Kant, there is no ‘method’ whose discovery might cut this process short. Time is 
nothing other than the becoming of the idea at the level of concrete existence. 
 Nonetheless, in his mature system, Hegel takes it that time is not the ultimate 
‘horizon’ of truth. Rather, he claims that the history of thought proves to have been a 
process in which the logical negation immanent to truth works itself out in the 
element of time. Spirit’s being in time is thus still the product of an of 
epistemological shortfall, albeit of a very specific kind, in which the idea repeatedly 
falls short of itself, before finally ‘thinking itself’ as the absolute idea in Hegel’s 
Science of Logic, thereby transcending the bounds of time. 
 In the 1819 synopsis of the VGP, Hegel repeatedly refers to the idea’s passage 
through its concrete existence as its ‘fall into time.’287 In Being and Time, Heidegger 
takes this notion of a ‘fall into time’ to be paradigmatic of the metaphysical concept 
of time.288 I take it that Heidegger’s point is that Hegel’s position ultimately implies 
that truth is achieved through a withdrawal from the element of time. The passage 
through time is a fall from truth—not in the sense of a fall into error, but rather, as a 
fall into a mode of thought which repeatedly falls short of truth. Even where this fall 
was absolutely necessary, his own philosophical system begins by leaving spirit’s 
long immersion in the element of time behind it.  
 
285 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997), p. 188. 
286 VGP, p. 116. 
287 He claims that it is necessary that ‘thought must fall into time’ [daß das Denken in die Zeit fallen 
muß].’ VGP, p. 112. 
288 See BT, p. 480 ff. 
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 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes: ‘spirit necessarily appears in 
time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not grasped its pure concept, i.e. has 
not annulled time.’289 This passage through time, along with its annulment, is 
necessary, and cannot be circumvented. Nonetheless, it is ultimately overcome—
making Hegel’s philosophical system the ultimate, final system, with which the 
history of philosophy draws to a close. In doing so, Hegel’s system overcomes the 
epistemological limitations of past systems—thereby liberating spirit from a history 
in which its knowledge of truth was always only partial and one-sided. The space of 
this history was thus ultimately a product of a form of epistemological difference —
albeit one which could not be leapt over, but instead had to be passed through as a 
necessary moment in the self-manifestation of truth. 
 
3.11 Conclusion to Chapter Three: Hegel’s Challenge to Philosophy 
 
In the above, we argued that the idea as it is presented in the Science of Logic can be 
understood to provide a kind of ‘transcendental ground’ of historical difference, 
without any appeal to error or epistemological shortfall. By asserting a parallel 
between the Logic and the VGP, Hegel attempts to show that every moment in the 
history of philosophy corresponds to a necessary moment in the immanent self-
development of the idea, by way of an extension and reversal of Kant’s project of an 
a priori grounding of the history of special metaphysics in the CPR. 
 The Logic itself provides us with no explanation of the incubation of 
philosophical systems—the question as to why philosophy should unfold over the 
course of time. We saw that Hegel accounts for this in his VGP—but in doing so, 
reintroduces the idea of an epistemological shortfall.290 This reliance on an 
epistemological shortfall does not undermine the internal coherence of Hegel’s 
system. For our purposes, however, it means that Hegel’s thought does not entirely 
escape the connection between historicity and epistemological difference. As such, 
while Hegel’s develops a critique of the Cartesian and Kantian connection between 
 
289 PS, p. 487. 
290 This shortfall is not merely epistemological, but might equally be said to be political and religious 
in nature. As we saw above, for Hegel, the cognition of truth also requires the existence of the 
institutions necessary to the proper realisation of human freedom.  
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error and historicity, he nonetheless ends up closer to them than is initially 
apparent—for historicity once again unfolds in the space of epistemological 
difference. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, Hegel’s great achievement is to have shown 
how philosophy can approach historical difference not simply in terms of error, but 
rather as a positive dimension of truth. For Hegel, in distinction to both Descartes 
and Kant, the past is not simply left behind and dismissed as a product of human 
thought’s tendency towards error. Rather, Hegel defends a position according to 
which this history is the necessary product of the fact that truth cannot be given all at 
once ‘like a shot from a pistol,’291 but must rather emerge over the course of a long 
history.  
 This allowed Hegel to take philosophy’s past seriously in a way that has 
rarely been matched in the history of philosophy. For him, the history of philosophy 
was no mere ‘sub-discipline’ of philosophy, but rather a necessary moment in his 
system. The conflicts which characterise historical difference were no longer seen as 
grounds to dismiss any serious philosophical consideration of the past; instead, 
Hegel’s position suggests an obligation to take account of this difference. 
Furthermore, his approach constitutes a challenge to philosophy which has 
rarely been adequately met. Many of Hegel’s critics have pointed to what they 
consider the reductive side of his approach to historicity. Yet for the most part, these 
same critics have lapsed back into a position which simply dismisses this 
engagement with the past as a legitimate philosophical enterprise, preferring instead 
the kind of clean break advocated by Descartes. The same can be said of 
commentators sympathetic to Hegel’s project, yet who prefer to dismiss his claims 
concerning the parallel between his logic and the history of philosophy, thereby 
neglecting one of the most crucial questions raised by his system.   
In this way, Hegel’s alleged ‘reduction’ of the past to a moment of his system 
has in many quarters been countered with a sheer indifference to the past. By 
contrast, Hegel always understood the past in terms of its truth. In spite of objections 
to the allegedly reductive nature of his readings, his VGP undoubtedly constitute the 
richest and most extensive engagement with philosophy’s past in the entire Western 
 
291 PS, p. 16. 
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canon. To think philosophy’s history in Hegel’s wake must mean rising to this 
challenge, and not simply reverting to the idea of the past a series of errant 
‘opinions.’  
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Chapter 4. Heidegger’s Errant History of Being 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the final chapter, we turn to an account of the status of philosophy’s past in the 
thought of Martin Heidegger. The question of historicity is a constant theme from his 
earliest writings onward. Yet it is first in the years following the publication of Being 
and Time that Heidegger developed a stringent conception of the relation of 
philosophy to its own past. With his notion of the ‘history of being,’ developed in a 
series of writings beginning in the 1930s, Heidegger aims to take seriously the idea 
that truth itself has a history, while also overcoming the perceived pitfalls of Hegel’s 
onto-logical approach. 
 We will see that, in contrast to Hegel, Heidegger returns to the idea of a 
connection between historicity and untruth. Nonetheless, in distinction to Descartes 
and Kant, Heidegger no longer understands untruth to be a product of 
epistemological difference. Instead, it is treated as a moment of ontological 
difference. It is thus not thought which errs, but rather being itself—such that being 
must be understood to be intrinsically historical. In a position that clearly echoes 
Hegel’s, for Heidegger, the history of philosophy is not merely a history of thought, 
but also a history of being. Yet by reintroducing the connection between history and 
errancy, Heidegger attempts to think a form of historicity which exceeds the 
economy of Hegelian reason. The history of thought is thus once again understood in 
terms of errancy—and yet this errancy does not constitute a falling short of truth, but 
the very essence of the truth of being. 
 In part one of this chapter, we give an account of the key features of 
Heidegger’s idea of a ‘history of being.’ We show how Heidegger treats the history 
of thought not in terms of an epistemological shortfall, but rather as a product of 
ontological difference. We then consider how this coheres with his project of a 
critique of metaphysical thought. 
In part two, we then show how this is reflected in his concept of untruth. 
Specifically, we will see that Heidegger understands the historicity of thought not in 
terms of error as a shortfall from truth, but rather as the product of an interplay 
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between two forms of untruth immanent to the economy of truth itself. We argue that 
Heidegger’s apparently paradoxical claim that ‘the essence of truth is untruth’ must 
be understood against the background of the connection between untruth and 
historicity, such that it can be interpreted to mean: ‘truth itself has a history.’ 
At the same time, we show how Heidegger’s distinction between the first and 
other beginnings ultimately sees him subordinate the ontological question concerning 
philosophy’s past to a Nietzschean ethical concern for the future. We explore this 
further in the conclusion to this thesis, with specific reference to the recently 
published Black Notebooks.   
  
 
Part One: The History of Being 
 
 
4.2 Prelude: Destruction in Being and Time 
 
We can only understand the later Heidegger’s approach to the history of philosophy 
by keeping in mind its relation to the question which dominates his entire 
philosophical project from his earliest to his final writings, the question concerning 
being. While he always considered his readings in the history of philosophy to be an 
indispensable component of his renewal of the question concerning being, his 
understanding of its significance underwent a crucial shift in his later writings, 
beginning in the 1930s. 
 From his very earliest writings, Heidegger explicitly argued for the need for 
philosophy to engage with its own history. Throughout the 1920s, he wrote and 
lectured extensively on the history of philosophy, and many of the key ideas in Being 
and Time were developed over the course of these engagements with the tradition, 
above all his Marburg lectures on Aristotle from the summer semester of 1924.292 
 Being and Time itself maintains an ambiguous relation to the history of 
philosophy.293 Within the work, Heidegger distinguishes between the analytic of 
 
292 GA 18, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie; translated as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian 
Philosophy trans. by Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2009). 
293 In the following, we will not be concerned with Heidegger’s account of Dasein‘s historicity in the 
final chapters of the published work, instead concentrating on his account of the ‘destruction’ of the 
Western tradition. In so doing, we follow Heidegger’s own suggestion in the late essay Time and 
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Dasein and the ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology—a task which was to be 
carried out in the final part of the work, which famously remained unpublished. As 
such, while Heidegger insists on the necessity of an engagement with the tradition, 
much of the analysis of Dasein presented in the work unfolds without any explicit 
reference to the history of philosophy.294 Indeed, the work is often read as a kind of 
transcendental account of Dasein in a Kantian vein, which provides the ultimate 
horizon for the question of the meaning of being in general.295   
 Recall that for Kant, the critique of human reason provided an ahistorical, 
timelessly valid horizon against which the questions of metaphysics were to be 
resolved once and for all. Similarly, it would seem that the analysis of Dasein’s 
temporality in Being and Time is intended to establish the horizon of a new 
fundamental ontology that would finally reveal the genuine nature of being. With this 
‘analytic’ framework in place, fundamental ontology would no more need to make 
reference to the history of philosophy than did Kant’s critical philosophy. 
 Heidegger’s account of the ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology in the 
introduction to Being and Time certainly goes a long way towards undermining the 
plausibility of such a reading. There, he treats the ‘task of destroying the history of 
ontology’ as the second part of the ‘twofold task in working out the question of 
being,’ apparently putting it on equal footing with the analytic of Dasein.296 In spite 
of the fact it was never carried out in the originally envisaged form, it is clear that 
Heidegger considers the fulfilment of the task to be a necessary condition of any 
future ontology, claiming that ‘the question of being does not achieve its true 
concreteness until we have carried through the process of destroying the ontological 
tradition.’297 
 
Being that it is this latter element which anticipates his own later position. He writes: ‘Because one 
everywhere represents the destiny of Being only as history, and history only as a kind of occurrence, 
one tries in vain to interpret this occurrence in terms of what was said in Being and Time about the 
historicity of man (Dasein) (not of Being). By contrast, the only possible way to anticipate the latter 
thought on the destiny of Being from the perspective of Being and Time is to think through what was 
presented in Being and Time about the dismantling of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings.’ 
Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 
p. 9. 
294 Significantly, the published portion of the work does contain an extensive engagement with 
Descartes, in which Heidegger contrasts his conception of worldhood with Descartes conception of 
the world as ‘res extensa’ (BT, p. 122. ff), and with Hegel’s concept of time (BT, p. 480. ff). 
295 See BT, p. 36 ff.  
296 BT, p. 36 ff. 
297 BT, p. 49. 
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 It would certainly be possible to read his later writings on the history of 
philosophy as his attempt to carry out the task which was to have occupied the 
unpublished portion of BT, a work which remains structurally incomplete. This 
would be to move too quickly, however, assuming a stricter continuity between BT 
and the later works than is justified. In fact, while Heidegger consistently remains 
committed to the necessity of an engagement with the tradition, his reasons for doing 
so undergo a fundamental shift. A brief consideration of the form of necessity which 
Heidegger attributes to the project of destruction in BT will help bring into relief 
what is at stake in his mature notion of the history of being. 
 In BT, Heidegger emphasizes that the task of destruction is not a negative 
undertaking, tasked with ‘shaking off the ontological tradition.’298 In other words, it 
is not a matter of clearing away the ‘errors’ of the past in order to make way for truth. 
The only ‘negative’ component of destruction takes aim not at the past, but at the 
present, and its tendency to interpret the past in a rigid manner shaped by the 
dominant philosophical problems of the day, or to treat it as being of merely 
‘historical’ interest. 
 Instead, Heidegger claims that the task of destruction is the retrieval of the 
‘primordial experiences’299 which shaped the thinking of the figures of the tradition. 
Beneath the surface of our received interpretations of the major texts of the history of 
philosophy lie a series of engagements which provide vital clues to the task of 
fundamental ontology. Heidegger insists that these primordial experiences can only 
be retrieved if we dispense with modern historiological practices, which tend toward 
mere doxography, and allow our readings to be guided by the question concerning 
being.300 
 Heidegger thus seems to come close to advocating a form of historia 
sapientiae, according to which the history of philosophy constitutes a series of 
encounters with truth.301 While the resulting accounts remain limited, they are an 
 
298 BT, p. 44. 
299 BT, p. 44. Heidegger gives a more detailed outline of this idea in the opening sections of the 1924 
Aristotle lectures, where he claims that such experiences can only be retrieved by studying the 
‚conceptuality‘ [Begrifflichkeit] of Aristotle‘s concepts. See Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian 
Philosophy trans. by Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2009), p. 4 ff and p. 11 ff. 
300 ‘The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of 
Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation.’ BT, p. 44. 
301 On historia sapientiae, see section 0.3 above. 
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indispensable resource to the philosopher seeking to establish a new relation to truth. 
It is by way of a repetition of these primordial experiences or encounters with being 
that the conditions arise in which the question concerning being can be posed anew. 
 As such, it is certainly clear that in Being and Time, Heidegger distances 
himself decisively from the tradition of historia stultitiae. The history of philosophy 
is not a collection of errors which must be cleared away, allowing ontology to finally 
be put on a secure footing. Moreover, he explicitly claims that the analytic of Dasein 
alone is not sufficient to allow us to adequately restate the question concerning being. 
Instead, the ground for Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology can only be 
prepared by way of a ‘positive’ retrieval of philosophy’s past. 
 Nonetheless, it is not clear that Heidegger actually succeeds in adequately 
motivating his claim concerning the necessity of this destruction in BT. Granted that 
the ‘primordial experiences’ of the philosophers of the tradition provide a kind of 
propaedeutic to the question concerning being, Heidegger nowhere demonstrates that 
the project of deconstruction constitutes a necessary precondition of adequately 
posing the question concerning being. 
 This point can be clarified by considering an example. In the introduction, 
Heidegger argues that Kant is the ‘first and only person’ to have investigated the 
dimension of temporality which BT demonstrates to be the horizon of the question 
concerning being. The reading of Kant Heidegger gestures toward here was 
eventually worked out in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Certainly, we can 
see that Heidegger’s reading of Kant in this work goes some way towards clarifying 
his own position in Being and Time. One might even argue that, although his reading 
of Kant remains highly controversial, it lends some weight to his own position, by 
illustrating that his own conception of temporality has precursors within the tradition, 
and because it allows us to discover a dimension of Kant’s project that had 
previously gone unnoticed. 
 What is not clear, however, is that his reading of Kant has any implications 
for the project of a fundamental ontology which were not already made apparent by 
the analytic of Dasein presented in Being and Time. Indeed, in a slight variation of 
Bennett’s objection to Kant’s transcendental dialectic,302 we might ask whether 
 
302 See section 2.10 above. 
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destruction is truly a necessary condition of fundamental ontology, since the analytic 
of Dasein alone has already established the fundamental horizon from within which 
the question of being is to be posed. In any case, it is clear that much of the reception 
of BT has unfolded in precisely this ‘ahistorical’ spirit—while most interpretations at 
least pay lip service to the importance of the destruction of the history of ontology, it 
is nonetheless treated as secondary to the analytic of Dasein. 
  There is another sense, however, in which this necessity is limited. This 
becomes apparent if we ask whether the relation between destruction and 
fundamental ontology implies a need for fundamental ontology to provide any 
account of the historical difference that characterises the tradition. Granted that the 
tradition constitutes a kind of indispensable resource for Heidegger’s enquiries, is 
there any sense in which a fundamental ontology will need to take account of the 
actual content of the history of Western philosophy, in the way in which Hegel (and 
to a limited extent, Kant) did so? 
 BT does not answer this question. This is perhaps because, in spite of the 
central place it has come to occupy in Heidegger’s reception, it remains a 
‘preparatory’ work, with the task of providing the background necessary to raise the 
question of being anew. It is only in the subsequent works that Heidegger would turn 
explicitly to the question of being itself, and the related notion of the history of 
being. At this stage, Heidegger still envisages the next stage of his project as the 
development of a fundamental ontology; in the next section, we will see that he 
abandoned this term for essential reasons. 
 If in the context of Being and Time, the engagement with the history of 
philosophy seems to be, at most, a necessary precursor to the posing of the question 
of being, his later writings constitute a substantial advance on this position. There, 
the engagement with the tradition is no longer treated as a kind of propaedeutic to 
ontology; instead, to pose the question concerning being and to engage with the 
history of philosophy become two inseparable dimensions of one and the same task. 
  
4.3 The History of Being 
 
The idea of the ‘history of being’ [Seynsgeschichte] first emerges in Heidegger’s 
texts from the early 1930s, and remains a constant theme down to his final published 
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writings. Like most of the key terms in the later Heidegger’s thought, there is no 
single passage or text in which one can locate a comprehensive statement of the 
nature of the history of being. Rather, it is a notion whose import only gradually 
becomes apparent through the complex weave of interrelated terms which populate 
his later texts. 
 Rather than follow the series of closely related figures by means of which 
Heidegger gradually brings the idea of the ‘history of being’ into view, we begin with 
a highly schematic overview. We will then spend much of the remainder of this 
chapter justifying and clarifying this schematic account, showing how it can be used 
to explain a series of key features of the later Heidegger’s thought—and above all, 
his account of untruth.  
 Let us begin, as Heidegger so often does in his own readings, with the very 
form of the word, Seynsgeschichte. The conjunction of these two terms, being and 
history, in a single word already announces a radical break with the attitude of the 
philosophical tradition towards historicity. Derrida emphasizes this radicality, 
claiming that prior to Heidegger, ‘never in the history of philosophy has there been a 
radical affirmation of an essential link between being and history. Ontology has 
always been constituted through a gesture of wrenching itself away from historicity 
and temporality.’303 
 Indeed, we have seen in the preceding chapters that, throughout much of the 
Western philosophical tradition, historicity is treated as a product of thought’s 
distance from being. We suggested that in such cases, the aim of philosophical 
method was to overcome the distance separating thought from being, thereby 
overcoming historicity. In attaining to a genuine relation of ‘correspondence’ to 
being, thought leaves its historicity behind it. Even in Hegel’s case, where the history 
of philosophy is taken to reflect the very nature of being, nonetheless, his systematic 
ontology is ultimately attained precisely by way of an ‘overcoming’ of this history. 
 We saw above that Heidegger’s position in BT remains ambiguous. By 
contrast, the later Heidegger’s notion of Seynsgeschichte suggests that being and 
history in some sense belong together. This immediately calls for two qualifications: 
 
303 Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), p, 21.  
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 1) The history of being is not independent of our thinking relation to being. 
There can be no history, in other words, without Dasein, just as there is no truth 
without Dasein (and we will see in the second half of this chapter that these two 
claims go hand in hand).304 Rather, like Hegel before him, Heidegger diverges from 
the tradition here by suggesting that within the relation between thought and being, 
thought’s historicity is not a measure of its distance from being; in fact, as we shall 
see in more detail below, for Heidegger, it is only by way of a certain openness to 
being that humanity becomes genuinely historical. It can do so only by ‘co-
responding’ (Ent-sprechen) to being; and the forgetting of being goes hand in hand 
with the encroaching ahistoricity of the modern technological age. 
 2) Heidegger’s history of being is not simply identical with history as we 
ordinarily understand it, nor with the history of philosophy. Heidegger goes to great 
lengths to distinguish the history of being from all forms of history as it is ordinarily 
understood. Peter Warnack notes that in Time and Being, he thus goes as far as to 
deny that Seynsgeschichte is anything ‘historical [geschichtlich].’305 
 Indeed, the history of being bears little resemblance to history in the sense in 
which we ordinarily understand it. According to Heidegger, the discipline of history, 
or ‘historiology,’306 is generally concerned to explain the world-historical events in 
causal terms. Certainly, the form which this causality takes differs radically from the 
causality of the natural sciences, such that historians have their own specific 
methodologies and means of explanation.307 Nonetheless, Heidegger claims that this 
insistence on causal explanation leads to a misapprehension of the genuine nature of 
historicity. 
 Applied to the history of philosophy, this results in the familiar chronological 
stories which are told about how a philosopher relates to their forebears and 
 
304 See e.g. ET, p. 127. It is important to note that Dasein is not simply identical with the human being 
for Heidegger. Above all, it should be emphasized Dasein’s truth is not Nietzsche’s ‘all-too-human’ 
anthropocentric truth, which he makes entirely contingent on the particular evolution of the human 
animal. Rather, Heidegger is far closer to Hegel than to Nietzsche on this point – inasmuch as for 
Hegel, too, the structure of the subject can be understood to transcend the ‘merely’ human, 
constituting a universal, transcendental ground for human thought. Heidegger’s Dasein, too, must be 
understood as a transcendental structure which human beings ‘take over.’ 
305 Peter Warnack, ‘The History of Being,’ in Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts, ed. by Bret W. Davis 
(Durham: Acumen, 2010) p. 155. 
306 Historie, as distinct from Geschichte; we follow Vallega-Neu in translating the term as 
‘historiology.’ See CP, p. 115 ff.  
307 Ibid. 
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contemporaries. For example, the history of German idealism is generally taken to 
commence with Kant, whose critical project emerges from the impasse between 
rationalism and empiricism. The classical variant of this story explains how Kant’s 
project then gave rise to Fichte’s ‘subjective’ idealism and Schelling’s ‘objective’ 
idealism, which were then unified in Hegel’s system. In more recent years, this story 
has been challenged, as Fichte and Schelling have been demonstrated to constitute 
more than mere steppingstones to Hegel’s position, with some commentators arguing 
that they surpass his position, and more attention has been paid to supposedly 
‘marginal’ figures. 
 Nonetheless, even as the specifics of this history are challenged, the essential 
mode of explanation remains the same, attempting to establish patterns of influence 
and disagreement, and assessing relative merits of each successive thinker. 
 Heidegger does not deny the legitimacy of such historiology. Nonetheless, he 
suggests that beneath the surface of the apparent continuity, there are ruptures which 
cannot be explained according to the logic of such stories. Even if we were to narrate 
such a causal history of Western philosophy from the earliest Greek thinkers down to 
the present day, this story would remain structurally incomplete. For this history can 
only be fully understood by references to shifts in the background meaning of Being 
which cannot be grounded in such causal sequences, but only by reference to a 
certain excess over such narratives. 
 For Heidegger, the only way of explaining this ‘deeper’ history is to attend to 
the ‘epochal’ shifts in the meaning of being. These shifts are not merely a matter of 
‘our’ understanding of being, but rather are intrinsic to being itself. Precisely because 
they exceed all causal explanation, they tend to escape our attention; they can never 
be explained by making use of the methodological resources of historiology, 
however sophisticated, since they are strictly speaking nothing ‘historical,’ but are 
withdrawn from all historiological causality. 
  As such, the history of being is not a history in the ordinary sense of the 
term. Rather, the historical difference proper to Heidegger’s history of being can only 
be understood in terms of the difference between being and beings. The question of 
this ‘ontological’ difference is the question on which Heidegger’s entire 
philosophical project is centred. In the following sections, we will see that Heidegger 
traces historical [geschichtlich] difference back to the ontological difference. 
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4.4 Ontological Difference and Ontotheology 
 
We noted above that Heidegger’s approach to the history of philosophy can only be 
understood if we keep in mind the single question underlying his entire philosophical 
project, the question concerning being. In the introduction to BT, he defines this in 
terms of the task of stating the difference between being and beings, the so-called 
ontological difference. 
 The ontological difference is Heidegger’s name for the fact that ‘the being of 
beings ‘is’ not itself a being.’308 According to Heidegger, much of the Western 
tradition has tended to define the being of beings by reference to some ‘ultimate’ 
being which constitutes the ground or ‘highest cause’ of all that is. Thus in the 
medieval era, God is understood to be the ground of all beings, such that beings are 
defined as ens creatum. Similarly, in the modern era beginning with Descartes, 
beings are defined as objects that stand in relation to thinking subjects; and 
subjectivity is thus treated as the ‘ground’ of the determinacy of all possible beings. 
 Heidegger refers to this practice of understanding being as a being which 
grounds all beings as ‘ontotheology.’ As Iain Thompson puts it, in ontotheology, 
 
[o]ntologists understand the being of entities in terms of that entity beneath or 
beyond which no more basic entity can be “discovered” or “fathomed” (ergründet); 
they then generalize from their understanding of this “exemplary entity” to explain 
the being of all entities.309 
 
 Ontotheology thus recognizes that the being of entities is not exhausted in their 
simple givenness. Rather, to understand any given being, it is necessary to seek out 
the horizon of determinacy against which this givenness takes shape. In 
ontotheological explanations, however, this horizon is taken to be constituted by a 
specific being, by reference to which all other beings are understood. As a result, all 
 
308 BT, p. 26, translation modified. 
309 Iain Thompson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of 
Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 14. Thompson rightly emphasizes that 
in spite of the construction of the word, ‚ontotheology‘ is by no means restricted to a critique of 
‚theological‘ modes of explanation. The role attributed to God here can equally be attributed to a 
‚secular‘ being, such as nature, matter, or Nietzschean ‚will to power.’  See Ibid., p. 2 ff. 
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beings are located in terms of a closed economy of meaning whose logic can be 
spelled out in terms of an ultimate horizon.310  
 As such, there is nothing ‘mysterious’ about humanity and its destiny from 
the perspective of a large proportion of medieval thought. All human behaviours and 
world-historical events can be mapped out in terms of humanity’s proximity to or 
fallenness from the divine.  
 For Heidegger, however, being cannot be understood as a being among 
beings, nor even as the highest of all beings. Indeed, strictly speaking, being ‘is’ not, 
precisely because it lacks the givenness or presence common to all beings. 
 In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger poses the question of being in terms of 
the ‘es gibt.’ The phrase ‘es gibt’ is the German equivalent of the English ‘there is.’ It 
is constructed from the German impersonal pronoun ‘es’ and the verb geben, 
meaning to give, in the present third person indicative, and can thus be more literally 
translated as ‘it gives.’ In the Letter, he notes that the French il y a translates ‘es gibt’ 
only imprecisely (much like the English ‘there is’): 
 
For the “it” that here “gives” is Being itself. The “gives” names the essence of Being 
that is giving, granting its truth. The self-giving into the open, along with the open 
region itself, is Being itself.311 
 
We stated above that ontotheology does not consider beings to be exhausted by their 
simple givenness. Instead, they are traced back to their ground in some other ultimate 
being, which thus establishes their place against a fixed horizon of meaning. 
According to medieval philosophy, what ‘gives’ being is God qua creator. For it is 
God who ‘grounds’ all beings in their being, bestowing upon them their presence. 
 In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger asks us to think this idea of the 
‘giving’ of beings in their givenness, but without reference to any determinate being 
which ‘gives.’ As an indeterminate pronoun, the ‘es’ of ‘es gibt’ does not stand in for 
some determinate being, as it does in some other formulations (as in the phrase ‘ich 
habe es gefunden,’ ‘I have found it’). Rather, its indeterminacy points to being itself 
 
310 Cf. AF, p. 364. Here, Heidegger claims that the presencing which precedes all presence comes to 
be thought of as something itself present. 
311 LH, p. 238. 
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as an excess over all givenness, which, without itself ever being given, nonetheless 
‘gives’ beings in their presence. 
 
4.5 Ontological Difference and Historical Difference 
 
Up to this point, our discussion of the ontological difference has remained highly 
abstract. Indeed, it seems that at most, we have succeeded in specifying what being is 
not (a being). Such formal explanations have a role to play; yet they tell us very little 
about the actual task for thought which Heidegger proposes in his later philosophy. 
Indeed, it seems they risk falling into a kind of empty formalism. ‘One cannot 
speculate about this il y a precipitately and without a foothold,’312 Heidegger writes. 
He continues: 
 
This “there is / it gives” rules as the destiny of Being [Geschick des Seins]. Its 
history comes to language in the words of essential thinkers. Therefore the thinking 
that thinks into the truth of Being is, as thinking, historical. There is not a 
“systematic” thinking and next to it an illustrative history of past opinions. Nor is 
there, as Hegel thought, only a systematics that can fashion the law of its thinking 
into the law of history and simultaneously subsume history into the system. Thought 
in a more primordial way, there is the history of Being to which thinking belongs as 
recollection of this history, propriated by it.313 
 
It is clear that Heidegger’s position here takes us beyond the one he presented in BT. 
We saw that there, Heidegger argues that an engagement with the history of ontology 
is a necessary condition of his renewal of the question concerning being—providing, 
one might argue, a kind of ‘foothold’ without which the question could never 
adequately be posed. 
 Yet in this passage, Heidegger collapses the distinction between ‘systematic’ 
thought and the history of philosophy altogether. The history of philosophy no longer 
plays a merely ‘illustrative’ role, constituting a kind of resource (however 
indispensable) for first philosophy. Rather, to think being is always to think 
 
312 LH, p. 238. 
313 LH, p. 238-9. Cf. BT, where Heidegger cites Count Yorck’s claim that ‘the separation between 
systematic philosophy and Historical presentation is essentially incorrect.’ BT, p. 454. 
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historically. It is to think the history of being as manifest in the ‘words of essential 
thinkers.’ 
In other words, the history of philosophy does not merely constitute a series 
of more or less successful attempts to say being, ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ which being 
remains self-identical and indifferent to this historical flux. Rather, this history is 
itself the manifestation of the truth of being. In making this claim, I take it that 
Heidegger is not suggesting that we cannot distinguish between more or less 
adequate accounts of being. Indeed, it is clear that in his own readings in the history 
of philosophy, he privileges certain thinkers over others. Rather, I take it that his 
point is that historical difference cannot be reduced to a sequence of more or less 
adequate accounts of truth, but that it reflects a form of difference intrinsic to the 
truth of being. 
Heidegger captures this in his equation of the ‘es gibt’ with the ‘destining of 
being,’ or Geschick des Seins. As such, the task of thought is not simply to think the 
formal difference between beings in their presence and the ‘es gibt’ which precedes 
them. Rather, it is to think being as the ‘destining’ of various historical epochs of 
being.  
As such, the ‘destining’ of being is Heidegger’s name for the fact that history 
arises not according to some ultimate horizon whose logic could be worked out by 
thought. Instead, it is a matter of being’s sheer excess over presence. One of the ways 
in which ontological difference becomes manifest is in the succession of different 
epochs of thought. These epochs are not treated as various falsifications or 
approximations of being, but rather as various ‘destinings’ or manifestations of 
being. None of these destinings is ever exhaustive of being, which remains 
structurally withdrawn, in excess over any given epoch. 
 We have seen in previous chapters that the tradition has tended to explain the 
historicity of thought in terms of the difference between thought and being. 
Historical difference is treated as the product of thought’s tendency to fall short of 
being, and the task of philosophy is to overcome this shortfall.314 
 
314 This is less clear in Hegel’s case. As we saw above, Hegel does not treat the various stages of the 
history of philosophy in terms of a shortfall of thought which any given thinker might overcome. 
Rather, the history of philosophy describes the way in which being itself is gradually worked out over 
the course of a history. In contrast to Heidegger, however, Hegel does not treat being as an excess over 
this process. Instead, the idea gradually unfolds over the course of spirit’s history, until in his own 
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 By contrast, Heidegger considers historical difference to be grounded in the 
ontological difference. It is not the difference between thought and being that gives 
rise to the conflicting positions that characterize the history of philosophy. Rather, it 
is a difference immanent to being itself.  
 In this passage, Heidegger also makes a brief allusion to Hegel. We have seen 
in chapter three that for Hegel too, historical difference is not an ‘excess’ over being 
which arises from thought’s difference from being. Rather, it is grounded in the 
negativity immanent to the idea itself. It is thus not simply a product of thought’s 
falling short, but rather of a form of difference immanent to being itself. Heidegger is 
aware of his own proximity to Hegel on this score, crediting him elsewhere with 
being the only thinker to have thought the history of philosophy philosophically.315 
 Nonetheless, Heidegger claims here that Hegel maintains a distinction 
between systematic philosophy and the history of philosophy, ultimately 
subordinating the latter to the former. We considered this distinction in the previous 
chapter. Although for Hegel, spirit must pass through this history, the concept itself 
remains indifferent to this history. While it ‘takes time’ for the concept to realise 
itself over the course of the history of spirit, retrospectively, the different stages of 
this history can be seen as merely ‘one-sided’ expressions of a truth which receives 
its full logical articulation in Hegel’s own system. Indeed, Hegel’s ontology, 
presented in his Science of Logic, need make no reference to the history of 
philosophy. Instead, it can be worked out a priori, thus providing us with the 
hermeneutic key to the history of thought. 
 By contrast, for the later Heidegger, there can be no systematic philosophy 
whose logic could unfold prior to or apart from the history of philosophy. We cannot 
give a ‘systematic’ account of being by means of which we could then 
retrospectively ground the different epochs of the history of being. For being is, 
strictly speaking, nothing apart from this history. Just as there can be no being 
without beings, so too being cannot be isolated or thought apart from the various 
epochs of being made manifest by the ‘essential thinkers’ from the history of 
thought. In this way, for the late Heidegger, the ‘es gibt’ is never simply a matter of 
 
logic, it is finally rendered entirely present to thought. See chapter three. Heidegger resists the idea 
that being could ever be rendered fully present in this manner. 
315 See CP, p. 167; cf. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 43-44. 
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the ‘giving’ of beings in their presence; rather, it is always at the same time a 
‘destining’ or Geschick which determines the horizon of an historical epoch. For 
beings to be given at all is for them to be caught up in the ongoing history of being, 
such that to think being is necessarily to think this history. 
 As such, the term Seinsgeschichte does not name a kind of ‘subdiscipline’ 
within the later Heidegger’s thought, such that we might hope to distinguish his 
‘systematic’ texts from his readings in the history of philosophy. In reading the 
history of philosophy, Heidegger is not simply searching for useful aids to his own 
philosophical project; nor is he engaged in explaining the fact of thought’s historicity 
as a distinct question in its own right. Rather, it is of a piece with the single question 
guiding his thought from the very beginning, the question concerning being. To think 
being is thus to think the way in which it has become manifest in the various 
‘destinings’ of being which make up the history of Western philosophy—along with 
maintaining the idea of a certain excess over this history, the nature of which we 
consider in more detail in part two below. 
 We have seen that, where the tradition has largely traced historical difference 
back to the difference between thought and being, treating it as the measure of 
thought’s distance from being, Heidegger treats historical difference as grounded in 
ontological difference. In the next chapter, we will show that this is reflected in 
Heidegger’s concept of untruth. To anticipate: we will show that Heidegger develops 
a notion of ontological errancy, according to which untruth constitutes an immanent 
moment of the economy of truth. For Heidegger, it is not thought which ‘errs,’ but 
rather being itself.  
 Before resuming our history of the concept of error, however, we need to 
address an aspect of Seinsgeschichte that is missing from our account so far. I stated 
above that the history of thought is nothing other than the history of the various ways 
in which being becomes manifest. While this is not wrong, it remains incomplete. 
For it fails to take into account the critical dimension of Heidegger’s engagement 
with the past. For Heidegger, the history of Western philosophy is not merely the 
history of the destinings of being, but also of the encroaching oblivion of being. 
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4.6 Beginnings 
  
In the above, we have seen that Heidegger understands the various epochs of the 
history of philosophy as ‘destinings’ of being. Being is intrinsically historical, such 
that to think being necessarily means to engage with the history of the way it has 
become manifest in the ‘essential thinkers’ of the tradition. To do so does not simply 
mean to narrate a history of Western philosophy from its beginnings in Greece down 
to the present day. Rather, it is a matter of thinking the epochal destining of being 
which structurally precedes all logics of presence, and so to take account of a radical 
form of historical difference that escapes the explanatory means of modern 
historiology. 
 Thus far, we have emphasized this ‘positive’ dimension of Heidegger’s 
engagement with the tradition, presenting a one-sided account in order to bring to the 
fore his radical break with the other approaches examined in this thesis. Nonetheless, 
Heidegger’s project also incorporates a critique of the tradition. Indeed, Heidegger’s 
most enduring legacy has been his ‘critique of metaphysics,’ a motif which went on 
to dominate much of twentieth century continental philosophy. Heidegger does not 
stage his project in terms of a reconciliation with philosophy’s past, but rather as an 
urgent attempt to liberate thought from the strictures of metaphysics. In doing so, he 
frames his project of the history of being in terms of a narrative of decline and 
potential redemption far more dramatic than anything encountered in Descartes, 
Kant, or Hegel.316   
 Our task in the remainder of the first part of this chapter is to give an account 
of this critical dimension of Heidegger’s project, exploring how Heidegger seeks to 
reconcile it with the ‘positive’ assessment of the history of philosophy presented 
above. In doing so, we respond to the following questions: how can Heidegger’s 
project incorporate a critical dimension, given that it begins by rejecting the idea that 
the history of philosophy is a product of error generated by thought’s distance from 
truth? Crucially: if Heidegger cannot appeal to the idea of an historical errancy 
rooted in thought’s excess over truth, according to what logic does his critique 
 
316 John D. Caputo argues that this account of decline is a product of Heidegger’s tendency towards 
‘storytelling,’ which ultimately distorts his insights concerning the history of being. See John D. 
Caputo, ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: "Alētheia" and the History of Being,’ in The Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Mar., 1988), pp. 519-546. 
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unfold? It would seem that Heidegger cannot propose a mere methodological shift as 
a corrective to metaphysics—for to do so would be to imply that it has been faulty 
thinking which gave rise to the historical oblivion of being. In other words, it would 
be a matter of epistemological and not ontological difference.  
 Without addressing this issue, we cannot understand Heidegger’s account of 
his own place within the philosophical tradition. For it is clear that his notion of a 
history of being constitutes a kind of break with philosophy hitherto; yet the precise 
nature of this break remains indeterminate. Indeed, in elaborating his own place 
within the tradition, Heidegger makes a series of what seem to be very classical 
gestures. Not only does he suggest a lack which permeates the philosophical tradition 
hitherto, to be ‘corrected’ by his own thought—thereby grouping together the entire 
Western tradition under the banner of the metaphysics, unified by a common 
limitation. Furthermore, he proposes the need of an ‘other beginning’ which would 
constitute an overcoming of the metaphysical first beginning, and thus of the 
limitations of thought hitherto.  
 The opposition of the first and other beginning bears all the hallmarks of a 
Baconian instauration.317 Heidegger’s ‘renewal’ of the question concerning being 
seems to announce the restoration of thought to its rightful task after a period of 
errancy. In this way, he seems to repeat the gesture we found in Descartes, Kant and 
Hegel of finally putting philosophy on a sound footing. 
 We turn now to an examination of the structure of the first beginning. If the 
first beginning is not denounced as false, it is nonetheless clear that Heidegger hopes 
to win some critical distance from it. What is the nature of this distance? In what 
space does it unfold? 
 
4.7 The First Beginning and the Forgottenness of Being 
 
Daniella Vallega-Neu notes that Heidegger’s notion of the ‘first beginning’ can be 
understood in both a narrow and a broader sense.318 On the one hand, it refers to the 
emergence of Western philosophy in Greece with the thinkers now referred to as the 
 
317 See section 1.11 above. 
318 Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 67. 
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pre-Socratics, down to Plato and Aristotle. In the broader sense, however, the first 
beginning extends all the way to the ‘end’ of Western metaphysics with Hegel and 
Nietzsche, and into the present technological age.  This ‘end’ should not be taken to 
imply that the first beginning has simply come to a close. Rather, its possibilities 
have been exhausted, such that we now found ourselves at its outmost, most extreme 
limit, doomed to simply repeating its gestures. 
 As such, the first beginning refers to the entire history of Western philosophy 
hitherto, down to the present day. According to Heidegger, what unifies the thinkers 
of the first beginning is not simply their belonging to a specific tradition within 
certain geographical and temporal boundaries.319 Rather, they belong to a common 
trajectory in which the excess of being over beings in their presence gradually 
withdraws from view. We now find ourselves at the culmination of this tradition, in 
which beings are completely abandoned to their presence, and the question 
concerning being is almost entirely forgotten. 
 According to Heidegger, it is the thinkers now referred to as the pre-Socratics 
who first raised the question concerning being. These early thinkers posed the 
question of the being of beings against the background of the ‘mystery’ of being. 
They thought beings in terms of their presence; yet the ground of this presence 
remained essentially concealed, implicitly pointing back to a horizon which exceeded 
all such presence. As John D. Caputo puts it, ‘The being for them is what rises up 
into well-formed and enduring appearance. Their thinking arises from the sheer 
wonder (thaumazein) that the being emerges into appearance and perdures there.’320 
While beings are thus defined in their presence, early Greek thought hints at their 
emergence from out of an indefinite horizon, whose ultimate nature remains 
mysterious. 
 The remainder of the first beginning is the story of a gradual decline, which 
resembles a kind of inversion of Hegel’s progressive account of the history of 
philosophy.321 The indeterminate horizon from out of which beings arise vanishes 
from view altogether, replaced by various ‘ontotheological’ conceptions of the 
 
319 In fact, we will see in the conclusion that Heidegger surreptitiously introduces just such boundaries 
into his idea of a history of being. See section 5.2 below.  
320 John D. Caputo, ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: "Alētheia" and the History of Being,’ in The Review 
of Metaphysics, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Mar., 1988), p. 524. 
321 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, trans. by John W. Stanley (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1994), p. 109.  
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ground of being, beginning with Plato’s realm of ideas. The Medieval age further 
constricts this horizon, taking it away from the speculative account of the idea, 
whose logic remains open to question, and replacing it with a dogmatic conception of 
God as the ‘cause’ of all things.322 In the modern age, beings come to be conceived as 
objects present to thinking subjects. This story reaches its culmination in the 
contemporary epoch of the Gestell, or ‘enframing,’ in which beings are reduced to 
mere ‘standing reserve.’323 
 By grouping the entire history of philosophy hitherto into a single trajectory 
in this manner, unified by a common trait, Heidegger repeats a gesture commonly 
made by first philosophy in relation to the tradition which precedes it. Just as for 
Kant, the history of philosophy is reduced to the status of ‘pre-critical’ thought, such 
that its various moments can be explained by its failure to have established the 
proper bounds of reason, so too it would seem that Heidegger’s ‘first beginning’ is 
unified by its failure to adequately heed ontological difference—an inadequacy 
which Heidegger’s thought seeks to redress by posing the question concerning being 
anew. It would thus seem that Heidegger’s own thought marks a kind of instauration, 
an overcoming of thought’s errant past through the establishment of the proper 
relation between thought and being. 
 In spite of the undeniable similarities, Heidegger’s relation to the tradition 
nonetheless differs from Kant’s in two important ways. Firstly, it is clear that in 
thinking beings in their presence, metaphysics does not falsify them. Recall that for 
Kant, the errors of special metaphysics arose when it posited the ideas intrinsic to 
reason as real objects belonging to the domain of theoretical philosophy. In doing so, 
it transgressed the legitimate bounds of theoretical knowledge, introducing objects 
which fall beyond the scope of possible experience.324 
 For Heidegger, by contrast, the first beginning is not the product of a 
defective mode of thinking which introduces an illegitimate content. In other words, 
metaphysics is not the product of error as an ‘excess’ over truth. Indeed, rather than 
being the product of error as an excess, it is characterised by a certain lack. Even as 
thought does not falsify beings, but rather discloses them in their presence, so 
 
322 See CP, p. 87-88. 
323 See ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in Basic Writings, trans. & ed. by David Farrell Krell, 
revised and expanded edition (London: Routledge, 1993). 
324 See section 2.12. 
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nonetheless, it fails to adequately pose the question of being, and so to think the 
excess over presence which he claims precedes all presence.  
 This is why for Heidegger, the critique of metaphysics is not a matter of 
‘refutation.’325 If the first beginning is in some sense ‘defective,’ this defect cannot 
be taken to imply its sheer falsity. Indeed, Heidegger insists that metaphysics fulfils 
its own proper task of thinking beings in their presence. Heidegger’s own task is thus 
not to refute the first beginning, but to attempt to overcome this limitation, by 
restoring philosophy to what he considers its proper task of articulating the difference 
between being and beings.  
 Nonetheless, the nature of this ‘lack’ must be examined more closely. For 
even if the philosophical tradition has not falsified beings in their presence, it 
nonetheless seems that Heidegger’s thought corrects a ‘fault’ which has plagued the 
first beginning since its inception. Throughout the tradition, thought has been 
increasingly turned away from being, attending only to beings in their presence. It 
would seem that Heidegger’s aim is to develop a mode of thinking which would 
allow us to overcome this focus on presence, bringing the ontological difference into 
view by means of a new method (even as Heidegger himself rigorously rejects any 
such terminology). 
 If this were the case, it could still be argued that the first beginning was in 
some sense the product of a defect which might have been avoided. Recall that in the 
CPR, Kant suggests that, had the ancients thought to raise the question of the 
synthetic a priori, the critical project might have emerged much sooner, setting 
thought on the right path, and avoiding the pitfalls of unchecked rationalism that 
shaped much of the philosophical tradition. 
 Can the same be argued of Heidegger’s question concerning being? Had the 
Greeks adequately raised the question concerning being in the first stages of the first 
beginning, might the epoch of metaphysics, and the present age of enframing, have 
been averted?⁠—Not as a succession of ‘endless errors,’ but nonetheless as an age in 
which beings in their presence came to overshadow being? Even if we consider the 
first beginning as a ‘destining of being,’ what prevented thought from obtaining 
 
325 See Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), p. 2. 
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insight into the excess of being over beings, and posing Heidegger’s question 
concerning being? 
 
4.8 The First Beginning and the Incubation Time of Being Historical Thinking 
 
This brings us to a question we have posed to every thinker examined in this thesis—
namely, the question of the ‘incubation time’ of their thought. Is the ‘delayed’ arrival 
of Heidegger’s mode of thinking in some sense necessary? Is it, like Descartes’ 
thought, merely belated, such that the shortfalls of the first beginning might have 
been rectified at any time, but for the right method? Or is the ‘other beginning’ 
characterized by posteriority,326 such that it in some sense presupposes the passage 
through the first beginning? 
 In the essay Overcoming Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the first 
beginning is made necessary by the very nature of being. With reference to the 
metaphysical fate of Western philosophy, he writes: 
 
This fate, which is to be thought in the manner of the history of Being, is, however, 
necessary, because Being itself can open out in its truth the difference of Being and 
beings preserved in itself only when the difference explicitly takes place. But how 
can it do this if beings have not first entered the most extreme oblivion of Being, and 
if at the same time Being has not taken over its unconditional dominance, 
metaphysically incomprehensible, as the will to will which asserts itself at first and 
uniquely through the sole precedence of beings (of what is objectively real) over 
Being?327 
 
Here, Heidegger suggests that the genuine nature of the ontological difference can 
only become manifest over the course of the long history of being’s withdrawal. We 
have seen that for Heidegger, beings ‘refer’ beyond themselves to being in its excess 
over presence. But the precise nature of this excess only comes into view over the 
long history of the oblivion of being which constitutes the first beginning. There is a 
clear resemblance here to Kant’s position, according to which critical philosophy 
 
326 On the concept of posteriority, see section 2.4 above. 
327 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 
1973), p. 91.  
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could only emerge after the conflicts of metaphysics had made clear the limits of 
human cognition.  
 Indeed, in spite of what is often taken to be Heidegger’s privileging of the 
early Greeks, it must be emphasized that his renewal of the question concerning 
being does not mark a simple return to the question posed by the pre-Socratics.328 
What separates us from them is precisely the experience of the first beginning as it 
has unfolded over the course of Western history. While the early Greeks encountered 
being as the horizon from out of which beings in their presence emerge, they had not 
yet experienced the way in which this horizon is characterized by withdrawal, self-
concealment and refusal. 
 John D. Caputo thus notes that the question concerning being was not the 
proper ‘destiny’ of the early Greeks: 
 
Instead, it falls to us “late-comers” who live in the wake of the first beginning, at the 
ending and unravelling of this great beginning, to make the end-state transition to a 
new beginning. And the only way to do this is to do again what they did, to think 
again what they thought. We must recapture the wonder of the beginning by 
experiencing again the wonder that the being is in its unconcealment. For us—
though not for them—that means to go back and see what was at work in their 
experience, to see the implicit clue which functioned in the enlivened beginning, 
which is the unspoken element of aletheia. We can think aletheia as such in a way 
that they could not.329 
 
As such, it is only in the wake of the first beginning that being can become apparent 
as an excess over presence, which withdraws in the face of the predominance of 
beings. This is why, for Heidegger, the possibility of the other beginning emerges 
only in the context of the absolute ‘plight’ of being, its oblivion in the age of 
enframing. For it is only here that being’s true nature as self-concealing becomes 
 
328 On this point, see Karin de Boer, Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000) p. 87.  
329 John D. Caputo, , ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: "Alētheia" and the History of Being,’ in The 
Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Mar., 1988), p. 524-5. Cf. Daniela Vallega-Neu, who claims of 
the Greeks ‘the fact that they were not able to think this original event is, according to Heidegger, not 
a failure of their thinking, but a necessity rooted in how the truth of being occurs in the first 
beginning.’ Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) p. 69. 
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apparent. We are thus in a position to think being in its truth in a way in which they, 
the Greeks, and indeed any other thinker within the first beginning, could not.330  
 Heidegger thus writes in the Contributions to Philosophy that 
 
 A history, i.e., a beginning along with its derivations and its advancements, is 
required to make possible (for those who are beginning to question) the realization 
that refusal pertains intrinsically to the essence of beyng. This knowledge, because it 
thinks nihilism still more originarily, all the way down to the abandonment by being, 
is the genuine overcoming of nihilism. The history of the first beginning is in this 
way completely delivered from the semblance of futility and sheer errancy; now for 
the first time a great illumination comes over all previous works of thought.331 
 
Seen as such, the first beginning does not occur out of some fault or defect in human 
thinking. Rather, it occurs because being necessarily refuses all attempts to render it 
present, withdrawing in the face of the successive epochs of history. It is only in the 
wake of this refusal that genuine insight into being is possible. At the same time, this 
‘great illumination’ bears a strong resemblance to both Kant and Hegel. Recall that 
for Kant, it was only retrospectively, from the position of the critical philosophy, that 
the necessity of the passage through the moments of dogmatism and skepticism 
could be shown up. Hegel took this further still, suggesting that the entire Western 
tradition, which prior to his own system had been apt to appear nothing but a series 
of opinions and errors, was demonstrated to follow a strict logical necessity.    
Heidegger thus suggests that the history of philosophy is not a matter of 
futility and ‘sheer errancy,’ but rather constitutes a precondition for an adequate 
posing of the question concerning being. At the same time, it is clear that his own 
position is in a sense privileged, first making the coherence of this history clear.  
 It is thus only in the wake of metaphysics that Heidegger’s own thought can 
finally pose the question of the ontological difference adequately. Nonetheless, 
Heidegger’s account of his own place in the history of philosophy differs 
substantially from the form of posteriority we encountered in Kant. For Kant, this 
‘coming after’ announced an absolute rupture, in which the historicity of thought is 
 
330 Heidegger thus writes in the CP that ‘Self-concealing [...] is the basic teaching of the first 
beginning and of its history.’ CP, p. 262. 
331 CP, p. 134. 
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radically transcended. While he attributed a certain necessity to the tradition which 
preceded them, so nonetheless, it was by way of a rupture with this history, and the 
establishment of a philosophy on an a priori footing, that philosophy was restored to 
its rightful task. Even as Kant offered reasons as to why the history of philosophy 
constituted a necessary condition of their own projects, his critical project proceeds 
in ahistorical terms. 
 By contrast, although Heidegger’s project can only emerge at the closure of 
the first beginning, it does not strictly speaking come ‘after’ the first beginning. 
Rather, it continues to abide within this first beginning, while at the same time 
subjecting it to a certain displacement. It is thus not by simply transcending the 
history of philosophy hitherto, metaphysics, that Heidegger seeks to renew the 
question concerning being. On the contrary, it is only by attending to what remains 
unthought over the course of this tradition—the withdrawal of being in the face of 
beings in their presence—that the question concerning being can be adequately 
posed.332 
 In spite of these qualifications, it is clear that Heidegger claims a definite 
privilege for his own mode of philosophical thinking. Above all, it is only with his 
own project that the question of being is raised adequately. Like Kant, he provides an 
account as to why this should be the case, and furthermore does so without appeal to 
the idea that thought was previously in some sense defective.  
 Furthermore, Heidegger claims that his own thought constitutes a ‘great 
illumination’ of the history of philosophy hitherto. Like both Kant and Hegel, he 
claims to have reached a privileged perspective which constitutes a kind of 
hermeneutic key to the history of philosophy. Unlike Kant and Hegel, however, he 
does not claim to have discovered a ‘logic’ behind this history. This means that the 
history of thought cannot be subordinated to any logic which could be laid bare by 
first philosophy. On the contrary, it is the task of first philosophy to engage with the 
past, in a series of hermeneutic readings of key texts. This is a task which Heidegger 
makes no claim to have completed, but is left essentially open. 
 As such, and in spite of Heidegger’s evident desire to avoid such a gesture, 
Heidegger does make a claim to a kind of ultimacy on the part of his thought. I take 
 
332 Cf. AF, p. 365. 
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it that this gesture is in a sense unavoidable. For any mode of thought which seeks to 
take the past seriously as a manifestation of truth cannot but implicitly claim that first 
philosophy has up to this stage failed to do justice to the past.333 It does so, however, 
in the name of a gesture of openness to the past, such that the truth of philosophy’s 
past is never denied, nor subordinated to an overriding logic. 
 
4.9 The Other Beginning 
 
We have seen that the ‘incubation time’ of Heidegger’s thought is characterized by 
both a form of posterity, and a qualified sense of ultimacy. This ultimacy differs from 
that of Descartes, Kant or Hegel, in that it does not lay claim to having discovered a 
‘logic’ underlying all past thinkers; nor does it claim to bring history to an end. As 
such, Heidegger’s history of being requires of us an ongoing engagement with the 
past on its own terms, which categorically refuses any gesture of ‘refutation,’ and 
obliges philosophy to engage in an ongoing dialogue with its own past.  
 
 Yet there is still one decisive dimension of Heidegger’s history of being 
which we have neglected up until this point. Above, we alluded to the fact that 
Heidegger opposes to the ‘first beginning’ the possibility of an ‘other beginning’ that 
is yet to come. Since this thesis is concerned above all with the ontological status of 
the past, we will not be concerned to address Heidegger’s notion of an other 
beginning that is yet to come in any detail. Nonetheless, I take it that Heidegger’s 
own orientation towards the other beginning fundamentally shapes his own approach 
to philosophy’s past, inasmuch as he ultimately gives priority to the future over the 
past. This has decisive consequences for his history of being.  
 This priority is evident in CP, which Heidegger addresses to the ‘future 
ones.’334 His stated aim in the work is not simply to renew the question concerning 
being, and with that to develop a historical conception of truth. Rather, Heidegger 
 
333 As such, I take it that e.g. Derrida’s deconstructive project is implicitly founded on a similar 
gesture. The idea of a ‘critique of the metaphysics of presence,’ even where it refuses any claim to 
simply ‘overcoming metaphysics,’ necessarily involves a claim to a certain privilege on the part of 
deconstructive thought. Like Heidegger, I take it that Derrida goes to great lengths to avoid such a 
gesture, or at least to soften it by rejecting the idea of a ‘method’ which would ‘correct’ the mistakes 
of metaphysics. 
334 CP, p. 395 ff. 
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defers the genuine renewal of this question to an indeterminate future. Indeed, 
elsewhere, in what almost seems like a conscious inversion of Kant’s claim in the 
final pages of the CPR that, with the critical method in place, philosophy might 
achieve everything it has failed at over the last two millennia before the close of the 
century,335 Heidegger suggests that the end of metaphysics will last ‘longer than the 
previous history of metaphysics.’336 
  Indeed, one of the frustrations in reading Heidegger on the history of being is 
that he frequently downplays the significance of his own insight into the historical 
nature of truth. His own philosophy does not reach its fruition in recognising that 
truth is essentially historical, and that philosophy is thus obliged to engage with its 
own past not as a sequence of errors, but as a manifestation of the destiny of being. 
Instead, he defers a genuine relation to truth to an indefinite future to come, which he 
labels the first beginning.  
 Daniela Vallega-Neu refers to the task of attaining to this other beginning as a 
‘more originary insertion into history.’337 I take it that as it stands, this aim might be 
taken to fall together with the kind of conception of the history of philosophy 
advanced in the pages of this chapter above. Yet for Heidegger, the import of this 
‘more originary insertion’ into history does not stop with a recognition of thought’s 
intrinsic historicity. Rather, this constitutes only the first step towards a new mode of 
philosophical thought whose form, Heidegger insists, cannot be anticipated, but will 
only emerge (if at all) in a distance future.338    
Crucially, in CP, he goes as far as to claim that ‘Previously, the human being 
was never historical, although indeed this being “had” and “has” a history.’339 In 
other words, the very form of historicity proper to the first beginning—and thus of 
philosophy’s past as such—was in some sense defective. It is only in the wake of the 
new beginning that Dasein’s genuine historicity will be realised.  
 
335 See section 2.3 above. 
336 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 
1973), p. 85. 
337 Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 30 ff. 
338 He writes: ‘To be sure, it is impossible to calculate whether the human being will attain history, 
whether the essence of history will befall beings, and whether historiology can be destroyed; these 
matters rest with beyng itself.’ CP, p. 387. 
339 CP, p. 387. 
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I take it that this betrays a Nietzschean ethical orientation to the future on 
Heidegger’s part. His aim in engaging with the history of philosophy hitherto is not 
simply to do justice to this past, but rather to put it to work in the name of a new 
form of humanity that is deferred to an indefinite future. Seen from this perspective, 
while the first beginning was in some sense necessary, it is nonetheless treated as 
defective, such that Heidegger maintains a critical distance from it. He does so in the 
name of a new modality of historicity that is yet to come. In this way, the first 
beginning is treated as a defective past, whose resources are to be exploited in the 
name of its own overcoming. While it is deferred, this suggests a break with the past 
as decisive as those proposed by Descartes or Kant.  
This priority of the future is already apparent in Heidegger’s earlier writings, 
specifically in BT, and remains dominant throughout Heidegger’s later writings. As 
Miguel de Beistegui puts it, in Heidegger’s thought, ‘the centre of gravity of 
temporality is no longer the present, as was the case in the tradition, but the future. 
The future is the source or the origin from which time flows.’340 In BT, this finds its 
expression in the structure of anticipatory resoluteness and being-towards-death. In 
his writings on the history of philosophy, it is expressed by the privilege of the task 
of preparing the other beginning. 
This orientation towards the future is decisive in shaping Heidegger’s 
engagement with philosophy’s past. His task is never simply to reconstruct the 
history of being, but rather to prepare the way for a break with the first beginning, 
and thereby with the metaphysical tradition. In this way, the other beginning is the 
horizon against which Heidegger’s readings in the history of philosophy unfold. It is 
his concern to prepare for the ‘other beginning’ which shapes—and I would argue, 
fundamentally distorts—his approach to philosophy’s past.  
Gadamer highlights a crucial example of this tendency. He notes that 
Heidegger’s attitude towards Plato was ambiguous in his earlier writings, but that it 
became exclusively negative with the wake of his idea of a history of being, from 
which point onwards, he began to see Plato as a the decisive turning point in the 
history of the oblivion of being.341 The logic of his later readings are thus 
 
340 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 71. 
341 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, trans. by John W. Stanley (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1994), p. 70. 
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increasingly driven not by the texts by themselves, nor but rather by his concern to 
break with the metaphysical past. It is on the same basis that he excludes certain 
moments—not through an engagement with texts, but rather by excluding them from 
the offset in deference to the narrative he constructed for his ‘history of being.’  
This ambiguity—whereby the past is treated, on the one hand, as a 
manifestation of truth, and on the other, as something to be overcome—permeates all 
of Heidegger’s post-BT writings on the history of being. Moreover, as we will see in 
part two of this chapter, it is reflected in an ambiguity at the heart of his concept of 
errancy. Ultimately, even while Heidegger professes to understand the history of 
philosophy as nothing other than the errant history of being, he maintains a critical 
distance from the first beginning, which is deemed ‘errant’ in a manner to be rectified 
by the other beginning.   
   
*** 
 
In the first part of this chapter, we gave an account of Heidegger’s history of being. 
We saw that Heidegger considers philosophy’s past not as the product of an 
epistemological shortfall, but rather as a manifestation of ontological difference. We 
suggested that with this gesture, Heidegger effectively dissolves the line separating 
first philosophy from the activity of reading the history of philosophy. At the same 
time, we suggested that Heidegger’s critical attitude towards the ‘first beginning’ and 
his orientation towards an ‘other beginning’ raises questions as to how seriously 
Heidegger takes the autonomy of the past, and whether he does not ultimately the 
question of the past to that of the future.  
 In part two, we turn to the question of the status of error in Heidegger’s 
thought, thus bringing our partial history of the concept of error to a close. We show 
how Heidegger’s idea of a history of being is reflected in the two forms of ‘untruth’ 
elaborated in his thought—concealing and errancy. We will see how this double form 
of untruth provides the conceptual underpinning for his idea of a history of being.   
 In the conclusion to this thesis, we return to the question of Heidegger’s 
ambiguous relation to the past, showing that ultimately, he subordinates the 
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ontological question of the past to a Nietzschean ethical orientation towards the 
future of the kind discussed in the introduction to this thesis.342  
 
 
Part Two. Heidegger and The Essence of (Un)truth 
 
In this part of the chapter, we conclude our fragmentary history of the concept of 
error. Our task is to show that the later Heidegger’s historical conception of truth 
hinges on a reappraisal of the essence of untruth. Where the tradition has generally 
taken historicity to be a product of thought’s fallenness from truth, we will see that 
Heidegger posits a form of untruth which is immanent to the economy of truth itself. 
 We will see that Heidegger’s account of untruth reflects his notion of the 
history of being presented in the previous chapter. As such, like Descartes and Kant, 
Heidegger associates historicity with untruth. Yet for Heidegger, the distinction 
between truth and untruth is not grounded in the epistemological difference between 
thought and being, but rather in the ontological difference. 
 At the same time, Heidegger distinguishes between two distinct forms of 
untruth: concealment and errancy. We will see that this doubling of untruth is 
essential to his account of his history of being.  
 To do so, we turn to his essay The Essence of Truth. While our reading 
concentrates on this text, we nonetheless supplement it with other texts from the 
1930s. We will see that Heidegger’s apparently paradoxical claim that ‘untruth is the 
essence of truth’ can only be understood against the backdrop of his notion of the 
history of being. 
 
4.10 The Usual Concept of Untruth 
 
On the surface, the essay The Essence of Truth seems to follow a simple structure, 
approaching the question of truth in similar terms to the account in §44 of Being and 
Time.343 Beginning with an account of the ‘usual’ concept of truth as correspondence, 
Heidegger goes on to investigate the background conditions which must obtain in 
order that a statement can be said to correspond to the matter at hand. As such, the 
 
342 See section 0.1 above. 
343 See BT, p. 256 ff. 
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essay has frequently been read as a kind of transcendental account of truth as 
correspondence. 
Certainly, these readings take their cue from Heidegger’s text. Yet in the 
Contributions, Heidegger warns that such interpretations are ultimately 
misleading.344 Furthermore, in the ‘remark’ which closes the essay, Heidegger notes 
that in the text, 
 
[o]ur thinking apparently remains on the path of metaphysics. Nonetheless, in its 
decisive steps, which lead from truth as correctness to ek-sistent freedom, and from 
the latter to truth as concealing and errancy, it accomplishes a change in the 
questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics.345 
 
In other words, the line of questioning shifts decisively in the latter sections of the 
essay—and at the precise point where untruth becomes the major focus of the 
essay.346 This transition involves thinking ‘truth as concealing and errancy’—that is 
to say, thinking truth as untruth. ‘Truth, in its essence, is un-truth,’ he writes in the 
Origin of the Work of Art347—insisting, however, that this must not be understood as 
amounting to the paradoxical claim that truth is at bottom falsehood.348 Instead, it is 
necessary to put aside the usual definition of untruth as falsehood in order to 
approach the genuine nature of untruth. 
 John Sallis notes that the question of untruth accompanies the question of 
truth from the very beginning of the ET essay, ‘haunting’ the first half of the text 
before revealing itself to be the essay’s central focus.349 Indeed, Heidegger introduces 
the theme of untruth in the first numbered section of the essay. Apparently in passing, 
 
344 CP, p. 340. In OWA, he writes: ‘We do, of course, occasionally take the trouble to concede that 
naturally, in order to understand and verify the correctness (truth) of a proposition, one really should 
go back to something that is already evident, and that this presupposition is indeed unavoidable. As 
long as we talk this way, we always understand truth merely as correctness, which of course still 
requires a further presupposition, that we ourselves just happen to make, heaven knows how or why.’ 
OWA, p. 177.  
345 ET, p. 138. 
346 In a remark on the text not reproduced in the translation, Heidegger writes: ‘between [section] 5 
and six the leap into the turn (essencing in the event).’ It is in section 6 that Heidegger begins his 
account of ‘untruth.’ GA 9 p. 193, my translation.  
347 OWA, p. 179. 
348 Ibid., p. 180. 
349 John Sallis, ‘Deformatives: Essentially Other Than Truth,’ in Reading Heidegger: 
Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 38 
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he notes that truth as correspondence goes hand in hand with a particular conception 
of untruth: 
  
Under the domination of the obviousness that this conception of truth seems to have 
but is hardly attended to as regards its essential grounds, it is considered equally 
obvious that truth has an opposite, and that there is untruth. The untruth of the 
proposition (incorrectness) is the nonaccordance of the statement with the matter. 
The untruth of the matter (nongenuineness) signifies nonagreement of a being with 
its essence. In each case untruth is conceived as nonaccord. The latter falls outside 
the essence of truth. Therefore, when it is a question of comprehending the pure 
essence of truth, untruth, as such an opposite of truth, can be put aside.350 
  
In this passage, Heidegger appears to simply assent to this ordinary concept of 
untruth; yet as Sallis notes, this assent is ironic, a rhetorical strategy on Heidegger’s 
part.351 From the perspective of the ordinary concept of truth, it seems self-evident 
that untruth amounts to a ‘nonaccordance,’ the failure of a statement or judgement to 
correspond to the matter at hand. Not only does it appear self-evident; furthermore, it 
is considered to be irrelevant to enquiries into the nature of truth itself, since it falls 
‘outside the essence of truth;’ it is therefore ‘put aside.’ 
 What does Heidegger mean when he says that untruth is ‘put aside?’ His point 
cannot be that philosophy tends to simply ignore the question of untruth. We have 
already seen that Descartes and Kant, both of whom define truth in terms of 
correspondence, devote lengthy discussions to the problem of error. Furthermore, a 
great deal of modern epistemology is concerned with rules to guarantee truth 
precisely by way of the exclusion of error. Far from rendering untruth irrelevant, this 
has led to a proliferation of texts devoted to the wide range of phenomena which 
ground error, including deception, hallucinations, etc. 
 Heidegger’s point here is not that untruth is simply ignored, but rather that it 
is treated from the outset as an excess over the economy of truth. Recall that for Kant, 
untruth constituted a kind of ‘anomaly,’ a ‘puzzle’ which could only be explained on 
the basis of a force which intervenes from outside of thought’s normative tendency 
 
350 ET, p. 119. 
351 John Sallis, ‘Deformatives: Essentially Other Than Truth,’ in Reading Heidegger: 
Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 32. 
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toward truth. Similarly, error interrupted the logical economy of Descartes’ 
Meditations; his task in the fourth meditation was to show that error plays no role in 
thought’s normative relation to truth, but instead constitutes an excess which 
intervenes from ‘outside’ of this economy. As such, for all the attention paid to 
untruth, it is always assumed that it constitutes a simple surplus over truth, and thus 
something to be overcome through the establishment of a method that guarantees its 
exclusion. Later in the essay, Heidegger adds: 
 
Certainly deceit and dissimulation, lies and deception, illusion and semblance—in 
short, all kinds of untruth—are ascribed to man. But of course untruth is the opposite 
of truth. For this reason, as the nonessence of truth, it is appropriately excluded from 
the sphere of the question concerning the pure essence of truth. This human origin of 
untruth indeed only serves to confirm by contrast the essence of truth “in itself” as 
holding sway “beyond” man. Metaphysics regards such truth as the imperishable and 
eternal, which can never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belong to 
man’s essence.352 
 
What remains unquestioned in the dominant definition of untruth is the underlying 
assumption that it has its origin in the human being qua thinking subject. Within the 
relation between thought and being, error is always assumed to constitute an excess 
of thought over being—a straying from truth in its eternal essence. All moments of 
untruth are ascribed to human thought, and considered a product of its distance from 
truth—or of what we have above called epistemological difference. 
 As Heidegger himself notes, this conception of untruth remains self-evident 
so long as we continue to define it solely in terms of incorrect statements. Certainly, 
an incorrect assertion does not bring us any closer to truth, merely serving to obscure 
the facts. It seems self-evident that such untruths are a kind of negative excess over 
truth with their origin in ‘human’ error, the straying of the subject from its object. 
 Yet for Heidegger, this conception of error serves to mask a deeper sense of 
untruth.353 In Being and Truth, he writes: ‘We have no logic of error, no real 
 
352 ET, p. 124. 
353 As Heidegger himself notes, to speak of untruth as necessarily belonging to truth ‘goes very much 
against the grain of ordinary opinion and looks like dragging up a forcibly contrived paradoxa.’ ET, 
p.131. Heidegger suggests that for ‘those who know about such matters,’ the question of untruth 
points towards the ‘still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (not merely beings).’ Heidegger’s 
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clarification of its essence, because we always take error as negative. This is the 
fundamental error that dominates the entire history of the concept of truth.’354 It is no 
exaggeration to say that the question of untruth is central to the later Heidegger’s 
entire project. ET must be understood in this light: not as an attempt to ground the 
possibility of truth as correspondence, but as a reappraisal of the nature of truth by 
way of an account of its other, untruth. 
 If we want to understand why Heidegger rejects the traditional concept of 
untruth, we can begin by considering the role that untruth has played throughout the 
tradition. While it seems uncontroversial to claim that untruth is a property of false 
statements, in the earlier chapters of this thesis, we have seen that a series of thinkers 
put this notion of untruth to work in order to explain the historicity of philosophical 
enquiry. Far from merely being a property of certain statements, it is also the implicit 
ground of the errant historicity of human thought. 
 In the following, I will show that the traditional connection between 
historicity and untruth examined in this thesis thus far provides the hermeneutic 
background necessary to understand Heidegger’s reappraisal of untruth. 
Heidegger’s claim does not amount to a paradoxical identification of correct and 
incorrect statements; nor does it amount to a hopelessly longwinded and obscure 
restatement of the truism that to think is always to risk going wrong, such that 
knowledge is always partial and uncertain. Instead, we will see that the place of 
untruth in his later thought reflects his conception of the history of being outlined in 
the first part of this chapter. 
 Seen from this perspective, it will also become apparent that Heidegger’s 
account of untruth does not amount to an absolute break with the traditional concept 
of untruth. In spite of the apparent radical difference, Heidegger shares with the 
tradition the conviction that historicity and untruth are intrinsically related. Rather 
than rejecting the traditional connection between error and historicity, Heidegger 
suggests that errant history belongs intrinsically to the economy of truth. There is 
thus a profound continuity behind the apparent absolute rupture. 
 
esotericism aside, our aim in the following is to elaborate a background against which this apparent 
paradox is resolved by showing how Heidegger’s turn to the notion of the history of being shows up 
an underlying continuity with the approaches to historicity and untruth examined thus far in this 
thesis. 
354 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 177. 
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*** 
Heidegger’s account of the ordinary concept of untruth here echoes Hegel’s 
discussion of error and falsity examined above in chapter three.355 We saw that there, 
Hegel claims that the negative has consistently been excluded from the economy of 
truth under the mark of falsity. ‘Why bother with the false?,’ Hegel asks ironically in 
the preface to PS.356 Heidegger’s ironic assent to the self-evidence of untruth as non-
correspondence in the first section of ET can be understood as part of a similar 
rhetorical strategy on Heidegger’s part. For Heidegger as for Hegel, the ordinary 
understanding of falsity ‘is a topic regarding which established ideas notably obstruct 
the approach to truth.’357 
 The suspension of the ‘abstract opposition’ between truth and error allowed 
Hegel to give an account of the history of thought not as an excess over truth—an 
errant wandering of spirit, or a straying from the true path—but rather as the 
temporal manifestation of truth itself.358 The history of thought is thus not a set of 
false statements or opinions, but rather a temporal manifestation of the necessary 
moments of the idea.  
 Like Hegel, Heidegger suggests that the accepted opposition between truth 
and untruth serves to obscure the genuine nature of truth. By treating the moment of 
untruth as a sheer excess generated by thought in its distance from truth, the tradition 
obscures a certain dynamism intrinsic to truth itself.359 This results in a 
misunderstanding of historical difference, which is treated purely as a product of this 
‘errant’ excess over truth. 
 
355 Indeed, Heidegger’s critique of the ‘ordinary’ notion of untruth can be read in parallel with his 
account of the metaphysical attitude toward negation. In §90 of CP, ‘From the first to the other 
beginning: negation,’ he writes: ‘How few understand "negation," and how seldom is it firmly grasped 
by those who do have some understanding of it! Negation is spontaneously taken to be sheer rejection, 
dismissal, disparagement, and even disintegration.’ CP, p. 140. While Heidegger is always careful to 
distinguish his own account of negation from Hegel’s, so nonetheless, he shares Hegel’s suspicion of 
the tradition’s attitude toward negation. For both, the tradition is characterised by an absolute rejection 
of negation; and for both, this goes hand in hand with the ‘rejection, dismissal and disparagement’ of 
thought’s history. 
356 PS, p. 22. 
357 PS, p. 22. 
358 This is why in CP, Heidegger claims Hegel is the only philosopher to have thought the history of 
thought philosophically. See CP, p. 167. 
359 The nature of this ‘dynamism’ is of course radically different for Hegel and Heidegger. I have 
deliberately chosen a term foreign to both Hegel and Heidegger‘s thinking in an attempt to capture a 
general affinity without suggesting any strict identity; Heidegger does not think in terms of Hegelian 
negativity, nor is Hegel a thinker of the Heideggerian ‘event.’ 
 
 
157 
 
 
 The similarities between Hegel and Heidegger do not go any further than this. 
While their critique of the traditional concept of untruth shares certain features, 
Heidegger’s account of what gets concealed behind the self-evidence of the modern 
concept of untruth is radically different from Hegel’s.360 Indeed, a crucial difference 
is already betrayed by the fact that for Hegel, negation properly understood is no 
longer a form of ‘untruth’ at all, but rather an intrinsic moment of truth which has 
been misunderstood by the tradition, but which his own ontology lays bare.361 By 
contrast, Heidegger retains the term ‘untruth’ to denote the moment obscured by the 
tradition. Whereas for Hegel, the history of philosophy unfolds in the light of the 
eternally present idea, for Heidegger, this history remains ‘errant’ in a manner we 
will explore further below. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, we consider Heidegger’s account of untruth, 
showing how he moves to inscribe it within the economy of truth. In doing so, we 
will need to explain why he continues to refer to this moment as untruth, but also 
why untruth is doubled in the process into the distinct moments of ‘concealment’ and 
‘errancy.’  
 
4.11 The Open Region 
 
As we noted above, Heidegger begins his essay by claiming that truth is ordinarily 
understood in terms of correspondence. Following the same structure as the analysis 
of truth in §44 of Being and Time, he initially proceeds by asking after the 
background conditions which first make truth as correspondence possible. In order 
for us to take the thing in question as the measure of the validity of our statements, it 
is necessary that we should stand in an open relation to it, accepting it as the standard 
[Richtmaß] against which our statements are to be measured.362 
 
360 Heidegger notes that Schelling and Hegel constitute something of an exception regarding the status 
of untruth in their thought and that with their notion of negativity, they introduce a certain ‘discord’ 
into truth. Yet in a strikingly Cartesian mode, he suggests that it would be better to be ignorant of 
Schelling and Hegel than to confuse his own position with theirs. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 
trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
p.18-19.  
361 See section 3.7 above. 
362 ET p. 121-2; cf. BT, p. 260 ff. 
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 This apparently self-evident relation comprises three distinct yet related 
moments. First, there is what Heidegger calls man’s ‘open stance’ [die 
Offenständigkeit des Menschen] or ‘open comportment’ [offenständiges Verhalten]. 
In order to take the being in question as the standard of our statement, we must be 
receptive to it, ‘open’ to it as the standard according to which the truth-value of our 
statement can be determined. Second, the being to which the statement refers must be 
‘opened up’ [ein Offenbares]—it must be disclosed to us, must ‘show itself’ [sich 
zeigen]. Finally, and most significantly: 
 
‘this appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an 
open region [innerhalb eines Offenen], the openness of which is not first created by 
presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness 
[Bezugsbereich].’363   
 
This ‘open region’ is less immediately self-evident than the other two moments; and 
yet it is a decisive figure in the later Heidegger’s thought. In other writings from the 
same period, he uses the term more or less interchangeably with ‘world’ [Welt] and 
‘clearing’ [Lichtung].364 In ET, Heidegger refers to the open region as a ‘domain of 
relatedness.’ This echoes his account of ‘world’ in BT. There, he claimed that 
everything Dasein encounters is always encountered as part of a system of relations 
he calls world.365 Dasein does not merely find beings in the form of bare ‘presence-
at-hand,’ only to then retrospectively incorporate them into this system of relations. 
Rather, such beings first become manifest as ‘ready to hand,’ i.e. as always already 
standing within the world as part of a broader network of concerns. 
 
363 ET, p. 121. 
364 Thus in OWA, ‘world,’ ‘the open’ and ‘clearing’ appear to be used as synonyms. In other contexts, 
however, Heidegger seems to maintain a subtle distinction between the terms. In the context of CP, the 
distinction seems to reflect the place of concealment; where in the open region, the emphasis falls on 
the unconcealment of beings, the clearing is explicitly clearing for concealment. This difference, 
however, is merely one of accent. 
365 ‘The ready-to-hand is always encountered within-the-world. The being of this entity, readiness-to-
hand, thus stands in some ontological relationship towards the world and towards worldhood. In 
anything ready-to-hand the world is always ‘there.’ Whenever we encounter anything, the world has 
already been previously discovered, though not thematically.’ BT p. 114. John Sallis notes the 
connection between the open region in the ET essay and the concept of world in BT; John Sallis, 
‘Deformatives: Essentially Other Than Truth,’ in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. by John 
Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 36. 
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 It would be a mistake, however, to think that the world or the related notion 
of the open region simply imply a kind of contextualist or relational conception of 
truth, according to which the veracity of a statement can only be established by 
reference to the place of an entity within a larger whole.366  In the Origin of the Work 
of Art, Heidegger attempts to head off such misunderstandings of his concept of 
world: 
 
‘The world is not the mere collection of the countable or the uncountable, familiar 
and unfamiliar things that are at hand. But neither is it merely an imagined 
framework added by our representations to the sum of such given things. The world 
worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which 
we believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us 
and can be seen. […] Wherever those utterly essential decisions of our history are 
made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered by 
new inquiry, there the world worlds.’367 
 
The ‘worlding of the world’ is another name for the presencing which precedes 
beings in their presence considered in the first part of this chapter. We saw there that 
within the first beginning, this moment of presencing has remained unthought, 
inasmuch as the moment of ‘givenness’ has been privileged over the ‘giving’ (the ‘Es 
gibt’). Within the metaphysical tradition, for beings to stand out in the open region is 
for them to be present, ‘open’ to thought. The open region thus seems to constitute a 
fixed horizon of presence. What remains unthought from the earliest moments of the 
first beginning down to its closure with Hegel and Nietzsche is the moment of 
presencing [Anwesen] which precedes all such presence [Anwesenheit]. The 
‘worlding of the world,’ or the ‘clearing’ which first opens up the open region, is 
another name for being in its excess over presence. 
 I take it that Heidegger’s definition of the open region in terms of the 
ontological difference is key to his post-BT conception of truth. In the opening 
sections of the ET essay, it appears simply to constitute the horizon against which all 
intentional statements take shape. In other texts from the 1930s, however, Heidegger 
 
366 Nor does such contextualism exhaust Heidegger‘s account of worldhood in BT. 
367 OWA, p. 170. Cf. ‘On The Essence of Ground’ in Pathmarks, trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 110. 
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specifies it more closely. In the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger uses the 
analogy of the ‘hollow recess’ of a jug to try to capture the nature of the open more 
clearly. 
 
Openness: is that not the emptiest of the empty? So it seems, if we try to take it, so to 
speak, for itself in the manner of a thing. Yet the open region, which conceals itself 
at the same time that beings come to stand in it in each case (indeed not only the 
things most proximately at hand), is in fact something like a hollow recess [hohle 
Mitte], e.g., that of a jug. Yet it must be recognized that the hollow recess is not just a 
haphazard emptiness which arises purely on account of the surrounding walls and 
which happens not to be full of "things." It is just the opposite: the hollow recess 
itself is what determines, shapes, and bears the walling action of the walls and of 
their surfaces. The walls and surfaces are merely what is radiated out by that original 
open realm which allows its openness to come into play by summoning up, round 
about itself and toward itself, such-and-such walls (the particular form of the vessel). 
That is how the essential occurrence of the open region radiates back from and in the 
em- bracing walls.368 
 
The hollow recess of the jug appears to be empty; it is not a ‘being.’ Indeed, what is 
immediately evident to us is just the jug itself, a being which is present before us, 
which we can then make the subject of predicative statements (‘the jug is heavy’). 
Yet Heidegger suggests that it is the hollow recess which ‘bears’ the walls of the jug. 
It both ‘determines’ and ‘shapes’ it, giving it the form which we so often assume it 
simply ‘takes,’ as though from itself. Though it goes unnoticed, apparently 
constituting a mere ‘void,’ it nonetheless determines what Heidegger elsewhere calls 
the ‘what-being and how-being’ of the jug in its presence.369 
 At the same time, it is clear that this hollow recess is not given ‘apart’ from 
the jug. The recess ‘radiates back from the embracing walls,’ and in the same way, 
the open region only becomes evident through the beings which it bears. The open is 
thus not a ‘logos’ in the Hegelian sense of a horizon of the determinacy of all 
possible beings which could be articulated by abstracting from beings and turning 
 
368 CP, p. 268; translation modified. 
369 The ‘Was- und Wie-sein;’ see GA 9, p. 131; ‘On The Essence of Ground’ in Pathmarks, trans. 
William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 104. 
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inward, examining the logical structure of pure thought. Rather, the open region only 
becomes manifest in and through the beings that stand within it.370   
 This is why in ET, Heidegger characterises truth in terms of Dasein’s ‘ek-
sistence.’ Dasein’s ‘ek-sistence’ refers to its ‘standing outside’ of itself. In relating to 
beings in the open region, Dasein also transcends these beings in their immediacy, 
and stands in a relation to the open region as the horizon of their determinacy. Dasein 
thus always takes its orientation not simply from beings in their immediacy, but from 
the open region within which they take shape. It exceeds beings in their presence—
yet at the same time, it is never given apart from them. 
 Heidegger closes the passage in the Contributions cited above with the 
following remark: 
  
We must understand in a corresponding way, though as more essential and richer, the 
essential occurrence of the openness of the "there." The surrounding walling action 
of the "there" is of course not an objectively present thing; indeed it is not a being, 
nor even all beings. Instead, it pertains to being itself and is the trembling of the 
event in the intimation of the self-concealing.371 
 
At this juncture, Heidegger introduces a moment of the open region never explicitly 
invoked in ET. The open region does not merely provide a static background against 
which beings come into view. Rather, it must be understood as an ‘occurrence’ or 
event. Again, a contrast with Hegel is useful here. While the open region does not 
share the structure of pure thought, so nonetheless, there are undeniable parallels 
between it and Hegel’s idea. The idea is not a being; nor is it an interpretative 
framework which thought ‘projects’ onto beings. Indeed, it can be described as the 
universal logos which determines the ‘what and how’ of beings in their presence. 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that Hegel’s account of the internal negativity 
of the concept allowed him to account for the different philosophical systems of the 
Western tradition as partial accounts of the concept. Nonetheless, his own system 
reveals the concept as the eternal, unchanging background against which this history 
unfolds. In his Science of Logic, he thus provides an account of the concept which 
 
370 On this point, see Heidegger‘s account of transcendence in the ‘On The Essence of Ground’ in 
Pathmarks, trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
371 CP, p. 268; translation modified. 
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transcends the partial accounts of the history of philosophy, establishing a timelessly 
valid account of the horizon of determinacy. 
 Heidegger’s open region occupies a similar place to Hegel’s concept as the 
horizon of determinacy of beings. Nonetheless, unlike Hegel’s concept, the open 
region is not a universal, fixed horizon, but is subject to change. He thus writes in the 
Origin of the Work of Art that ‘the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing, is 
never a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings 
runs its course.’372  For Heidegger, it is these shifts in the open region which bring 
about the transitions from one ‘epoch’ of history to the next. Heidegger hints at this 
in ET when he writes that ‘the rare and simple decisions of history arise from the 
way the original essence of truth essentially unfolds.’373 It is only in its relation to the 
open region that humanity becomes properly historical. History thus does not unfold 
against the ‘backdrop’ of the open region; on the contrary, it is the history of the open 
region itself.  
 Recall that Hegel suspended the opposition between truth and falsity in order 
to bring into view the negativity which characterizes the idea. For Heidegger, too, 
truth comes into view only when we suspend the standard opposition between truth 
and falsity. Yet what is revealed is not a negativity at the heart of truth, whose total 
mediation constitutes the horizon of the determinacy of beings. The epochs of history 
are not woven together into a coherent logical totality.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, it is my intention to demonstrate that the two 
forms of ‘untruth’ presented in ET have nothing in common with untruth understood 
as error or falsity; nor can they be understood simply in terms of the ‘concealment’ of 
beings standing in the open region. Instead, they pertain to the ‘event’ which first 
opens up the open region. Where traditionally, untruth is understood as a kind of 
defect in man’s ‘open stance,’ a limitation in mankind’s ‘openness’ to beings in their 
disclosure, we will see that Heidegger moves to inscribe untruth within the open 
region itself, thus removing it from the domain of epistemological error. 
 
 
372 OWA, p. 179. 
373 ET, p. 127. 
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4.12 Untruth as Concealing 
 
The first form of untruth Heidegger introduces in ET is concealment. He opens his 
account with an apparently paradoxical statement: ‘Concealment deprives alētheia of 
disclosure, and does not yet allow its act of sterēsis (privation [Beraubung]); instead, 
it preserves what is most proper to alētheia as its own.’374 
 On the one hand, concealment seems to be defined by its opposition to 
unconcealment. In this way, it seems to constitute a kind of frustration of truth, 
‘depriving’ it of disclosure. It would thus seem to be simply the ‘other’ of truth qua 
unconcealment. 
 At the same time, however, Heidegger suggests that this concealment 
‘preserves what is most proper to alētheia as its own.’ One might assume that 
Heidegger is here simply reiterating the familiar idea that all human knowledge is 
intrinsically finite, such that our grasp of truth is necessarily always partial.375 Yet in 
anticipation of such misreadings, he goes on to warn us that this concealment ‘does 
not first show up subsequently as a consequence of the fact that knowledge of beings 
is always fragmentary.’376 
 In the following paragraph, Heidegger defines concealment as the ‘non-
essence’ of truth. In an extremely dense passage, he qualifies this statement, 
attempting to show how it cannot be understood in terms of the usual opposition 
between the essential and the unessential: 
 
‘Non-essence here means not yet fallen to the sense of essence as what is general 
(koinon, genos), its possibilitas and its ground. In this way, non-essence is the pre-
 
374 ET, P. 130; translation modified. The original reads: ‘Die Verborgenheit versagt das alētheia das 
Entbergen und lässt sie noch nicht als sterēsis (Beraubung) zu, sondern bewahrt ihr das Eigenste als 
Eigentum.’ p.193. I have translated ‘noch nicht zulassen’ with ‘does not yet allow’ instead of ‘does not 
render it.’ Note that in BT, Heidegger uses privation or ‘robbery’ [Beraubung] as a synonym for 
disclosure. See BT, p. 265. 
375 I take it that Lee Braver has something like this in mind when he interprets concealment in ET as a 
question of ‘focus’: ‘Heidegger argues that a complete shadowless grasp of every aspect of something 
is not just unattainable by our finite minds, but is actually incoherent. The way unconcealment works 
is that when one aspect of something comes to light, its other aspects as well as beings as a whole fade 
into the shadows. Due to the very nature of focus, bringing one thing into the foreground of one's 
attention displaces all else to the background.’ Lee Braver, Heidegger’s Later Writings: A Reader’s 
Guide (London: Continuum, 2009) p. 34. 
376 ET, p. 130. 
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essential essence. Yet “nonessence” means first and for the most part the deformation 
of essence in that fallen sense. Certainly, in both of these senses, the non-essence 
remains essential to essence, each in its own way, never becoming inessential in the 
sense of irrelevant.’377 
 
We ordinarily take ‘nonessence’ to mean the ‘deformation’ of essence in the sense of 
the general (genos). It is that which ‘deviates’ from the essence, corrupting it. And 
indeed, seen from the perspective of truth as the disclosure of beings, concealment 
would seem to constitute just such a nonessence. Yet Heidegger insists (emphasizing 
the difference with a hyphen) that we must here instead understand this ‘non-essence’ 
as preceding the ordinary distinction between the essential and inessential. 
Concealment is not simply the ‘nonessence of truth,’ but rather its ‘pre-essential 
essence.’ 
 We saw above that Heidegger claims in the early sections of the essay that 
untruth is ordinarily understood as the ‘nonessence’ of truth in the sense of its 
deformation. He thus noted that, when it comes to considering the ‘pure essence’ of 
truth, untruth is ordinarily simply put to one side. Heidegger has now reversed this 
structure, positing untruth as the ‘pre-essential essence’ of truth.  Far from being a 
simple excess over truth, he suggests that this ‘non-essence’ of truth ‘points to the 
still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (and not merely of beings).’378 
 In other words, this moment of concealment points back to the ‘event’ by 
means of which the open region is first opened up. It thus does not denote the 
‘covering over’ of beings which might otherwise be disclosed in the open region. 
Rather, as Heidegger writes in the Origin of the Work of Art, ‘concealment as refusal 
is not simply and only the limit of knowledge in any given circumstance, but the 
beginning of the clearing of what is cleared.’379 
 We saw above that the open region is not a static ‘horizon,’ but rather is 
essentially changeable. According to Heidegger, the open region first takes shape as 
the result of an interplay between truth and untruth which precedes all 
 
377 Ibid., translation modified. 
378 ET, p. 131. 
379 OWA, p. 178-9. 
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unconcealment of beings—what in the Origin of the Work of Art he calls the ‘primal 
strife between clearing and concealing.’380 
 It is by means of this ‘strife’ that Being delivers beings over into an epoch of 
presence. Yet Being, as the destining that first gives rise to an epoch of presence, 
itself always exceeds the horizon of presence. As the ‘Es gibt’ which precedes all 
givenness, being itself is structurally concealed. Truth qua unconcealment is thus 
always preceded by a moment of untruth—and yet it is this very untruth which first 
gives rise to the horizon of presence within which truth unfolds. As such, 
concealment precedes the economy of truth conceived in terms of presence. It is an 
‘absence’ which precedes all presence, first making it possible,381 ‘untruth’ inscribed 
at the very heart of truth.  
I take it that this notion of concealment is crucial in explaining why for 
Heidegger, being itself has a history. For it means that being itself is never 
‘present’—neither to thought, nor indeed to itself. For it means that being does not 
‘have’ an essence, but rather ‘essences’ in a verbal sense. It ‘occurs’ as event, in 
which beings are disclosed in the open region, and in which being itself withdraws in 
self-concealment. Being lets beings stand forth only by concealing itself. Since it is 
structurally withdrawn, no ‘event’ of truth is ever final, such that the open region is 
always structurally open to further events. It is precisely because being is not an 
essence or ‘ground’ of things that it can never be rendered present, but rather only 
become manifest in a series of events, none of which are ever exhaustive of being. 
  In ET, Heidegger refers to concealment as the ‘mystery’ [das Geheimnis]. He 
explores the structure of the mystery in more detail in his Parmenides lectures. There, 
he argues that in the modern age, a mystery is conceived simply as something which 
has not yet been explained.382 It is treated as something obscure which still awaits 
illumination—a ‘residue’ which our knowledge has not yet been able to incorporate. 
As such, its only relevance consists in the possibility of its eventual illumination. 
Insofar as it remains ‘mysterious,’ it is not properly speaking an object of knowledge, 
instead denoting a simple limit to our knowledge. On this account, the ‘truth’ of a 
 
380 OWA, p. 180. 
381 Cf. Miguel de Beisetgui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 127. 
382 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 63. 
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mystery comes with its dissolution and illumination—such that it ceases to be a 
mystery. 
 Heidegger explains this point by playing on the meaning of the term “open 
secret” [offenes Geheimnis]: 
 
We readily misuse the term “open secret” or “open mystery” and apply it to the 
situation where there is precisely nothing secret or mysterious at all but where what 
is already known by everyone is not supposed to be brought into the open. The 
“open mystery” in the genuine and strict sense, on the contrary, occurs where the 
concealing of the mysterious is simply experienced as concealedness and is lodged 
in a historically arisen reticence. The openness of the open mystery does not consist 
in solving the mystery, thus destroying it, but consists in not touching the 
concealedness of the simple and essential and letting this concealedness alone in its 
appearance. The insignificance of the concealment proper to the genuine mystery is 
already a result of the essence of the simple, which for its part is grounded 
primordially.383 
 
The mystery, then, is not a puzzle awaiting resolution, nor something which is simply 
as of yet unknown or unexplained. Rather, Heidegger suggests that to stand in an 
open relation to the mystery involves allowing it to prevail as the mystery that it is. 
In other words, it involves adopting a stance in which one does not attempt to ground 
it in some being or economy of presence. All attempts to ‘get to the bottom’ of the 
mystery destroy the mystery qua mystery. 
 There is a similarity here with the status of illusion in Kant’s thought, 
although the parallel is far from absolute. In chapter two, we saw that ordinarily, the 
task of thought is to ‘overcome’ illusions; in the act of exposing an illusion, it ceases 
to deceive us. For Kant, however, transcendental illusion persists even after being 
exposed. Similarly, Heidegger argues that a mystery is generally conceived of as 
something to be overcome. Yet he goes on to suggest that this will to overcome the 
mystery is the consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of truth. 
The ‘mystery’ of concealment is not something to be overcome, but rather something 
 
383 Ibid. 
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which we must be allowed to persist—an irreducible moment of untruth inscribed at 
the heart of the economy of truth. 
 
4.13 A-letheia and the Clearing for Self-Concealing 
 
It is often assumed that for Heidegger, aletheia is synonymous with truth. Yet in the 
Contributions, Heidegger suggests that his own conception of truth implies an 
overcoming of the notion of truth as aletheia in the sense in which it was understood 
in the first beginning. He writes: 
  
A-letheia means un-concealment and the un-concealed itself, which already indicates 
that concealment itself is experienced only as what is to be cleared away, what is to 
be removed (a-). 
Therefore questioning, too, does not address the concealment itself and its ground; 
and therefore also, conversely, the unconcealed as such is all that is essential, not the 
process of unconcealing and certainly not this as the clearing in which the 
concealment itself now actually comes into the open. Nevertheless, the concealment 
is not thereby cancelled [aufgehoben] but first becomes graspable in its essence. 
 Truth as the clearing for concealment is thus an essentially different 
projection than is aletheia, although the former projection pertains to the recollection 
of the latter, and vice versa.384 
 
The term aletheia is constructed from the Greek lēthē, meaning concealment or 
forgetting and an alpha-privative. Heidegger privileges the term aletheia over the 
later terms veritas and truth because it contains a reference to this negative moment 
of concealing or forgetting. Nonetheless, he suggests here that within the first 
beginning, truth was always understood as a privative operation, in which 
concealment is reduced to a moment to be overcome. We saw in part one of this 
chapter that early Greek thought hints at the emergence of beings in their 
unconcealment from an indefinite horizon. Yet from the beginning, Greek thought 
was turned toward beings in their presence. Truth designated the rising up of beings 
in their presence in the open region. What remained unthought, even amongst the 
 
384 CP, p. 277. 
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earliest Greek thinkers, was the moment of concealment which precedes all 
unconcealing.  
 By positing untruth as the essence of truth in the form of the concealing 
which precedes all unconcealment, Heidegger asks us to ‘recollect’ this moment of 
lēthē not as a simple surplus over truth as unconcealing, but rather as an essential 
moment of primordial truth. Truth does not occur as the privative act of overcoming 
concealment, but rather incorporates the strife in which being withdraws beneath 
beings in their unconcealment. Indeed, I take it that Heidegger gives precedence to 
concealment—claiming that it precedes all unconcealment —precisely so as to 
reverse the traditional idea that untruth constitutes a kind of corruption of truth which 
we might thus seek to overcome. Instead, it is the very nature of being to conceal 
itself, such that any moment of unconcealment is always already accompanied by an 
irreducible moment of concealment.  
 In order to emphasize the belonging of lēthē to aletheia, in the Contributions, 
Heidegger defines truth as clearing for self-concealing. We noted above that 
Heidegger uses the terms clearing and ‘open region’ more or less interchangably in 
many writings from this period. Yet here, a slight difference in accent comes to the 
fore.385 In ET, the open region is defined as the ‘domain of relations’ within which 
beings in their presence are disclosed. Yet we saw above that the unconcealment of 
beings presupposes a more fundamental sense of truth, the strife by means of which 
this open region is first ‘opened’ or cleared. 
 The notion of the ‘clearing for self-concealing’ brings this primordial moment 
of strife to the fore. Dasein’s truth consists not simply in being open to beings in their 
unconcealment. Instead, it consists in attending to the mystery, the moment of 
concealment which precedes all unconcealing. What is ‘concealed’ in the event of 
truth is not simply this or that being, nor some aspect of beings that might otherwise 
be revealed. Nor is it the open region as such, as the horizon against which these 
beings come into view. Rather, it is the excess of being over this horizon. It is this 
excess which ontotheology overlooks. Indeed, it is apt to be overlooked, as it cannot 
be thematized in positive terms. Yet for Heidegger, it is this excess over the totality 
 
385 Heidegger says of aletheia, openness and the clearing of what is self-concealing that: ‘Roughly 
speaking, these are different terms with the same meaning. Nevertheless, behind these names lurks a 
decisive question.’ CP, p. 263, translation modified. 
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of beings which means that being is never exhausted by any particular ‘horizon,’ or 
epoch of beings. I take it that for Heidegger, one of the primary ways in which this 
excess becomes manifest is in the historical shifts from one horizon to another. These 
shifts do not obey a logic intrinsic to any given horizon, but rather point to an excess 
over all such horizons.  
 According to the Contributions, the task of inceptual thinking is thus the 
sheltering [Bergung] of being’s self-concealment.386 Heidegger writes: ‘Whence does 
sheltering derive its urgency and necessity? From self-concealing. The sheltering of 
this occurrence is needed to preserve the self-concealing rather than do away with 
it.’387 While the first beginning has tended to treat concealment as a moment to be 
overcome, Heidegger understands it as an essential moment of truth. 
  
4.14 Untruth as Errancy 
 
In ET, having established untruth as the concealment which precedes all 
unconcealing, Heidegger goes on to introduce a second form of untruth, errancy [die 
Irre]. As ek-sistent, Dasein relates not only to beings in their presence, but equally to 
the mystery which precedes the openness of beings. Dasein is thus equally in ‘truth,’ 
as the unconcealment of beings, and ‘untruth,’ as the structural withdrawal of the 
ground of beings. 
 Yet Heidegger claims that, in the process of the unconcealment of beings, the 
moment of concealment itself gets covered up.388 For the most part, human beings 
are turned towards what is unconcealed, ‘acquiescing’ in the openness of particular 
beings. In the face of beings in their presence, the mystery gets forgotten. 
 Heidegger refers to this as Dasein’s ‘insistence.’ He writes: 
 
As insistent, man is turned toward the most readily available beings. But he insists 
only by being already ek-sistent, since, after all, he takes beings as his standard. 
However, in taking its standard, humanity is turned away from the mystery. The ek-
sistent turning toward what is readily available and the ek-sistent turning away from 
 
386 See CP, p. 307. 
387 CP, p. 308. 
388 ET, p. 131. 
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the mystery belong together. They are one and the same. […] Man’s flight from the 
mystery toward what is readily available, onward from one current thing to the next, 
passing the mystery by – this is erring [das Irren].389 
 
‘In-sistence’ is not simply opposed to Dasein’s ek-sistence. Instead, it presupposes 
the latter, and can be understood as a modification of it. Indeed, is only as ek-sistent 
that Dasein stands in relation to beings in their openness at all. Heidegger notes that, 
even in Dasein’s mode of insistence, the mystery continues to hold sway, as the 
implicit horizon of beings in their presence. Nonetheless, as errant, Dasein does not 
attend to the mystery, but is rather ‘turned away’ from it, instead taking its orientation 
from beings in their presence. The most fundamental form of truth, the interplay 
between concealment and unconcealment, gets covered over. 
 On the one hand, ‘errancy’ simply denotes the everyday comportment of 
Dasein—what in BT Heidegger called Dasein’s inauthenticity. For the most part, 
Dasein is not concerned with the truth of Being, but is simply absorbed in its familiar 
world.390 It thus takes beings in their presence for granted, simply accepting the 
interpretations of the ‘public interpretation’ of beings passed along by the ‘they.’391 
 Note that like concealment, errancy bears little resemblance to the traditional 
concept of ‘untruth’ as falsity. By ‘insisting’ on beings in their presence, Dasein does 
not falsify them. On the contrary, beings are ‘unconcealed’ in errancy. Errancy ‘errs’ 
only inasmuch as it fails to attend to the mystery, the absence at the heart of beings in 
their presence.  
 As such, errancy would seem to denote a kind of falling short of primordial 
truth, as the interplay between concealment and unconcealing which first gives rise 
to the open region. Properly speaking, errancy is not opposed to truth as 
unconcealment, but rather to un-truth qua concealing. It is a secondary form of 
untruth, in which concealment as the pre-essence of truth falls from view.  
 
389 ET, p. 132-3. 
390 Bret W. Davis thus notes that ‘letting beings be’ is not a permanent state into which one enters, but 
can occur only ‘from time to time’ by way of a ‘glimpse into the mystery out of errancy,’ that is, by 
stepping back from one’s dealings with beings to expose oneself to the question of being.’ Bret W. 
Davis, Heidegger and the Will. On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2007), p. 284. 
391 Heidegger equates such ‘falling’ with untruth in BT; see BT, p. 264. 
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 If errancy constitutes a ‘falling short’ of primordial truth, does this mean that 
Heidegger has reintroduced a moment of epistemological shortfall into his account of 
untruth? In the passage cited above, Heidegger talks of man’s ‘flight from the 
mystery toward what is readily available.’ On the face of it, this seems to suggest 
that, unlike concealment, errancy is not an intrinsic feature of the economy of truth, 
but rather denotes Dasein’s distance from truth. 
 Moreover, errancy clearly resembles the oblivion of being which 
characterises the history of philosophy hitherto. We saw in part one of this chapter 
that, over the course of the first beginning, thought is increasingly turned towards 
beings in their presence, such that the moment of giving which precedes presence 
falls from view. 
 It may thus seem as though, while concealment constitutes a moment of 
untruth that belongs irreducibly to the economy of truth, Heidegger considers errancy 
to be a moment of untruth in the more traditional sense of something to be overcome. 
The first beginning would thus be errant—and the task of inceptual thinking would 
be to overcome this errancy. 
 In ET, Heidegger is careful to insist that errancy is by no means accidental. It 
is not a contingent feature of the human condition, but rather an irreducible feature of 
being. Heidegger writes: 
 
Man errs. Man does not merely stray into errancy. He is always astray in errancy, 
because as ek-sistent he in-sists and so is caught in errancy. The errancy through 
which man strays is not something which, as it were, extends alongside man like a 
ditch into which he occasionally stumbles; rather, errancy belongs to the inner 
constitution of the Da-sein into which historical man is admitted.392 
 
As such, unlike Cartesian or Kantian error, it is clear that for Heidegger, errancy is 
not a merely contingent feature of thought. It is not an accidental feature of human 
existence, distorting thought’s ‘natural tendency’ toward truth. On the contrary, 
Dasein is intrinsically turned toward beings in their presence. 
 In this passage, Heidegger might be taken to be making a simple point about 
human finitude. The idea of a relation to truth in which error would be entirely 
 
392 ET, p. 133. 
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eliminated is illusory. It is not by accident that we sometimes go astray; on the 
contrary, human thought always and will always tend towards error.  
 Yet I take it that Heidegger’s point here is a different one. In ET, Heidegger 
defines errancy in terms of Dasein’s turning away from the mystery. As a result, one 
is left with the impression that errancy is a product of a kind of defect in Dasein’s 
open stance. Certainly, on this reading, Heidegger differs from Descartes and Kant, 
in that he suggests that this defect cannot be simply overcome. Nonetheless, errancy 
ultimately remains a product of a kind of shortfall of thought—albeit one which can 
never be redressed.  
Yet in other writings from the same era, it becomes clear that for Heidegger, 
errancy is not merely the product of a kind of shortfall on the part of Dasein. Rather, 
it is a necessary moment of the economy of truth—a product not of an 
epistemological shortfall from truth, but rather a moment made necessary by the very 
nature of being.  
 
4.15 Errancy and History 
 
In ET, Heidegger defines errancy in terms of Dasein’s turning away from the 
mystery. Yet in other writings from the same period, he offers what might be 
considered a more ‘positive’ definition of errancy. In Mindfulness [Besinnung], he 
writes:  
Errancy and erring in errancy is the simplest experience of thinking unto which 
thinking sees itself relegated when it has given up the support of beings and the 
escape into beingness. This errancy itself is the clearing (openness - truth) of be-ing. 
Errancy does not set itself up against the truth, and is also not removed by truth and 
made to disappear. Rather, errancy is the appearing of the truth itself in its own 
sway. Errancy is that within which a particular interpretation of be-ing must err, 
which erring alone truly traverses the clearing of refusal—traverses in accord with 
the clearing of what is lighted up. 
The fundamental consequence of errancy as the sway of the truth of be-ing is that 
any being that enters into and stays within the openness and can possibly preserve 
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this openness, simultaneously resides in 'un-truth' in the double sense of sheltering-
concealing and dissembling.393 
 
Here, Heidegger talks about errancy not in terms of Dasein’s ‘turning away’ from the 
mystery, but rather as ‘the appearing of truth in its own sway.’ Crucially, errancy is 
not treated here as a defect in Dasein’s open stance, nor as a product of its in-
sistence. On the contrary, it is what thought experiences when it renounces its 
insistence on beings in their presence, ‘giving up’ the ‘support of beings.’ How are 
we to understand this apparent deviation from his account in ET?  
 I take it that here, Heidegger uses errancy simply to refer to the way in which 
beings are made manifest in their presence in the open region. Beings do not point 
back to the event of truth through which they first become manifest; nor do they 
stand in any direct relation to concealment. Rather, they are simply ‘given’ in their 
presence.  
Heidegger puts the same point more explicitly in the Anaximander Fragment. 
He writes: 
 
As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws. In this way, by illuminating them, 
Being sets beings adrift in errancy. Beings come to pass in that errancy by which 
they circumvent Being and establish the realm of error [Irrtum] (in the sense of a 
prince's realm [Fürstentum] or the realm of poetry [Dichtertum]). Error [Irrtum] is 
the space in which history unfolds.394 
 
In the very same movement in which being reveals or ‘illuminates’ beings, it also 
‘sets them adrift’ in errancy. I take it that this is Heidegger’s way of denoting the fact 
that, for the most part, the open region is stable and apparently fixed. Where in ET, 
Heidegger claimed that it was Dasein’s ‘in-sistence’ that gave rise to errancy, here, he 
 
393 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 
2006), p. 229. 
394 AF, p. 26. Heidegger is here playing on the suffix -tum in ‘Irr-tum,’ suggesting it must be heard in 
the same sense as in the word ‘Fürsten-tum’ – literally a principality, translated here as prince’s realm. 
It is important to recognize that he does not use ‘error’ in a sense distinct from errancy here, and 
certainly not in the ordinary sense of a ‘mistake;’ on the contrary, he suggests that ‘Irrtum’ must here 
be understood as the ‘Irre-tum’—the ‘realm of errancy,’ or the space opened up by the errancy of 
being.  
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seems to suggest that errancy is the name for the way in which beings are revealed in 
the open region.  
Crucially, in this same passage, Heidegger claims that it is in the space 
opened up by errancy that history unfolds. It is only here that the full import of 
Heidegger’s concept of errancy becomes apparent. The term does not simply denote 
Dasein’s tendency to ‘turn away’ from the mystery. On the contrary, we must hear in 
this term an echo of the traditional notion of the ‘errant’ history of thought. Just as 
for Descartes, the history of philosophy was set adrift in errancy, for Heidegger too, 
history can be conceived as a kind of errant wandering. 
Yet in distinction to Descartes, Heidegger conceives of this errancy not 
simply as a shortfall on the part of thought, but rather as an errancy immanent to 
being itself. The various ‘destinings’ of being are errant, inasmuch as they establish a 
fixed horizon of beings, within which any particular epoch of humanity dwells.  
Heidegger makes the connection between errancy and history explicit in the 
passages which follow in the Anaximander Fragment, writing: ‘Without errancy 
there would be no connection from destiny to destiny: there would be no history.’395 
Errancy thus does not simply describe Dasein’s ‘erring past the mystery,’ and so a 
defect in Dasein’s open stance. Rather, in a more ‘positive’ sense, it also denotes the 
way in which being discloses beings in a series of historical ‘epochs’ He adds: 
From the epoche of Being comes the epochal essence of its destining, in which world 
history properly consists. When Being keeps to itself in its destining, world suddenly 
and unexpectedly comes to pass. Every epoch of world history is an epoch of 
errancy.396 
 
Heidegger’s point here is not that every epoch of world history is in some sense 
‘false,’ or defective, nor that it arises through some defect in Dasein’s open stance. 
Rather, as Derrida notes, the errancy of history follows from the fact being can never 
be rendered present, but is essentially concealed. As such, no horizon of presence can 
ever lay claim to being exhaustive of being: 
 
395 Ibid.  
396 Ibid., p. 27. 
 
 
175 
 
 
Without this dissimulation of Being by the existent there would be nothing, and there 
would be no history. That Being occurs in all respects as history and as world means that 
it can only retire beneath ontic determinations in the history of metaphysics. For 
historical “epochs” are metaphysical (ontotheological) determinations of the Being 
which thus brackets itself, reserves itself beneath metaphysical concepts.397  
 
In other words, being only reveals itself through this dissimulation, and thus in the 
form of an errant history. This errancy does not occur through some defect in 
Dasein’s comportment, but rather is simply Heidegger’s name for the fact that for the 
most part, beings persist in their simple presence, within which the original event of 
truth is not apparent.  
As such, for Heidegger, the task of thought is thus not to ‘transcend’ errancy; 
indeed, this cannot be the case, as strictly speaking, there is nothing ‘beyond’ or 
‘behind’ this errancy. The ‘metaphysical’ determinations of being are simply the way 
in which being reveals itself in the open region, even while at the same time 
withdrawing into self-concealment.  
 Rather, thought can only ‘overcome’ errancy in the limited sense of 
recognizing the essential groundlessness of a given epoch of being. By attending to 
the mystery, thought can recognize that its own epoch is not exhaustive of being, but 
rather that it is adrift in the errancy of being, which is essentially ungrounded, and 
open to change.  
 As such, even in the wake of the ‘other beginning,’ it is clear that Dasein’s 
history would remain ‘errant,’ in the sense that it will continue to exist within a 
particular ‘destining’ of being. The shift which Heidegger seeks to bring about is thus 
not one which would correct the ‘errant’ history of the past. This is why, in the 
passage from Mindfulness cited above, Heidegger claims that ‘errancy does not set 
itself up against the truth, and is also not removed by truth and made to disappear.’ 
Errant history is not bracketed, cast aside and rendered neutral, or made to vanish. 
Rather, it is the errant history of truth itself.  
 
397 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 180. 
Similarly, in his Heidegger seminars, he writes ‘Dissimulation is as originary and essential as 
unveiling. Cf. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. If this were not so, then the historicity of being would be 
derivative and secondary.’ Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2016), p. 63. 
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Recall that for Descartes and Kant, the ‘space’ in which history unfolded was 
opened up by thought’s falling short of truth. It was only due to a faulty application 
of the faculties that the space of thought’s history opened up at all, such that 
historicity ultimately took shape in the ‘gap’ between the economy of cognition and 
the economy of truth. By contrast, in these passages, Heidegger makes clear that this 
‘space of error’ is not the product of a shortfall of thought, or of Dasein’s 
comportment, but is rather immanent to the economy of truth.   
 This means that accounting for historical difference belongs to the remit of 
ontology—conceived broadly as the thinking of being.398 Moreover, for Heidegger, 
such ontology cannot be systematic. This is because there is no ‘law’ according to 
which history unfolds. Being is radically withdrawn and concealed, such that its 
‘logic’ can never be rendered present to thought. As such, we cannot seek to trace 
historical difference back to the intrinsic structure of human cognition, as Kant does, 
nor to a universal logos at work behind this history all along, as Hegel seeks to do.  
 Another way of putting this point is to say that historical difference is granted 
a certain autonomy. It is not reduced to a form of ‘epistemological difference’ whose 
law could be specified by way of an account of the human faculties. Nor is it a 
product of the kind of ontological negativity which Hegel. If for Heidegger, historical 
difference is ‘grounded’ in ontological difference, this does not mean that we can 
expose the ‘logic’ of historical difference solely by attending to ontological 
difference. Rather, it means that historical difference is the way in which ontological 
difference becomes manifest. To attend to ontological difference is just to attend to 
historical difference, such that the two can only be thought together.  
 In practice, this means that philosophy is obliged to engage with its own 
past—not merely in the form of a secondary discipline, nor even as a subsection of a 
broader philosophical system. The line separating first philosophy from the history of 
philosophy is essentially erased altogether. To ask after truth is also to ask after the 
history of truth. There is nothing behind the errant paths or ‘Holzwege’ of history.  
And since no law can be specified which would circumscribe the limits of this 
 
398 As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, Heidegger rejects the term ‘ontology’ in his later 
thought for its systematic connotations. I nonetheless employ it here to denote the fact that for 
Heidegger, historical difference does not have its root in an epistemological shortfall, but rather 
follows from the very nature of being itself.  
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history, it is only through a hermeneutic engagement with past texts that the labour of 
thought can proceed. 
 We stated above that Heidegger’s claim that ‘untruth is the essence of truth’ 
must be interpreted against the background of the traditional association between 
untruth and historicity. In short, the statement means nothing less than ‘truth is 
essentially historical.’ We have now spelled out this connection in detail.  
 
*** 
 
The question remains, however, as to how we are to reconcile this notion of 
‘ontological’ errancy with the account of errancy given in ET. Heidegger switches 
relatively freely in his writings between these two senses of errancy—Dasein’s ‘in-
sistence’ on the one hand, and the fixed horizon of beings in their presence on the 
other.399 On the one hand, errancy simply denotes the way in which the history of 
truth unfolds. On the other, Heidegger treats it as a ‘defect’ characteristic not of 
history as such, but specifically of the first beginning, which, we are to assume, 
would in some sense be overcome in the other beginning.  
 We saw in part one above that Heidegger goes to great lengths to show that 
this first beginning does not arise out of some defect on the part of thought. Rather, 
he treats it as a ‘destining’ of being, through which concealment first becomes 
apparent.  
Nonetheless, I take it that Heidegger exploits the concept of errancy as in-
sistence to maintain a certain critical distance from philosophy’s past. For Heidegger, 
the past is not simply a matter of the historical unfolding of truth, but also of a 
certain decline, which can only be redressed through a radical break with the past. In 
this way, Heidegger retains the idea that the first beginning is marked by a kind of 
shortfall, which his own project seeks to overcome  
I take it that this is a consequence of Heidegger’s privileging of the future 
over the past, as discussed at the end of part one of this chapter. For the ambiguity in 
 
399 It falls beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the scope of these different usages here. 
Nonetheless, I take it that a detailed study of Heidegger’s writings from this era would reflect that the 
tension between the meanings reflects the context in which the terms are used. Specifically, it is in his 
criticism of the first beginning that Heidegger associates errancy with Dasein’s ‘in-sistence,’ and so a 
kind of defect in Dasein’s open stance; while his other more general writings on the history of being 
reflect more neutrally on the idea that the history of being is intrinsically errant.   
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the concept of errancy allows Heidegger to maintain, on the one hand, that the past of 
thought is nothing other than being’s own past; and on the other, to denounce the 
metaphysical past in the name of a ‘more originary insertion’ into history that is yet 
to come. We return to this issue in the conclusion to the thesis, with specific 
reference to the Black Notebooks.  
  
4.16 Conclusion to Chapter Four: The Doubling of Untruth  
 
We saw above that Heidegger understands the history of thought not as a product of 
thought’s tendency towards error, but rather as a history of truth itself.  
This has a number of consequences. Firstly, it means that for Heidegger, as for 
Hegel, the history of thought is not a product of thought’s tendency toward error in 
the sense of falsity. Indeed, there is a strong resemblance between the ‘errancy’ of 
historical epochs in Heidegger’s thought, and the ‘one-sidedness’ which defines the 
history of thought for Hegel. For both, the history of thought is never simply a 
question of thought ‘falsifying’ being. 
 By contrast to Hegel, however, for Heidegger, the truth underlying the history of 
philosophy can never be rendered present in a single, fixed economy of truth.  As 
such, inceptual thinking cannot start with a ‘new beginning’ of the kind Hegel 
proposes in his presuppositionless logic, which would finally render the structure of 
being bare. Recall that Hegel’s a priori account of the idea allowed him to 
reconstruct the logic underlying the history of philosophy, such that the VGP 
presupposed the logic as the hermeneutic ‘key’ to Hegel’s readings of historical texts. 
 For Heidegger, there is nothing to be thought ‘beyond’ being’s errant history. 
In this way, Heidegger comes close to Descartes’ position, in the sense that the 
history of thought does not unfold according to any specific logic, but rather as a 
certain excess over the economy of truth. Yet for Heidegger, this excess is built into 
the economy of truth, which is not static and unchanging like Descartes’ idea, but 
rather is intrinsically mutable.400 
 
400 John Sallis refers to this as the ‘monstrosity’ of truth. See John Sallis, ‘Deformatives: Essentially 
Other Than Truth,’ in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 29 ff.  
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 I take it that this is why untruth is ‘doubled’ in Heidegger’s thought. 
Heidegger understands the history of being as an interplay between concealment and 
errancy. Recall that for Descartes, truth was unequivocal. History consisted in a 
contingent ‘erring’ past the truth, until such time as thought could be put on the right 
track by his method.  
 For Heidegger on the other hand, truth itself is ‘errant.’ This should not be 
taken to constitute a simple paradox, in which truth and falsity are equated. Rather, 
the form of errancy identified by Descartes is now treated not as an excess over truth, 
a waste product generated by an epistemological shortfall, but is instead taken up as a 
moment of the economy of truth itself. 
 At the same time, this ‘errant’ wandering does not occur against the backdrop 
of a fixed ‘idea’ or truth. Errancy is not merely a consequence of Dasein’s finitude, 
such that from a higher, extra-human perspective, the truth of being might be stated 
in ahistorical terms. Rather, being is essentially self-concealing. It can never be 
rendered fully present, but rather constitutes an excess over all horizons of presence. 
It is for this reason that the errant history of being remains essentially open—since a 
new ‘destining of being’ always remains possible. It is thanks to being’s self-
concealment that thought can never be other than errant, and that being is essentially 
historical. 
With regards the question of the ‘incubation time’ of Heidegger’s thought, I 
take it that there remains the residue of the idea of an epistemological shortfall. It is 
true that for Heidegger, the errancy of thought’s history is nothing that can be 
overcome inasmuch as it belongs essentially to the economy of truth. Nonetheless, 
Heidegger cannot avoid claiming a certain privilege for his own thinking, which is 
taken to overcome the limitations of the first beginning, from which he maintains a 
critical distance.  
 Indeed, as we saw in part one of this chapter, Heidegger is strikingly close to 
Kant on this score. He goes to great lengths to insist that the first beginning is not 
simply the product of a ‘mistake’ on thought’s part. Rather, the withdrawal of being 
could only become apparent over the course of a long history. It is only at the point 
of being’s most extreme withdrawal that a genuine relation to truth can be 
established. This echoes Kant’s notion that the critical method only becomes possible 
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after metaphysics has passed through the stages of dogmatism and skepticism, and 
once the limits of reason have been rendered explicit.  
 Certainly, there are clear differences between Kant and Heidegger. The 
passage through the first beginning is not a matter of rendering clear a disjunction 
between human cognition and being; rather, it plays out immanently in the economy 
of being. As a result, the first beginning is not simply a matter of ‘errors.’ Yet the fact 
remains that the first beginning has always ‘erred past the mystery.’  
We saw above that Heidegger’s notion of errancy remains ambiguous. I take 
it that this ambiguity reflects his aim to show simultaneously both that philosophy’s 
past is nothing false, and yet to maintain a critical distance from it. Above all, I take 
it that Heidegger’s notion of an ‘other beginning’ holds within it the promise of a 
kind of errancy that would not be marked by Dasein’s ‘in-sistence.’  
 In the conclusion to this thesis, we return to our account of the way in which 
Heidegger’s distinction between the first and other beginnings ultimately distorts his 
project of a history of being begun in section 4.9 above. Nonetheless, we suggest that 
in the wake of his failings, the task of philosophy is not simply to abandon the idea 
of a history of being, but rather to renew the question of the relation between error 
and history, and so to pose the question of the ontological status of the past beyond 
the limitations of Heidegger’s project.  
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Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
In the preceding, I traced an historical development in philosophy’s attitude towards 
its own past. We saw how four major thinkers from the Western tradition understood 
their own relation to the tradition which preceded them—beginning with a gesture of 
exclusion, and moving through a series of approaches in which the line dividing first 
philosophy from the history of philosophy became increasingly blurred. Furthermore, 
I showed how in each case, the status of philosophy’s past was reflected in the status 
attributed to error by each thinker.  
In the first chapter, we saw how Descartes commences his project by 
suspending all appeal to the authority of the tradition. While he does not dismiss the 
tradition out of hand, I argued that implicitly, Descartes can only account for 
historical difference—the contradictory positions defended throughout the history of 
philosophy—by appeal to the concept of error. Turning to his fourth meditation, I 
showed how his attitude toward the tradition is reflected in his account of the ground 
of error. Errors arise due to the fact that human thought is positioned ‘inter deum et 
nihil’—between divinity on the one hand, and the nothing on the other. This means 
that for Descartes, historical difference is rigorously excluded from the economy of 
truth. It is the product simply of a shortfall from truth, and as such, philosophy need 
not engage with it. The history of philosophy is conceived as a contingent errant 
wandering, whose content need be of no concern to contemporary philosophy. We 
argued that this position remains prominent in a large proportion of contemporary 
philosophy.    
 In the second chapter, we saw that Kant repeats Descartes’ gesture of treating 
the history of philosophy as the product of a tendency towards error. Yet in contrast 
to Descartes, Kant argued that these errors were not a product of sheer contingency. 
Rather, they arose naturally from a disjunction between the economy of human 
cognition on the one hand, and the economy of truth on the other. It was only by 
passing through the errors arising from this disjunction that the proper scope of 
human cognition could become clear. This allowed Kant to take account of the 
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specific content of the history of Western metaphysics, albeit within certain strict 
confines.  
In spite of their differences, we claimed that Descartes and Kant both 
ultimately reduce historical difference to the product of an epistemological shortfall. 
The ‘incubation period’ of their respective systems was merely the matter of the 
overcoming of error, and one which, but for the right method, might have been leapt 
over. The past is thus rendered superfluous to truth—even as it was a necessary 
precondition of critique for Kant.    
 In the third chapter, we examined Hegel’s onto-logical account of the history 
of philosophy. Among the thinkers considered here, Hegel constitutes a major 
exception, inasmuch as he does not treat historical difference as a product of error. 
We showed how in lieu of such a concept of error, Hegel appeals to the idea of a 
form of negativity immanent to truth as the ground of thought’s historicity. We 
argued that his much-maligned claim concerning a parallel between his history of 
philosophy on the one hand, and his Logic on the other, in fact constitutes a major 
component of his philosophical system. Ultimately, we showed that Hegel 
subordinates philosophy’s past to his own onto-logical account of the idea, rendering 
an engagement with the past superfluous to the tasks of first philosophy. 
Nonetheless, we claimed that Hegel’s account of the history of philosophy 
constitutes the most extensive engagement with the past in the history of Western 
philosophy. Furthermore, many of his critics simply relapse into a Cartesian position, 
rather than attempting to find a way of doing justice to the autonomy of the past.  
 Finally, in chapter four, we turned to an examination of Heidegger’s ‘history 
of being.’ It would seem that Heidegger’s notion of a history of being gives us a way 
of considering the past without simply dismissing it as error, as had Descartes and 
Kant, but equally while avoiding the Hegelian gesture of treating it in terms of a 
logic of presence. Heidegger’s conception of errancy implies that all thought is 
intrinsically ‘errant,’ in the sense of being without any ground in the logic of 
presence. The history of thought is a history of being itself. 
 Nonetheless, we suggested that Heidegger ultimately subordinates his project 
of a history of being to his prioritising of the question of the future. This found 
expression in an ambiguity inherent to his conception of errancy. In the next two 
sections, we consider this limitation of Heidegger’s project in more detail, before 
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turning in the final section to a consideration of the prospects for a renewal of the 
question concerning the relationship between errancy and historicity.  
 
5.2 Heidegger’s Failure I 
 
The publication of the so-called ‘Black Notebooks’401 beginning in 2014 has seen a 
renewed focus on the question of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, both within academic 
circles and in the German and international mainstream media.  While it had 
previously already been the subject of extensive scrutiny, the content of the 
Notebooks forced a confrontation with the issue that had all too frequently been 
swept aside.  
 This thesis has not explicitly engaged with the Notebooks, nor has it sought to 
develop an exhaustive account of Heidegger’s position. Rather, our focus has been 
on whether his notions of the history of being and errancy allow us to raise the 
question of philosophy’s past in terms other than those of epistemological failure. Yet 
the Notebooks have made it unequivocally clear that Heidegger’s own understanding 
of the ‘history of being’ is inseparably intertwined with both his anti-Semitism and 
the privilege he affords to the Greek-German ‘destiny’ of Western thought. Peter 
Trawny thus speaks of Heidegger’s ‘being-historical anti-Semitism;’402 and 
Donatella Di Cesare refers to Heidegger’s ‘metaphysical anti-Semitism’—a term that 
is in no way intended to ‘soften’ Heidegger’s anti-Semitism through qualification, 
but rather to convey the fact that is not solely a product of his political commitments, 
but rather permeates the very heart of his thought.403   
 We noted in the introduction to this thesis that the association of history and 
error has its roots in the concept of historia stultitiae from early Christian 
philosophy, which ‘makes a nullifying value judgment on tradition, but it thereby 
keeps it as the history of the aberrations of the human mind, in order to show the 
weakness of that mind when left solely to the light of its own reason.’404 The early 
Christian philosophers needed a way of excluding pre-Christian, ‘pagan’ thought 
 
401 Heidegger, GA 94-97.  
402 See Peter Trawny, Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy, (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2015), p. 18 ff. 
403 See Donatella Di Cesare, Heidegger, die Juden, die Shoah (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2016), 
p. 9.  
404 Gueroult., p. 576. 
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from any claims to absolute truth—even as they continued to draw on the Greek 
tradition in their own thought.  
 In defining philosophy’s relation to its own past, the concept of error has 
frequently been invoked as a means of exclusion. This exclusion can occur along 
purely ‘theoretical’ lines—the dismissal of thinkers or schools of thought as simply 
misguided in contrast to one’s own position. Yet more often than not, they have 
occurred along political, ethnic, linguistic, cultural or theological lines. In the 
Christian tradition, the notion of error was invoked to relegate all which had 
preceded it to a space prior to history, a time prior to time proper.  
  Heidegger’s notion that errancy does not constitute an excess over the 
economy of truth, but is instead inscribed at the very heart of truth, would seem to 
provide the means to fundamentally disarm any such exclusionary gestures. For it 
suggests that philosophy’s past has never been a matter of contingent falsehoods, but 
of a manifestation of an ongoing history of being. To engage with a past thinker is 
thus at one and the same time to engage with the truth of being, such that their 
thought cannot simply be dismissed as ‘mistaken.’   
 Yet on Heidegger’s account, the ‘history of being’ is by no means coextensive 
with the history of thought as such. Indeed, it has a concrete beginning, and is 
founded on a series of exclusionary gestures as rigorous as that of the early Christian 
tradition. For Heidegger too, there is a time ‘prior’ to history proper. Even as he 
treats the past as the past of being, this past is cast within limits as arbitrary as they 
are absolute. 
 One need not turn to the Black Notebooks to find evidence of this 
exclusionary gesture. In section 4 of ET, Heidegger claims that ‘the ek-sistence of 
historical man begins at that moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand 
with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what are beings?’405 Though 
posed here in abstract terms, Heidegger goes on to reveal that this first question 
concerning being is located at a concrete point in time and in the world, in ancient 
Greece, where being as a whole reveal itself as ‘physis.’ He continues: ‘The 
primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, 
 
405 ET, p. 126. 
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and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a ‘time’ 
which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure.’406  
  The ‘primordial disclosure of being as a whole,’ the open region, and with 
them the history of being, commence only with the beginning of Western history—
and specifically, a one-sided version of Western history that has its roots exclusively 
in Greece. The ‘time’ in which this beginning occurs is ‘immeasurable,’ precisely 
because it marks the origin of time proper, and can only be gestured toward as an 
absolute beginning. While Heidegger would certainly not deny the existence of a 
‘history’ preceding Greece in the banal, ‘ontic’ sense of the term, for him, this can no 
longer a question of the history of being. To ask after this past prior to the proper past 
of Western thought is no longer to pose an ontological question, and as such does not 
belong to the remit of philosophy as Heidegger understands it.  
 Furthermore, Heidegger’s exclusionary gesture is not solely defined in terms 
of a temporal division into a ‘before’ and ‘after.’ Rather, his history of being also 
distinguishes between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside.’ Just as much of the Christian 
tradition has drawn a distinction between those belonging to the Christian tradition 
and contemporary ‘heathen’ cultures which fall outside of its history, Heidegger 
constructs his history of being along geographical, political and cultural lines. Not 
only does Heidegger privilege texts written in Greek and German. Furthermore, he 
saw the future of the German people—and with it, the history of being—beset by 
threats on all sides, in the form of Americanism, bolshevism, Judaism and 
Christianity.407 
 How does Heidegger explain this exclusion at a conceptual level? If he rejects 
the ‘metaphysical’ exclusion of thought’s past under the heading of error, by what 
means does he seek to justify his own exclusionary gesture?  
 As we saw in the final chapter, Heidegger claims in ET that human beings are 
structurally errant. Nonetheless, this errancy goes hand in hand with the possibility of 
the ‘glimpse into the mystery out of errancy.’ Even where Dasein is ‘turned away’ 
from being, in-sisting on beings in their presence, there remains an implicit tension 
 
406 Ibid., p. 127. 
407 For a more exhaustive account of these various ‘outside’ moments, see Peter Trawny, ‘The 
Universal and Annihilation: Heidegger’s Being-Historical Anti-Semitism’ in Andrew J. Mitchell and 
Peter Trawny (eds), Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: Responses to Anti-Semitism, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017), pp. 1-17. Trawny suggests they can be grouped together under the heading of 
what he calls the ‘universal topography.’  
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between concealment and unconcealment. In this way, Dasein is always poised 
between these two moments, even where concealment withdraws and is apparently 
lost from view altogether. As such, however far Dasein may stray into errancy, 
Dasein remains in truth, and the possibility of both an authentic relation to truth and 
a new event of truth remain open. It is thanks to this tension that humanity is 
genuinely historical—that is to say, not merely caught up in the causal chains of 
‘historiological’ events, but rather open to the transformations of the open region. 
 Heidegger associates the figure of ‘the Jew’ with the dissolution of this 
tension. For Heidegger, the present historical moment is defined by an increasing 
forgetting of the mystery, the ‘oblivion’ of being. Judaism is attributed a specific role 
in this forgetting. Not only is Judaism—like Americanism, bolshevism and a whole 
series of other figures—turned away from the mystery. Rather, Heidegger claims that 
this turning away from the mystery is the very essence of Judaism. We might thus 
speak of a form of human existence that is purely in-sistent. If the German people 
promise the possibility of a renewed a ‘glimpse of the mystery,’ ‘the Jew’ is the one 
who remains structurally turned away from the mystery. In an entry in the Black 
Notebooks from 1939, he writes:  
 
The occasional increase in the power of Judaism is grounded in the fact that Western 
metaphysics, especially in its modern evolution, offered the point of attachment for 
the expansion of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, and these 
thereby created for themselves an abode in the “spirit” without ever being able, on 
their own, to grasp the concealed decisive domains.408 
 
According to Heidegger, Judaism ‘increases in power’ as the calculating rationality 
of the modern age spreads. Where the culmination of Western metaphysics 
constitutes a forgottenness of being with the possibility of a redemption, a turning 
back towards being, for Heidegger, Judaism fulfils its essence in in-sistence. ‘The 
 
408 Ponderings XII–XV: Black Notebooks 1939–1941, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2017),  p. 67.  
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Jew’ is ‘without history’ because Judaism is completely abandoned to beings in their 
presence.409 
 In this way, I believe that we can speak of the absolute errancy of ‘the Jew’ in 
Heidegger’s thought. This is not a term he himself employs, and for essential 
reasons. For much of his project hinges on the argument that errancy has been 
misinterpreted in the metaphysical tradition as something purely negative. At the 
opening of this thesis, we cited his claim that:  
 
We have no logic of error, no real clarification of its essence, because we always take 
error as negative. This is the fundamental error that dominates the entire history of 
the concept of truth.410 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that in his post-BT writings, Heidegger attempts to 
develop a new logic of error. He argues that errancy is not a mistake or a deficit, but 
an essential moment of being. Yet Heidegger excludes ‘the Jew’ from this economy 
of truth. As such, in a seminar course from 1933-34, rather than labelling ‘the Jew’ as 
‘errant,’ he uses the term ‘nomadic.’411 His choice of words here is extremely 
revealing—and not solely in its echo of existing anti-Semitic tropes. For the term 
‘nomadic’ is proximate in meaning to errancy, suggesting a wandering or a straying 
from the right path (or perhaps better: the utter lack of any such path). It allows 
Heidegger to attribute to Judaism all of the negative traits that the tradition associated 
with errancy, while at the same time reserving ‘errancy’ as a positive term in his own 
conception of truth. Heidegger thus subverts the metaphysical conception of errancy, 
while at the same time repeating the exclusionary gesture of the metaphysical 
tradition, by means of which whole moments of history are effaced from history 
‘proper.’  
For Heidegger, being ‘nomadic’ means being structurally abandoned to 
beings in their presence. It means being without a world, and without history. For 
 
409 As Di Cesare puts it, the ‘Jew’ is not simply excluded from Western history, but rather from being. 
Donatella Di Cesare, Heidegger, die Juden, die Shoah (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2016), p. 
135-6. 
410 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 177. 
411 Martin Heidegger, Nature, History, State, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 56; cited in Peter Trawny, Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy, 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 115. 
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history proper takes place as the interplay of concealment and errancy in the open 
region, an interplay from which Judaism is structurally excluded. A string of other 
terms applied to Judaism—such as worldlessness,412 or ‘Entwurzelung,’413 can 
equally be understood as an expression of Judaism’s absolute distance from the truth 
qua concealment.  
This means that for Heidegger, Judaism does not merely fall outside of the 
history of being, but furthermore is actively destructive of it. It is for this reason that, 
as Di Cesare puts it, he sees the Jew as the ‘metaphysical enemy.’414  
Thus, although Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, i.e. of the first 
beginning, is never a matter of dismissing ‘errors,’ Heidegger excludes various 
moments from this first beginning. There is an ‘outside’ of the history of thought 
which is simply dismissed out of hand. While on one level, he rejects the notion of 
absolute error as a means of explaining historical difference, on another, he continues 
to appeal to it in order to define the limits of his own history of being. If the past is to 
be taken seriously, then it is only one version of the past, to the violent and arbitrary 
exclusion of all others.  
We noted above that there is a tension between Heidegger’s notion of errancy 
as the errancy of being on the one hand, and errancy as Dasein’s ‘in-sistence’ on the 
other. Heidegger’s exclusion of ‘the Jew’ is the most extreme and morally 
reprehensible example of the way in which Heidegger exploits this ambiguity in 
order to exclude certain moments from his history of being; but it is far from being 
the only one. Indeed, even within the first beginning, Heidegger distinguishes 
between moments which tend towards a genuine relation to being, and those which 
contribute towards a gradual decline, culminating in modern metaphysics. Within the 
fold of the first beginning, the possibility of redemption remains. Nonetheless, 
Heidegger’s readings are shaped by his will to exclude certain moments, and to take 
a critical distance from the metaphysical tradition. We saw above that Gadamer 
argues that Heidegger’s orientation towards the ‘other beginning’ led to increasingly 
critical readings of figures in the tradition, in which his readings of Plato and others 
 
412 Ponderings VII–XI: Black Notebooks 1938–1939, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2017), p. 76. 
413 GA 96, p. 243. 
414 Donatella Di Cesare, Heidegger, die Juden, die Shoah (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2016), p. 
129. 
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were shaped not by a desire to understand them as manifestations of being’s 
historicity, but rather as evidence of a decline to be rectified by a mode of thinking 
yet to come.  
Might we assume that an alternative approach might have been possible—one 
which could have taken Judaism, and a range of other excluded cultures, to have 
constituted not mere strayings from the economy of truth, but rather as a form of 
ontological errancy? And one which would not have bracketed the first beginning as 
a history caught between two forms of errancy? I take it that this is the task which we 
face in the wake of Heidegger’s thought. 
 
5.3 Heidegger’s Failure II 
  
Heidegger’s history of being is thus from the very beginning founded on a gesture of 
exclusion, which permeates all of his writings on the history of being. Even those 
moments ‘sanctioned’ as belonging to the history of being are at the same time held 
at arm’s length, and are interpreted not simply as the history of the manifestations of 
the truth of being, but equally evidence of a decline in the history of the West.  
 Heidegger’s gesture of exclusion is considerably more violent than, for 
example, Hegel’s. To see this, we need only consider the logic behind this exclusion, 
or rather the fundamental lack of any such logic. For it seems there is no rule to 
Heidegger’s selection of his privileged texts, or of historical moments to be 
excluded, other than his political convictions.  
 By contrast, in Hegel’s case, we can discern a clear logic behind his history 
of philosophy. This potentially gives us a normative means by which to perform an 
‘Hegelian’ critique of Hegel, examining moments that fall outside the scope of his 
own history of philosophy, and showing how they reflect either moments in Hegel’s 
own ontology, or even how they highlight gaps in this system which nonetheless 
cohere with its own logic.415 
 By contrast, there is no normative standard in Heidegger’s history of being to 
which we could appeal. For our purposes, this renders his entire ‘history of being’ 
philosophically irrelevant. Further research into it can only hope to further explore 
 
415 Hegel himself was keen to emphasize that his Logic was inevitably incomplete, wishing he might 
have been afforded the leisure ‘to revise it seven and seventy times.’ SL, p. 42. 
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his personal prejudices, such that it can be of no interest other than as a privileged 
example of how not to engage with philosophy’s past. Certainly, his individual 
readings of those thinkers who meet with his approval are often exemplary of how 
we can approach the past texts.416 Yet his conception of the ‘narrative’ of history, and 
the means by which he distinguishes the inside from the outside, is without 
foundation.   
 Nonetheless, the core idea of a ‘history of being’ remains one which any 
investigation into philosophy’s relation to its past cannot fail to take seriously. 
Indeed, far from being an idiosyncrasy of Heidegger’s thought, we have shown in 
this thesis that it marks a kind of culmination of a broader development within the 
philosophical tradition. Above all, it points towards a way in which historical 
difference might be thought in ontological terms, even where Heidegger himself 
failed to do so. 
 What led Heidegger to shrink back from his insight? Answering this question 
in detail would take us too far from our central question, which is concerned not 
primarily with a reading of Heidegger, but with the question of how we can approach 
philosophy’s past. Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that Heidegger’s failing 
ultimately hinges on a fundamental distinction which we drew in the introduction to 
this thesis, namely, between an ontological and a Nietzschean ethical orientation to 
the past.  
 I take it Heidegger’s thought is characterised by a profound tension between 
these two approaches. Heidegger is at his furthest from Nietzsche when he suggests 
that the past is not a matter of epistemological error (nor of illusion, lies, fables, and 
the chain of related terms Nietzsche employs). As we saw in the final chapter, 
Heidegger’s thought points the way towards an ontological question concerning 
historical difference and the past that remains absent in Nietzsche’s approach. 
Yet I take it that Heidegger’s orientation towards an ‘other beginning’ sees 
him ultimately adopt a Nietzschean ethical attitude towards history. It is clear that at 
least from BT onwards, Heidegger privileges the future over the other moments of 
 
416 Indeed, Levinas notes that ‘In Heidegger there is a new way, direct, of conversing with 
philosophers and asking for absolutely current teachings from the great classics. Of course, the 
philosopher of the past does not directly involve himself in the dialogue; there is an entire work of 
interpretation to accomplish in order to render him current. But in this hermeneutic one does not 
manipulate outworn things, one brings back the unthought to thought and saying.’ Emmanuel Levinas, 
Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1995), p. 43-44.  
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temporality. His project of a ‘history of being’ is thus not ultimately oriented towards 
reconciling philosophy to its past, but rather, towards a new kind of break with the 
past, which will usher in a new era of history. As he puts it in CP, his task in his 
thinking of the ‘history of being’ is primarily that of preparing the way for the ‘future 
ones’ who ‘who bear the staff of the truth of beyng.’417 These ‘future ones’ will not 
simply be the next moments of the ongoing history of being, but rather will constitute 
a break with the first beginning. Ultimately, this will mean that the history of the first 
beginning comes to a close, and a new modality of history will commence.   
 From this perspective, it is clear that Heidegger’s concern with the 
ontological status of the past is secondary to this concern for the future. As such, his 
readings in philosophy are ultimately subordinated to a question about a future yet to 
come—and specifically, the future that is the destiny solely of the German people, in 
their heroic struggle against the ‘Jewish world conspiracy,’ along with Americanism, 
Bolshevism, and a series of further excluded moments. This is sufficient to justify 
whole currents of thought’s past that are deemed detrimental not merely to the future, 
but to this Germanic future. The exclusionary gesture—and with it, the implicit 
conception of ‘absolute errancy’ discussed above—can be understood as products of 
this Nietzschean, ethical orientation toward the past.418 I thus take it that what we 
have called Heidegger’s ‘first failing’ is rooted in this second failure—i.e. in his 
thoroughgoing subordination of the question of the past to that of the future—and not 
just any future, but a future which is treated always as the specific destiny of the 
German people. Thus, while for Heidegger, it is only through an engagement with 
the first beginning that preparations can be made for the other beginning, this 
engagement is concerned not with doing justice to the past, but rather with the aim of 
preparing a (German) history yet to come. As such, the ontological question 
concerning the past remains inadequately posed in Heidegger’s thought.419  
 
 
417 CP, p. 313.  
418 In CP, Heidegger goes as far as to suggest that ‘previously, the human being was never historical,’ 
but only ‘had’ a history. See CP, p. 387. I take it that Heidegger’s point here is that . The only 
‘genuine’ history will be the one to come, which is attained through what Vallega-Neu calls a ‘more 
originary insertion into history.’ But this implies that the past was not properly historical.  
419 Ibid. 
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5.4 Prospects 
 
In the wake of the publication of the Black Notebooks, Badiou’s call to ‘forget the 
forgetting of forgetting’420—and thereby to move out of the long shadow cast by 
Heidegger’s thought—is doubly compelling. Nonetheless, I believe it would be 
mistaken to take this as a reason to follow Badiou in divorcing first philosophy from 
the history of philosophy. There can be no question that continental philosophy must 
seek to move beyond Heidegger—yet this is a process which has in any case long 
been underway. The question remains as to how this step beyond Heidegger should 
proceed.  
 Specifically: should it entail the rejection of the idea of an errant history of 
being as a way for philosophy to approach the past? Or should it rather constitute a 
rejection of the Nietzschean side of Heidegger project, and the exclusionary gestures 
which go along with it? Are we to reject the obligation for philosophy to take account 
of its past, an obligation which Heidegger himself never fully realised, but merely 
hinted at in his idea of a history of being? Or should philosophy commit to 
developing an account of the past that is not subordinated to a future that is yet to 
come? 
The question of the legacy of the ‘history of being’ is thus by no means 
simply identical with the question of Heidegger’s legacy. The history of being has 
long since been taken up and transformed by, among others, the deconstructive 
tradition. Furthermore, we have shown that Heidegger’s own notion of errancy has 
its roots in a long tradition of questioning concerning philosophy’s history, of which 
Descartes, Kant and Hegel are only three privileged representatives. Heidegger 
himself rarely acknowledges this debt, preferring to suggest that the question of error 
had never been adequately raised prior to his own thought. I take it that philosophy 
must seek to wrest this question from Heidegger’s possession, and his idiosyncratic 
and violent understanding of history, and confront its core questions anew. What 
would a philosophy look like which takes the ontological question of the past 
 
420 Alain Badiou, Conditions (London: Continuum, 2008) p. 5; see section 0.1 above. 
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seriously, without subordinating it to the question of the future, or making a violent 
gesture of exclusion? 
 There is no doubt that first philosophy will, for the most part, continue to be 
conducted in relative isolation from the question of its past. Nonetheless, Badiou’s 
prescriptions confront us with a pressing question which cannot be sidestepped: Are 
we willing to embrace the idea that the past is nothing but a matter of error? To do so 
would be to revert to a Cartesian perspective.421 Now certainly, the attempts of Kant, 
Hegel and Heidegger to take account of philosophy’s past were flawed. Yet the 
question is whether the way past these flaws is to reject their efforts to take account 
of the past as fundamentally misguided, or to renew this line of questioning in the 
name of a more adequate approach to the past.  
 I argued at the end of chapter three that Hegel’s major contribution to the 
question of philosophy’s past was to disarm the traditional gesture of simply 
dismissing the past in terms of error. I take it that Hegel’s arguments are compelling, 
and that Badiou offers no rebuttal of them, other than his ‘ethical’ concern with a 
renewal of philosophy.  
 Indeed, Badiou remains ultimately Nietzschean in this regard. The past can be 
useful; but we are equally free to dismiss it where it is deemed to hinder our own 
progress. As we claimed in the introduction, Nietzsche’s position implies the 
ontological question of the past, but rejects it in favour of the ethical orientation 
towards the future. If we are to raise the question concerning the past, it can only be 
by rejecting this orientation. Kant, Hegel and Heidegger all offer indications of the 
form that that this might take.  
 I take it that the deconstructive and hermeneutic schools which rose to 
prominence in the twentieth century constitute an attempt to retain Heidegger’s 
insights on the status of the past, while moving beyond the limits of his own history 
of being. While in practice, they remained fundamentally concerned with readings in 
the history of Western philosophy, they actively promoted a move beyond these 
bounds, and an opening of philosophy to other traditions. As in Hegel’s case, there is 
no theoretical limit to their geographical or cultural bounds. 
 
421 Badiou identifies himself as a Cartesian in this regard. See Alain Badiou, Conditions (London: 
Continuum, 2008) p. 5. 
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These traditions are above all concerned with the praxis of reading the 
tradition. I take it that they are not to be understood as belonging to the ‘sub-
discipline’ of the history of philosophy, but are carried out in the spirit of recognizing 
that one cannot step ‘behind’ philosophy’s history and pose a question in abstraction 
from it.  
 Nonetheless, the question concerning the connection between historicity and 
errancy, and with it the question concerning the ontological status of the past, is not 
picked up within this tradition.422 Although an engagement with the past continues in 
practice, its theoretical foundations remain underdetermined.  
 Without renewing this question, I take it that the deconstructive and 
hermeneutic traditions risk being written off as a ‘subset’ of philosophy, a kind of 
engagement with past texts which refuses the tasks of first philosophy. I take it that a 
defence of the deconstructive mode of engaging with philosophy’s past must take the 
form of confronting Badiou’s challenge directly by renewing the question of the 
ontological status of the past.423  
The question concerning the past cannot be approached solely in abstract 
terms. Rather, it can only be adequately raised by allowing the distinction between 
‘first philosophy’ and the history of philosophy to break down—operating at the 
point where philosophy ceases to hold its past at bay as the product of mere error, 
and instead embraces its own historicity. For its part, the approach taken in this thesis 
to reading past thinkers is intended as a step in this direction.  
 
  
 
422 Derrida’s 1964-65 seminar Derrida, Jacques Heidegger: The Question of Being and History 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), cited on various occasions throughout this thesis, 
make it clear that he was aware of the significance of the status of error in relation to the question of 
historicity. A study dedicated to the status of error in Derrida’s corpus would be a fruitful way of 
further developing the project pursued in the above pages.    
423 The question of the relation of philosophy to its past was one of the core subjects in a debate 
between Alain Badiou and Jean-Luc Nancy which took place at the Universität der Kunste in Berlin in 
2016, the proceeds of which were published in English in 2018. The debate did not, however, 
explicitly address the concept of error. See Alain Badiou and Jean-Luc Nancy, German Philosophy: A 
Dialogue, ed. by Jan Völker, trans. by Richard Lambert (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018). Nancy also 
engages Badiou on this topic in Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Philosophy Without Conditions,’ in Peter Hallward 
(ed.), Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2004). 
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